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ABSTRACT 
The nenerCl1 theme of the work is to revi e,·/ the 
recent econoMic reforms in the COMECON Easte:~ Europeo Besi 
discussing the nature and inevitability of economic re~orrns 
in these countries, it attempts to show that contrary to the 
opi n i on of many wri ters on thi s subject, these economi c reforms 
do not indicate the be9inninn of the end of socialismo It also 
attempts to dra\,1 certain con c1us ions for deve1opi n9 count ri es 
in qeneral and to India in particular, in the light recent 
reforms in the Cm,1ECI1N Eastern Europe. 
To beqin \t/ith there is a brief discussion on the merits 
of private enterprise followed by an account of its workin9 in 
the contemporary world. The theoritical advantages of Socialism 
are examined in the liqht of the contributions of soci ist 
thinkers like Oscar Lanqe and Kalecki. 
Chapter II is mainly concerned with the theory of 
economic reforms. While analysino the economic performances 
of the Cm1ECON countri es of Eas tern Europe, it exp lares the 
reasons for the failure of the socialist system to develop in 
the manner assuMed by theory. This is followed by an examination 
of various sU~Qested economic reforms and their compatability 
with socialist theories. 
i i 
Chapter III is devoted to a critical examination of 
econoMic reforms in the COMECON Eastern Europe. A survey 
economic reforms in these countries with special reference to 
Pl ann"j no and ~1an~qement, Pri ces, t~aCles and producti vi ty ; s 
attempted. The effects of economic reforms with reference to the 
rate of economi c r1rowth, per capita income, economi c fl uctuati ons , 
impact of profi t and ~/aqes on product", vi ty and new problems 1i 1\,:­
unemployment and fluctuations are studied. As an outlook for 
the future, the problems and prospects of these countries are 
also examined. 
Chapter IV briefly discusses the lessons of economic 
reforms in these countries, for developinfl countries with special 
reference to India. These lessons are examined with reference to 
recent political changes in India, after explainino its 
experience with mixed economy principles which have been in 
voque for the past twenty five years. 
FOREWORD 
While analysing a controversial topic s 
the writer came across a relatively large number of articles 
and works by many eminent authors criticizing the actual 
working of the socialist planning mechanism. One can hardly 
wonder why this is so. The reforms adopted before and after 
1965 bear testimony to a certain extent to this. Even the 
socialist writers do not anymore believe in lone answer l to 
all problems. Most of the western writers do not seem to 
appreciate the positive aspects of socialist planning, 
probably because such lessons are of little use to a mature 
developed economy. Nevertheless, there are certain positive 
aspects worth learning from the experiences of these countries 
This is especially so with reference to developing countries 
like India. This becomes more relevant when one compares 
performances of China and India. Though the present writer 
;s fully aware of the problems of socialist planning methods, 
the present work is more aimed to see the positive aspects 
and draw certain conclusions concerning India's economic 
development, rather than to add one more drop in the ocean 
of criticisms which are already in store. 
No acknowledqement can qive full appreciation to all 
those who have helped the writer in his endevour. Many must 
perforce remain unmentioned. 
The writer isqreatly indebted to Dr. K.J.Charles, 
Professor of Economics, the supervisor of this thesis, for his 
immense help riaht from the beainninq. Several passanes in this 
thesis wera completely rewritten at his suo~estion, insistano 
and dictation. \~hile the writer profusely acknowledaes the same, 
the writer alone is responsible for the errors that remain. 
The writer is also qreatly indebted to Dr. C.A.lJecchinis, Professor 
and Chairman, Department of Economics for his timely and sustained 
help. The writer takes this opportunity to thank all the learned 
members of the faculty for their advice and especially Dr. ~. Kondor, 
for his valuable suqqestions. Last but not the least, thanks are 
due to Mrs. Patty Drew, who tolerated the wri terl s presence in 
willinqly sharino the physi.cal facilities of the department. 
The writer considers it as a qreat honour to dedi 
this humble effort to his mother Smt. V. Saraswathi, with the hope 
that the writer may some day write a treatise more worthy of r 
sacrifice. 
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CHAPTER I 
The 'ISM's 
Mr. X saw what he expected
Breakdowns in Transportation 
A growing indignation
with Communist oppression.
A steady retro~ression 
to chaos bloody and red 
Just as he had always said. 
The sights that Y sele6ted 
Bore out what he expected.
Great factories arisinq,
An enthusiasm surprising 
for welfare and education 
A new world in formation 
much better than the old 
Just as he foretold. * 
* Michael Ellman, ECON()~nC REFORr,1 IN'THE SOVIET UN'ION , London: 
P.E.P. Broadsheet 509 April, 1969. 
Maurice Dobb years aqo stated that 'the question of 
what was the nature and what were the movina forces of the decline 
of Feudalism as an economic system, and what connection had this 
decline with the birth of modern ~apitalism is not entirely without 
interest, I think, for many under developed count.ries , •1 In the 
writer's opinion, the insertion of the words 'socialism' for 
'feudalism ' and the "Jord 'modern socialism' for I capitalsim' 
in the above statement provide a better description of contemporary 
reality,for today socialism has given birth to modern socialism 
instead of communism. The study of the nature of socialism and what 
were the moving forces of the decl i ne of soci al ism and the connecti on 
betv/een thei r decl i ne and the bi rth of rnodern soci ali sm is not 
without interest. This study examines the recent economic reforms 
in Eastern Europe 2 and the nature and dynamics of the present 
system with a view to drawing lessons useful to developinq economies 
in thei r attempt to attai n rap.; d qrowth. 
1. Dobb Maurice, Lectures delivered at the Institute of Statistics 
of the University of Bolo~na on March 24, 1962 and published in 
Italian STATISTICA April-June 1962, Anno XXII, No.2, and reproduced 
in PAPEnS ON CAPITALISf1, DEVELOPt~ENT AND PLANNINA, London: Routledoe 
& Keqan Paul Ltd., 1967, p.l. 
2. Centrally Planned COMECON e'ountries of Eastern Europe. 
(1) 
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The first use of the term socialism can be traced as 
early as 1826, thouqh it became established in the 1830s. Since 
1917 when the first socialist state was formed after the Russian re­
volution, to date, socialist countries are on the increase thouah 
strictly speakino there are only fourteen countries officially 
considered as socialist and controlled by the Communist party. 
There are many developin~ countries today which t while not fully 
socialist have borrowed many features of this system. The workin~ 
of these socialist countries has inf1uenced many of the trad~t~1nal 
capitalist countries. Since ~he Keynesian revolution more emphasis 
is placed on macro studies and problems of qrowth and welfare 
have also forced them to think on a macro level. Mainly as a 
result of this chanoed perspective these capitalist countries 
have adopted some kind of plannin~ like 'indicative', 'frame·, 'ooal I, 
•structural , or 'reqional', to more effectively tackle problems of 
unemployment, welfare, price stability, qrowth and so on. There 
has been an increased sphere of rJovernment part; ci pat; on 1 i ke 
anti-trust leqislation, state marketin~ agencies, consumer protection 
etc. There is now increased control of banks via monetary and other 
direct regulations. There are increased controls like price, profit 
and waqe controls. Obviously these are the outcome of the influence 
of the experiences of the socialist countries. 
"Imminent and inevitable death of capitalism has been confidentl 
pronounced several times durinq its turbulent history, but the 
funeral has ah/ays been postponed, confoundino both its critics 
p 
3 
and friends alike. Everytime, capitalism has risen from its death­
bed to enter another phase of its axciting career: 1 Nevertheless, 
the working of the actual capitalist economy is far from text book 
descripti on of free enterpri se.' .'llnfortunately supporters of thi s 
text book free enterprise '-Cpntinue to uphold a·systerrr that no lotr~r 
longer. exi sts ..... We wi 11 not ddi scuss indetai l he're the problems 
of modern capital ism 2 except mentioning two of them. 
It is always imagined that the people even i:n countries like 
~he U.S. and Canada are enjoying fairly high standards.. of 
living. Even though this is true to a great extent, there are many 
people who are living in absolutely deplorable condition) Inequalities 
of income and wealth exist in these countries and with the absence 
of strong family ties or,extended family system and governmentDs 
lack of positive assistance and self centred attitude of the people 
have increased the magnitude of the problem. 
1. 	 Charles, K.J., IThe' Future of Capitalisml. SOUTH;RN ECONOMIST, 
Jan. 1, 1969; p. 1.' 
2. For a good account of modern capitalist practices and the problems 
see recent Government of Canada pUblications.such as: 
a. 	 Dynamic change and Accountability in a Canadian Market Economy 
b. 	 A Proposal for Class Actions Under Competition Policy Legislation 
c. A Study on Consumer Misleading and Unfair Trade Practices Legislation 
for Canada 
d. 	 Studies of Foreign Competition Policy and Practice. 
1. 	The writer has been living with such poor people and ha~ an 
intimate knowledge of their ,material and psychologic.al sufferings. 
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Another important prob 1em is the rronopo 1 i s ti c corporati ons 
of today. ·Commanding a significant degree of monopoly power, the 
gi ant corporation con.tfonts the pr; ces at whi ch it sell s it output
I ' 
and buys its inputs not as objective market data but as magnitudes 
which depend on its own operations and on those of a small number 
of other similarly situated 'concerns. As a vast enterprise not 
necessari·ly identified with any particL.:ar group of individuals l!'lt 
rather thought of by its owners and managers as an everlasting 
entity, it seeks to maximize the flow of profit over a much longer 
planning horizon thd~ a small competitive capitalist can afford to 
take account of. Its dri ve for maximum attainable profits under 
such circumstances no longer involves merely finding the best ways 
to reduce the costs of production of a given commodity or group of 
cOOlmodities. It has to keep under continous review the problem of 
what conmodities to produce - their physical attributes, their outward 
appearance, brand names, etc. Durability and quality have to be 
determined in the light of the firm's other lines of production 
and traditional practices, as well as of the behaviour of other 
suppliers of related or possibly related products. In arriving at 
decisions, it is necessary to weigh advertising and other marketing 
costs; and in fixing the quantities of the various commodities to be 
produced as well as the pri ces to be charged, the shape of all re 1 evan t 
demand and ,marginal revenue curves has to be explored and taken 'into 
account. The qutside world which the competitive capitalist has to 
take for granted not only directly influences the monopolistic 
5 
corporation's production process but is subject to delibrate 

manipulation on its partl, 1 

The net result is obvious. In 7.he working of modern Ifree 
enterprise' there is neither economic I freedom I nor the glorious 
lenterprise' the engine of economic development under capitalism. 
From the theory point of view, the price is not equal to the point 
where Me = MR, violating the necessary condition for Pareto optiP1J91ity .. 
How are then the resources allocated and rewarded optimally? This 
eludes the solution for Irationality'. To quote Baran and Sweezy2. 
again, " ••• that the development of all these sophisticated and 
often genuinely scientific methods for guiding the behaviour of a 
monopolistic or oligopolistic corporation has anything in common 
with a search for the optimal allocation and utilization of society·s 
productive resources, or for that matter even with the partial 
rationality standards which were relevant to the process of commodity 
production under a regime of competitive enterprise. The nature and 
volume of output, the technology employed, the investment undertaken 
the raw materials used, the prices charged - none of these, no matter 
how rational the methods by which they are arrived at, can be thought 
. of as corresponding to the needs of society as a whol e or even as 
1. Baran, P.A., and Sweezy, P.M., uEconomics of Two Worlds" in 
ON POLITICAL ECONOMY AND ECONOMETRICS - ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF OSKAR LANG~ 
Warsaw: P W N and London: Pergamon Press, 1965, p. 19 
2. !.!?.:!!!., p. 20 
6 
reflecting the growth of the forces of production in one of its 

component partsll. 

As ~.oainst these~' problems of capitalisl1\ advantages of social ist 

system1 may be eX'amined: 2 

Production processes are determined by t~e economi c pl an. 
Appeal is made to higher social instincts and profits play., a subdued 
role as ~eans rather than as end. The Il;drket wherever allowed cor 11 tments 
pl anning and forms an useful instrument. 
A great advantage of planning is the maintenance of continued 
full employment with the inbuilt mechanism, planning can aviod over 
production and cyclical fluctuations. 
A socialist economy has a more effective system for 
developmental take-off and sustained rapid growth by virtue of its 
control over the means of prodtlction and macro eaonomic proportions. 
As shown elsewhere the growth rates have been comparatively better 
than capitalist countries. In view of the semi feudal conditions 
inherited, the absence of colonies, the widespread wartime devastation, 
western embargo, and pr~ctically no aid from the capitalist world, 
. their achi evements can be descri bed by objecti ve observers as 
1. See for a detailed analysis of a case for socialism, Oskar Lange, 
liOn the Economic Theory of Socialism ll , ~in Lippincot, B .. E., (ed) 
ON THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF SOCIALSIM, Vol. 2, Univ. of Minnesota Press, 
(fourth printing) 1956, pp. 98-121. 
2. Wi 1czynski ,J., THE ECONOMI CS OF SOCIALISM, Chi cago: Al di ne Publ i shi ng 
company, 1970, pp. 208-218. 
, 
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spectacular. 1 
With virtually no private ownership of the means of production 
or any property, wages and salaries are the only source income" 
Though wage differentials are not ruled out completely, equality of 
real income is maintained by generous benefits out of the soc; 
consumption fund. Though the standard of living is lower than in 
west, thpre are no striking contrasts o. cases of 
Supported by the political and ideological superstructu,'e 
with the primacy of social over private preferences, soc; ali 
state is in a good position to study and apply social cost 
while the neglect of such negative externalities and anti soci 
individualism capitalist society can never op,timize in their location 
or welfare decisions. Moreover, capitalism is known for its 
like artificia.l product obsolescence, unnecessary product 
the unwarrented fragmentation and duplication of equi 
excessive sales personnel, misleading advertising, conspicuous consum... 
ption and production etc. Other kinds of waste incl excess 
caused by recessions, restriction of output, strikes and so on. 
But the picture is not complete without an analysis the 
weaknesses of socialism. 2 There is undue ideological and politi 
dominance of the economic scene. Marxian theories such as labour 
ces 
1. !2iS.~ p. 209. 
2. Ibid. ~ pp. 211-13. 
p 
8 

theory of value overrides economic commonsense. Economic decisions 
are made by political leaders and there are many opponents of 
1i berl i on who regard economi c reforms as of Ire sm 
which should be sabotaged. 
The system is highly bureaucratic and inflexi e. Signi'i'icance 
is not attached to the problems arising at the micro economic 
level, and there is poor correspondence of decision making b 
macro and micro levels. 
The system is liable to errors being corrmi on a 
scale. Central planners are political appointees owing the; success 
to the social set-up in force. Thus their decisions are 1; y 
be biassed. Even otherwise some of their decisions must be arb; 
Erroneous deci si ons ~/hen they were made or rendered erroneous by 
subsequent development when they are taken at the macro 1 
assume large proportions. 
The weakest poi nt of the soci ali st system is at there 
is no rational and workable pricing system& Prices do not refl 
input costs. Different ptices for the same good according to use 
may have some rationality but it does not p for ration 
function. The whole system thus becomes arbitrary. The critics 
often make prices as the major attack since even after introduci 
profitability without flexible prices they may not mean anything 
seri ouslYe 
Lack of competition may promote inefficiency. With prevalence 
of seller's market, no fear of unemployment, well developed soci 
securitYwand wage equality, ~he. capable have limited scope \'/hile 
the . indifferent and inefficient are sheltered by the system. 
> 

Section B Socialist Growth Theories 
There are two essenti a1 forces lf/hi ch speci cal 
the conditions of growth in a socialist system. 1 
a) Socialism creates the possibility and necessity to 
present and solve economic problems on the scale of the national 
economy treated as a whole. According to Oscar Lange2 there occurs 
the it1regration of particular aims i Ito one econom; C (I': m. 
In such conditions, growth - conceived as the basis of an incr"easing 
satisfaction of social needs - can be conciously up as m 
of co-ordinated planned action on the scale of the entire nati 
economy. 
b) Through the nationalization of the means of production 
and the consequent p~tting of the basic resources 
of the community, socialism creates the premises of the on 
of a general economic aim. The allocation of the 
may be affected according to the pl an, with a view to the 
utilization of the existing growth potential, and the aviodance 
of obstacles caused by particular private interests. 
Thus socialism creates, practical possibilities of 
in a high degree the national growth potential, and consequently 
of minimizing the discrepancy between the real and the potent; 
rate::of- growth:jHowever, it should not be concl uded that the nnrcn'1!" 
1. Brus and Laski, 'Problems of Growth and Socialsim l , in 
Robinson, E'-A .. G.. (ed) PROBLEMS IN EGONm4IC DEVELOPMENT, Proceedings
a conference held by the International Economic Association~ 
London: Macmillan &Co. 1965, p.22 
2. See for a detailed account Oskar Lange, Opacit., pp. 142. 
(9 ) 
> 
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is achieved under socialism automatically without difficulties. 1 
Well before the Liberman discussion Kal 2 developed 
his theory of growth with the emphasis on opment of a 
positive theory of dynami csof ~centrally planned economy .. Neverthel 
it also pointed out certain short-comings of so¥iet type planning. 
It challenged certain prepositions such as: a) growth rate 
in'.. estmeot must necessari ly outpace :hat of on income ar 1 
ip~o 6acto, capital formation must increase more dly than 
consumption; and b) the dynamics of technical n'll'l,,"\I"IIV"I".:l1l:" S 1eads to 
a rising organic composition of capital and inevi "Iy always 
entails a more rapid growth of the capital goods 3 
Kalecki singled out and analyzed certain cons 
components and crucial factors governing and limi ng 
processese He argued that to each social system corres an 
appropriate theory of ~rowthQ The same equation for the of 
growth of nat; anal income, shoul d be -j nterpreted in a 
4fashion depending on the soc; system to which it is i 
Brus and Laski, op. ci ,p. 22. 
2. Kalecki, M., 
ECONOMY, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969. The original pol; version 
was published in 1963. 
3. Feiwel, G.R., IIssues in the'Economic Theory of Cap; ism 
Socialism: Michael Kalecki·s Contribution over Four ""'......... v.y'"" 
INDIAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Vol. XX, No.2, Oct-Dec. 1972, po 
4. lb.i.9..., p. 165. 
lSocialist growth models start with the problems of IS 
rather than problems of aggregate effective demand. can 
represented in the lowing ways: a) From the 
current 1abour (1 abour reserves and thei r increase; 1 of 
labour productivity and its changes). Thus, gross national income 
(Y) ;s determined by the product of employment ( producti 
(W~ ned as gross ue added pe employee 
y = Z x W O.CI!O •••••• 090 •• 01l ••• " ( 
The same may be approached from the poi nt of 
(stocks of means of product; on and thei r increase; effecti veness 
of means of production and its changes). Thus the product of 
real xed capital (E) def'ined as gross value added per t of 
ta1 9 ie .. , 
Y :: M x E 81 ., C Q ... 8 IJ ., " a • d " e •• '. G ••• ,. ,. (2) 
On the above basis Kalecki's growth model may exp1 ned 
as follows: In terms of (1) above, 
t:.Y 
r :: = CL + a ( 3)•••••••••••• &0 
y 
Where, 
r is the rate of growth of national income ng the peri t 
1. See for a detailed analysis of the socialist growth theory, 

Brus and Laski, Ope cit., pp. 21-54 and pp. 69-74 and Plotnikov,K.~ 

I Factors Influencing the Economic Development of Socialist es i , 

, pp. 55-69. 
Y is the gross national income at the period t-l 
a is the rate of increase in avera~e 'productive empl 
at the period t in re1ation to od t-l 
a is rate increase in average 1 product; 
period t in rel ation to period t-l 
The rate of income growth is the sum of the rate of increase 
in employment and of rate of increase in product; tyo But ncrease 
in employment and productivity assume a corresJ>onding increase in 
productive fixed capital and its effectivenessc i of 
above, 
fj,Y 1 
r = = i x - a + u (4 ) 
Y m 
Where, 
I 
i = is the rate of investment at the od 1 
y 
m is investment outlay necessary to obtain an in 
in national income by one unit. 
a is the coefficient of the decrease in n on 
income resulting from the actual losss means 
production or the dim~nution in r effect; ve 
functioning due to physical depreciation. 
u 	 is the coefficient of the increase of nati incmne 
resulting from all kinds of improvements raising 
the effectiveness of the existing real productive 
fi xed capi ta1 
p 
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lUiIn a capitalist economY coefficient is not an independent 
variable and fluctuates greatlYe Thus equation (4) above has 
1; mi applicability for S countries. AS a contras for s 
countries this coefficient ;s positive.1 reflecting the 
of continued improvement 	of the existing !Jroduct;ve apparatu5e 
1 
Thus the magnitude i x - becomes a strategi c factor deter:ni 
m 
the rate of economic growth. 
Combining (3) and (4) above, we get, 
1 
a + a = i x --- - a + u 
m 
The confrontation of these two aspects is important as it 
enables us to understand some of the interrelations needed to 
define the optimal rate of growth in given conditions. 
To obtain the optimal rate of growth it d necess 
to do two things only. 2 
a) To establish satisfactorily the unequivocally 
rate of investment; (b) to put into operation a mechanism 
the actual attainment of such a rate of investment and i mai 
According to Feiwel,G.R., this may assume pas; ve or negati
values. The negative value is attributed because of the retrogressive 
effect of the traditional planning system. See for details, 
Feiwel, R., 'Issues in the Theory Capitalism and Socialism u 
op.cit., p.. 166. 
2. Brus and Laski, op. cit" p. 26. 
-
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ance at the sa.me 1eve1. The importance of a 5 aci ali s t system 
is that i t c~eates; premi ses for the di rect estab1i 
a rate i on n 
postulated rate of growth. 
However, certai n problems outl ined by Ka 1 ecki is worth 
noticing. When an i antely gh r is forced, the output of 
ce\t?in sectors, and cul ti Jse engaged in production 
of raw materials, lags behind demand for these products becau~e 
of certain technologi and organization ceilings limiting the 
rate of growth of particular ac vities; e-g.natural resources~ 
During plan implementation insurmountable barriers arise 
ever the rate of ex~ansion of particular industries are forced 
beyond a certain limit, even if finan resources are adequate; 
e-g. protracted period of gestation of construction projects and 
its effects. Again any imbalances thus created mit; 
by indirect production and to maintain the balance of payments 
equilibrium, export promotion or import substitution is to be 
resorted. This will usually increase capital and labour coeffi 
and also growth affect growth processes. 1 
An increase in the relative phase of investment in national 
income may bring about a rise in consumption in the long run. 
1. Feiwel, G. R. , IIssues in the Economic Theory of Capitalism 
and Socialism l , Opa cit., pp. 172-73. 
p 
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But in the short run consumption is decreased. The choice between 
the present and future is crucial. The compromise is based on 
the political decision. In the theory of growth of a socialist 
economy Kalecki takes as exogenous variable the central planner's 
compartive valuation of the inter temporal pattern of consumption 
in the short and long run ( consumption and accumulation ) and 
the bottlenecks and ceilings on the rate of growth in single b','anches 
arising out of supply constraining technical and organization 
factors, appearing often under the guise of the difficulties in 
balance of payments, constitute the central problem of a substantive 
and realistic theory of growth in a centrally planned economy. 
It should also be stressed that Kalecki believed that no 
-general' theory of economic growth is conducive to understanding 
economic realities of different social systems for the institutional 
framework of a system exerts a profound infl uen'ce on its dynami cs:1 
Same is the conclusion arrived at by Brus and Laski when they state· 
that 'socialism overcomes a number of fundemental contradictions 
of the capitalist system; this does not mean, however, that it 
. eliminates aJl contradictions of every kind, nor that it avoids 
creating new contradictions arising from the characteristics of 
the socialist sytem as such'. And also, 'Socialsit socio-economic 
L Ibid., p. 173 
p 
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system provi,des a possibility of different solutions of the 
method of functioning of the economy, thus allowing choice of 
alternatives in this field also, wjthin certain obvious limits.l 1 
1. Brus and Laski, Ope ci~., p. 54 
p 
CHAPTER II 
Review of Pre-Reform Discussions 
'Political Economy is essentially a historical science 
(and) cannot be the same for-all countries and for all 
historical epochs. I 
- Engels ­
p 
Section A The Problem 
The Soviet revolution of 1917 took place in 
a relatively underdeveloped country which found itself 
livind in a markedly hostile world. The soviet government 
un d e r too k to b u i 1d u pan i n d u s t ria 1 econ 0 my i,n the s h 0 r t est 
possible time. A high degree of centralization was insti~ 
tuted under ministries which had supreme authority in 
their sectors for the entire country. Capital accumulati.on 
for heavy industry was viewed as the key problem, arid 
all else was subordinated to this. In each successive 
five year period, beginning in 1929. growth in particular 
areas was held to be de~isive, and the best efforts 
were thrown in to meeting each successive goal. Shortages 
in the implementation of plans were made up at the 
expense of areas of lower priority. Through these methods 
the soviet union did indeed build up its basic industry. 
The ach1vements of this system were remarkable. 
Not only the level of output ~nd capacity increased, 
the econ.omy was so strong that it was able to throw 
back the. flerman invader and become ·one of the great 
powers of the world. A formerly backward country with 
extensive illiteracy, low. level of technology, was 
transformed by this system into country of sophisticated 
(18) 
pat 
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technology, universal' literacy, long lif~ expectancy. 
It could not only put the first satellite in the orbit 
but al so su'ccessfJjlly demonstrated its superamacy in 
technology by putti ng the f; rst. man in the ."orbi t. In 
the s p her e 0 f res earchan d e due at; 0 n the U. s. s. R. i s next 
to none. It was a challenge which was accepted and 
executed. At the time when the soviet system was adopted 
not only many British (Or elsewhere) economists were 
unwilling to tackle pressing problems of the day like 
mass unemployment" inequalities of income and wealth 
but were elaborating 'empty economic boxes'. This 
system successfully demonstrated that it is possible 
to create a classless society with a tremendous reduction 
of inequalities of income and wealth. In the 1930s the 
success of this system combined with the failures of 
capitalism led to the widespread belief that soviet 
economic system of tplanning' was the best solution 
to. the question of rational economic organizatioh. 
This system was also extended to the other Eastern 
European countries where it worked successfully for 
a decade. Nevertheless, what made these countries 
in spite ot' triumphant 'I-told ... you .. so's from Washington 
and continua' diatribes fromPeking,not to speak of the 
oppostttQn of ~ecusant stalinist diehards at home, to 
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adopt economic reforms which included elements which 
resemble the capitalistic features? 
The traditional soviet economic system as 
adopted in U~S,S.R~ and Eastern Europe gave rise to 
a number of micro economic problems:­
Enterprises often received plans long after 
the beginning of the period to which they referred. 
Not only enterprises often received conflicting plans from 
a multitude of higher authorities. plans were often 
changed, 
The intermediate and capital goods which 
enterprises need in arder to produce their outputs 
were allocated to them by the material technical supply 
system. The supply system was operated through the 
chief administrations for marketing of the union re­
publics~ and then, depending on the nomenclature, 
through the state planning committee to the all-union 
marketing administations - has increased the time 
required t01process the papers involved and has made 
the task more complicat~d. For instance, the Kharkov 
Economic council did not possess, by the middle of 
December 1958 , the orders and specifications, or the 
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list of suppliers, for many fulfil.lment of the pro ... 
gramme for the first quarter of 1959. Thus, centralized 
administrative allocation of resources often resulted 
in short supply of a~ important component ~r intermediate 
good resulting in idleness of men and machines. For 
example, the Krasnodarsk compressor plant with the 
approval of the state planning committee began production: 
of ethylene superpressure compr.essors. When the produc~ 
tion of the compressors had been mastered, it turned 
out that there were no pumps and that orders for them 
had not even been placed~ The compressor plant had to 
make the pumps itself, and this involved high production 
costs and delay. In October 1958, hundreds of compressors 
worth 7.0 million rObles lay in the yard of the plant, 
since they cou1d not pe sent'to the consumers because 
certain completing items were lacking. Such are the 
consequences of mistakes and miscalculations in plann­
ing.(l) 
The question of whether output was useful, 
or wanted, or of. good quality was immaterial to enter­
prise because its efficiency was measured not in terms 
of goods so1d and profit earned but in varied terms 
< < < 
1. 	 Et G. ~{berman, tI Economt'c 1 evers for' fu 1fi 11 in g the 
p 1 an for so v1 e tin d u s try" " 'K OM'M:U N'1'S T, 195 9 " No. 1
. 
 ( 
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like, weight,.value added and so on which created 
chain of ingenious ways of production not necessarily 
leading to production of good which were in great 
demand. 
Thes~ target variables often 1ed to d;stort~ 
ions. For instance, factories making prefabricated 
cement blocks, prefer to make large blocks, which 
is the easiest means of fulfilling a plan in terms of 
tons, resulting in a shortage of small blocks necessary 
for completing portions of the buildings under cons­
truction. But if the same is calculated in roubles 
they were made unnecessarily costlier, The humorous 
journal Krol~od:\l once pictured. in a car'toon, a factory 
which fulfilled its entire monthJs output programme 
for nails by the manufacture of one gaint nail, 
hanging,from an overhead crane the whole length of 
\ 
the workshop. As mentlone~ above when output was' 
calculated tn rouble, costly tmputs were used to make 
tt costlier. For many ye~rs the production of inexpensive 
claths was tnhtb1ted by the reluctance of manufacturers 
ta Uttlize the cheaper cloths, To avfod this when 
the pl~n was given tn linear meters they were made 
wtth. narrower width. Targets given in completed machines 
-
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always resulted in shortage of spare parts because 
it does not 'pay· the firm to produce spare pa s. 
Some restaurants avioded cheap dishes, as the plan 
was in terms of gross turn over. The soviet economist 
Aboltfn reported that the Stalingrad construction 
trust was d metal cause, for one of its projects 
the ::>lad was expressed in terms ,f metal used" When 
transport organ ations are given plans in ton kilo 
meters they ignore optimal transportation schemese 
Because geological surveying units receive plans in 
linear meters of drilling they undertake work they 
know to be useless.(l) 
As it was easier to fulfill and over lfil 
an easier plan than the difficult one, it was customa 
for the managers not to reveal their capacity and 
also try to get a lower target. A wise director by 
experience learnt that even if he 'could' achieve 125% of "the 
·ta~qet he need ~nly fulfill 105% s6 that his tarqet in 
the coming year is not enhanced. This is not peculiar 
to socialist system;even under capitalist sys sales­
.'''-.' 	 "," \.. 
4( '( ( < .' {(, <0; 
1. 	 Ale c Nove, ,I S 0 me pro b1ems 0f 's u c c e s sin d i c r s ' 
in soviet industryH ECONOM!CA 1958 
wherein he coined a new phrase\'success indica r 
problem~ 
., 

24 

men or managers rewarded only on calender basis resort to the same C~ 
and try postpone extra sales or production for the next e 
ode Under sociali system this resulted in nq 
labour and other inputs to make their target easier. To counter 
this planning authorities used a Ilie index· and fix targets 
accordingly .. The planning authorities used to x the targets 
higher than the revealed capac; to get over the problem. Ano~her 
problem connected with this was an influential manager always 
used to get away easy target then "j n that case p1 was 
subjective and not scientific .. v,lhether the plans were It; orI 
t~lack' resulted in considerable waste .. 'Planning from the achi 
1 resulted in a situation in which the enterprise was interesI 
not in eff; cient allocation of res'ources, in the production 
goods th which enterprise was familiar. 
In the sphere of risk-taking and innovation, soci 1St 
enterprises offer a paradoxical picture: on one side there are 
impressive statistics published from time to time about 
number of new ideas put forward. In addition commercial secrecy 
does not exist, so that new methods or new models dey; in one 
enterpri se are avai 1ab1e for the use of all enterpri ses, and 
effective new ideas are widely publicized on a nation wide s ee 
At the same'l time we have in abundance criticisms of ck""in~the-mud 
directors who refuse to adopt new methods and continue to produce 
'" 
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obsolete designs. One can trace three reasons for thise rs 
managers are concentrating on fulfilling the current 
Many new ideas involve a halt for retooling or making 
vant changes, and it is very difficult to do this without 
ly affecting the production figures of the current period. Whi 
is.no assured benefit for any innovation, the 
run risk of being penalized fvr non ful 11;n9 
target. Secondly, financing such investments are diff; 
Until recently there was practically no source for financing 
such expenditures. Even money was available specific authori on 
was required resulting in waiting interviews et~e~ If gher 
author; ti es approved the project, on the grounds that the 
or costs would benefit by the proposed change, they were apt 
to amend the plans and target accordingly, so that there would 
1; e or no gain to the initiators in the event 
ance possible loss of bonuses and reputation. Thirdly, 
snag concerns the impact of innov~tion on the ·success,inrli 
of the enterprise', and, linked with itt the failure reward, or 
indeed even to recognize risk taking. If the proposed 
ts into output and / or cos t reducti on i ndi cators, then it 
be favourably considered otherwise not. And also one should· 
forget rigid fixed prices. Since the price is fixed and any quali 
improvement increases cost the managers are not interested in 
quality improvement~ even though there is a marginal increase in 
quali 
26 
Here again we should not overlook similar problems in 
a capitalistic society. Commercial secrecy, buying up of inventions 
in order to freeze them, trade union resistence to new methods 
sheer conservatism supported ~y a price ring and high import 
9uties are the usal features that come in the way of innovation(l) 
As we pointed out earll-er, plan lng was often subjective 
in that success depended more on getting easy no,rms and an easy 
plan than on managerial and technical efficiency. The lagging 
enterpri ses are often I a; d'ed I by the 1 switching' of thei r ass; gn­
ments in order to create the impression that all is well with 
the branch administration of the given economic councilu This 
practice was widely followed by the ministries and, unfortunate 
it has not been abandoned by the economic councils. Three days 
before the end of the first quarter of 1958, the Iaroslavr peat 
workers received from the economic council a • corrected' plan ch 
had been enlarged. As a result, an advanced enterprise was turned 
overnight in to a 'lagging' enterprise. The same economic council 
1.. Alec Nove THE SOVIET ECONOMY Second Edition New York: 
publishers and George Allen &Unwin Ltd., 1969 PI85 
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Irounded off' the plan of construction of an oil refinery four 
times in the first quater in order to present favourable figure 
with respect to fulfilment - 103%. Anumber of machine buil n9 
pl ants were suddenly conv~rted from 1agging in to advanced enter­
prises a day before the month ended. The state planning committee 
0f the Ukraine made so many changes in the plans of the Kharkov 
economi~ council throughout 1958 that tht latter was repeatedly 
forced to change the production programs of the enterprises. This 
produced a lack of coordination in the material supply service, 
non fulfillment of the output assortment plan and of course an 
abundance of correspondance.(l) 
Becuase of the peculiarity of the cost accounting system 
enterprises tended to enlarge fixed capital without considering 
the prospective return. Extra fixed capital was useful because 
it costs nothing and facilitated increases in output and cost 
reductions. State farms used to send application for new tractors 
eventhough they had many unused tractors. Examples of various 
problems mentioned above in very large numbers, drawing on 
material published not only in the U.S.S.R. but also Hungary, 
1. E.G .. Liberman, uEconomic Levers for fulfilling the Plan for 
SOy; et Industry", KOMMUNIST, 1959, No. I. 
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Poland and Czechoslovakia, where a similar institutional struc­
ture involved similar problems. (1) 
UcS.S.R. and Eastern Europe found themselves with a complex 
economy with .any thousatds of industrial enterprises connected 
by extremely intri cate inter re1aJ:j·(}!lS't: with a tremendous assort­
ment of.prouucts th a large cadre of s~ ~lled managers, sci s 
techn; ci ans and workers, wi th increasing demands for qual ity 
consumer goods, and in the main with a relatively sophisticated 
level of technology. Under these circumstances, the old methods 
of ghly centralized economic management proved to be quite in­
adequate. The rate of growth of G.N.P. continued to be high, but 
began to decline. The volume of production in relation to fi 
assets actua11 y di d dec1 i ne (around 1958-60).. Enormous nunbers of 
construction projects were begun and were left unfini for 
many years at a time. The application of new technology fell 
behind international standards in many areas, and unwanted consumer 
goods began to pile up in warehouses because they fail to meet 
increasing consumer demand for quality products. 
1. See for detailed analysis Janos Kornai, OVER CENTRALIZATION IN 
ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION Oxford, O.U.P. 1959. Alec Nove, IS ome 
Problems in ·Success indicators in Soviet lndustry' ECONOMICA 
Jan. 1958, PP 2'0 
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Table A 
Annual Rates of Growth of Selected Macro Economic Indices 
(Percentages) 
U.S.S.R. 
1951-55 
National Income 11 .. 4:' 
Industrial Production 13.2 
Industrial Fixed Capital 11.3 
Incrementa 1 Capital Output Rati os 
Country 1950-55 
U.S.S.R. L.77 
Bulqaria 1.83 
Czechoslovakia 2.61 
G.D.R. 1.28 
Hunqary 4.04 
Poland 2.75 
1956-60 
9.2 
10.4 
11.2 
1955-60 
2.53 
1.92 
3.14 
2.70 
2.84 
3.68 
1961-64 
6.4 
8.6 
10.9 
1960-65 
3.83 
3.89 
14.28 
6,,02 
3.65 
4.62 
Source: U.N. Economic Bulletin for Europe XVII Nov. 1~ 1966. 
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More objectively, the reforms became inevitable mainly 
due to fall in the annual growth rates and increase in the capital 
output ratio. Between the period 1960-65 not only the average 
annual rate of increase in national income fell considerably, 
wi th an increase in the incremental capital .... output rat; 0" . 
Table A will show clearly the trend of these rates. 
Moreover, as the economy becomes more and more complex, 
the existing methods and persons employed find it more and more 
difficult to cope. There were many problems associated with this: 
Collecting the necessary data; aggregation and disaggregation by 
commodities, enterprises and time units; doing the necessary cal­
culations in the time available; and coord'inating the administrators .. 
It is because the planners are simply unable to solve these problems 
that enterprises receive inconsistent plans long after the beginn­
ing of the Rplanned ' period, only to have them altered subsequentlyo 
According to one estimate the soviet economy is now 1600 times more 
complex than it was in 1928, but the techniques of pl ng are 
essentially the same. Ghishkov has stated that at the present rate 
development, by 1980 the entire adult"population of the U.S .. S.. R.. 
will be engaged in p1anning! (I) 
1. Michael Ellman, ECONOMIC REFORM IN THE SOVIET UNION ; 
London: P.E.. P.. Breadsheet 509 Apri 1, '~1969, p" 288. 
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The foregoing arguments should not be construed as 
implyinq that the economies of these countries were functionina 
in a totally inefficient manner. • In spite of all these problems 
they were functioning better than many of the capitalistic countries. 
The reforms were' enunciated mainly wi.th the purpose of establ ishing 
stable high growth rates compatible with a developed ~ocialistic economy. 
Following Prof. Selucky(l) we may trace §ix reasons that 

favour market type reform. The first reason is ecenomic. In order 

to achieve a goal oriented national econofllY to function smoothly, 

a self regulating mechanism capable of keeping the constantly 

recurring and inter rel ated.: economi c processes with in its proper 

limits is necessary. The function of this self regulator or 

internal mechanism can not be' supp·l anted. A natural sel f regul ating 

mechanism of economY is the market; the plan is an external regul a­

tor. The plan has been built in to the system expost facto and 

therefore is not automatic. Plan can be effective only when they 

do not· replace the self regulating mechanism but supplement it 

where it has failed. The market as an internal regulator and the 

plan as an external regulator of economY are mutually complerrentary. 

1. Radoslav Selucky, ECONOMIC REFORMS IN EASTERN EUROPE - POLITICAL 
BACKGROUND AND ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE New York: Praeger Publishers, t 
1972, PP 43-51. 
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The-market is' a 'source of~ da1;~. for~'makfR~~;Up' th.e plan, a cri eteri on 
of its fulfillment, a corrective of its aims and means; the plan 
provides the self regulating mechanism with its. goal, its rreaning, 
and its content. Without a plan, market functions around profit 
principle and is unable to prevent inequ~lities or ensure full 
employment. Without a market the plan is deprived' of objective 
data (Prices and demand), and is unable to ensure an equilant ex­
change of various economic activities or to keep the individual, 
group, and social interests in balance. Plan and market are not 
substitutes. They complement each other to ensure smooth, undisturbed 
proportioned, dynamic and socially well planned function,;ng of 
economic systems. 
Socielogically, the diversity of human interests is related 
to the social division of labour. Socialism could only abolish private 
ownership of the means of producti on but not the soc; al division of 
labour whether in its technical, social or natural meaning. The 
di fference between mental an,d physi ca 1 1 abour , natural di fferences 
like age,sex and territorial lOcation are bound to exist which' 
is a source of conflict. The market mechanism not only enables 
competition among individuals and groups but also regulates them, 
while the centralized system knows only to supress the conflict 
admini strati ve1.y. The market system makes it feasibl e for the 
interest of society to emerge as a sum total of conflicting, 
partial interests. 
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Technologically too market system creates a conducive 
atmosphere. Under market system, producers are naturally and materially 
interested in innovati ons; this means that a dynami c development of 
productive forces are built in, while the absence of market 
system deprives automatic technological progress and deprives the 
economY of the main source of growth. 
Politically, the market 'system paves the way for dictators.hip 
of the proletariat and peasantry. Under centraiized system this class 
is reduced to play a subdued role of fulfilling the predistined 
functions. With decentralization self man,agement, the workers 
can as producers and consumers become the real ruli~g class. 
Humanistically, under authentic Marxism', the final aim 
of socialism'is an affirmative development of· the individual and 
his creatjve self fulfillment. A pre requisite for this is ~ndi­
vidual IS participation in the creation of his so~\'~~syst~, in the 
creation of policies, in political decision making, and in shaping 
of future forms of ~ociety. While the centralized system excludes 
rank and file of the comrm.ulity, market system presupposes his 
participation. 
Philosophically, the centralized system proceeds from 
determinism, from the theory of a 'sinqle model of socialism'. 
34 
The soviet type of socialism 'has been made absolute and declared 
identical with socialism. Thus it is a closed system, where society 
has no choice or alternative. Acceptance of a highly centra­
lized system '. deadens human thought, critical faculties, rationality 
and creative activity, leads to conformity, mediocrity, and apologetic 
submission to status qyo. The market 'system under overall socialism encourages 
human thinking, critical faculties and r~tional;ty, leads to dialogue, 
to a creative upsur~e, to searching, and to changes. The deterministic 
centralized system ;s a product of doctrinaire Marxism, while demo­
cratic s~cialism based on market economy ;s a product-of humanistic 
Marxism. 
To sum up~as against the advantages'of centralized planning 
mentioned earlier, the following major . features were responsible 
for search for reforms: Wasteful methods of freezing ca~ital, ill 
conceived and dispersed construction projects; accumulation of idle 
equipment; under utilization of capacity; excessive labour turnover; 
and lack of stimuli for assimilating technical p~ogress. In addition, 
there were severe fluctuations in output, accumUlation of huge. 
stocks of unwanted consumer goods, dominance of seller over buyer, 
rationing and uncertainity of delivery, and a cumbersome supply 
system. Moreover, there was hoarding of materi als by industri al 
producers and excessive factor inputs and use of resources in less' . 
productive employment. Finally, the system was rigid, accompanied 
by inertia and lack of initiative and a prolifer~tion of the 
p 
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bureaucratic apparatus. The planning system was a legacy of 
the period of extensive development which was unsuitable to 
meet the challenge of intensive growth. (1) 
1. G.R.Feiwel, THE QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY: ISSUES, 
CONTROVERSIES AND REFORMS, New York.: Praeger Publishers, 1967, 
P 5. 
Section B 
Theory of Economic Reforms: Pre Liberman Era 
The post Stal inist era is marked by the search for meaning­
ful value categories. prices, profit, money and economic calcu1a­
tio~s became important subjects of discussion. It is obvious what 
profit means in a capitalistic economY. Under socialism however, 
profi tis a form of product for soc; ety, contri buted by 1abour 
free of exploitation, and distributed so as to ensure expanded 
reproduction and the well-being of the population. Socialist profit 
with its method of formation, division, utilization and calculation 
is a sharp antithesis to capital 1st profit. The argument is that 
whereas increase of profit, irrespective of the means, is the sup­
reme end of the capitalist, under socialism it is only "one of 
the subordinate elements .in the entire system of the 'etOft'Om1c·~ , 
categories of soc1alis~l, used to the extent to which it facilita­
tes achievement of the ultimate end of socialist production:the 
fullest satisfaction of the population needs. The latter aim is 
the criterion which determines the bounds for usirt9 profit. 
\ 
Profit under socialism has two distinct roles to play both 
at micro and macro levels. Following Lange a hierarchical structure 
can be envis,aged. At the pinnacle of the structure appears the 
national economic plan which may be called as the first order end. 
The logic of the planning process requires that the goals of the 
(36) 
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lower order (firm &enterprises) be subjected to the aim of the 
plan. The enterprises serve only as a medium for implementing and 
achieving the plan's goal. The two ends need not necessarily be 
the same as long as the enterprises' goal ·induces it to achieve 
the over-all goal of the plan. 118y 1aying down the condi ti ons 
under which the maximization of profit takes place, the plan -at 
the same tirre determines the result of the activity of such enter­
prises. This is also a way of indirectly subordinating the activity 
of an enterprise to the end of the social economic plan." (1) 
Thus in this structure means serving the ultimate goal of the plan 
are designated as second order ends, means serving ,second order 
ends (eg. maximization of present income) are des,ignated as third 
order ends, followed by possible fourth order(like maximization of 
present cOnsumption). In this regard, whether or not profit, or its 
rate, could be best used ;n realizing the ultimate end is a questton 
posed by the soviet profit-oriented school. 
, I If we analyze how to use economi c levers to implement 
, , . ~ : : ~ ; ; ; ; : . 
1. Oscar Lange , POLITI CAL f-CONOMY , Part I Trans 1 ated from Pol ish 
New York: Pe,rgamon Press, 1963. PP 179-80 
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the plan mainly by economic means, as distinct from directives then 
profit would serve "as a stimulus to the completiDn of the plann­
ed targets and as a test of how far the economic principle is 
observed ll • (1) Such a use of profit is criticized by many who 
condemn 'it for leading to automatic regulation of the economY, 
negating the advantages of the central planning. Some soviet 
economists have discussed . use of profit for the best imple­
mentation of the centralised plan. It can serve then fon.best 
allocation of resources which have not been centrally channelled 
to specific uses. It is also admitted that profit is one of the 
criteria for investment in production of sUbstitutable inputs 
and outputs, within a given branch and even amo.ng branches of 
industry. It ;s recognized that efforts to increase profit may 
stimulate improvement of organization and production techniques 
cause more rational utilization of resources, and increase 
productivity. 
In the de-stalinsa~ion period the role of profit as a per­
formance criterion was so~~what elevated and enterprises' use 
(I)Oscar Lange, Op cit., P 178. 
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of profits was enlarged... Nevertheless, it dYd not occupy 
a cardinal position. ,Profit as performance criterion was assianed d 
crucial role by Prof. Z.Atlas as early as 1949. He distingui 
between formal and geneuine profitability. He stressed that 
the exi sting methods were defi cient ;n terms of pri ce and cost 
calculations. He pointed out that the degree of utilization 
uf fixed and working capital is only insignificantly reflected 
in the calculation of profit. If enterprises i profit is linked 
with productive capital, it will dissuade firms acquiring super­
flous equipment and supplies. The rate of profit will be computed 
by having profit in the numerator and fixed and working capital 
in the denominator. In this computation should the actual rate 
exceed the planned, the enterprise would benefit from a higher 
incentive fund. The actual rate of profit attained will be hinher 
a larqer ouput sold, a lower cost per unit, a faster rate of 
working capital~turn over, and a higher rateof'utflization of 
fixed assets, subject to the condition that there is a certain 
amount of profit per unit of output. Though he admits certain 
short ....comings in the price system, he clai'ms that his scheme can 
be implemented with out essentially reconstructing the price 
system. 
During 1930s concepts akin to opportunity cost and marginal ism 
were developed among soviet engineers. The engineers realized 
p 
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that the output target could generally be met by employing 
product; ve processes of vari aus capital ~intensity where,. 
lower subsequent operating costs could be achieved by greater 
initial capital outlay. As it was soon observed the minimi ng 
of operating costs could not be rationally selected' as a 
desideratum since the reduction was achived mainly at the cost 
0f high capital--;:intensity, diverting capital.l from other uses 
w~ere its productivity may have been higher and the economy 
of operating costs greater than in its sub.optimal applications. 
In solving the problem of choice of capital in late 1920s 
normally a six per cent interest rate was applied. About 1931 
a tendency emerged to exclude interest from the selection of 
variants with few important exceptions. This encouraged capi 
intensive variants which was void of any economic cri a and 
limits in applying technical knowledge and disregarded any 
alternative choice of investment. The test of th'e profitability 
of an enterprise as awhole was not invoked .. , 
As the inclusion of interest in operating costs fell into 
di srepute, the project makers shied away from it .. Other 
devices were employed with out naming interest explicitely. ( ) 
From the mid 1930s generally expressions such as leo-efficient· 
or 'norm l was in vogue when the inverse of the co-efficient 
1. G. R. Feiwel, op cit., pp 163-173.. 
41 

of relativeeffectiveness (CRE) became popular discussion 
under the name of Iperiod of recoupment!. For two alterna­
tive technological variants, producing the same stream of 
output with instantaneous single capital expenditures of 
k1 and k2 for the two variants respectively and uniform an­
nual operating costs, including depreciation on capital as­
sets, but excluding a charge for capi "al Cl and C2 re~pec-
tive(y, and where ,K2>Kl and C2 >C 1 CRE = ~!_: .. ~21 
, ,~ - K 
Thus CRE stands for the annual economY of operating 
costs resulting from each monetary unit of the incremental 
investment expenditure of the more capital-intensive vari­
ant, given the existing value parameters. The inverse of eRE 
the period of recoupment, refers to the span of time dl.lring 
which the incremental investment from a more capital-inten­
sive variant is reimbursed by the annual economY of opera­
ting costs. This includes depreciation char-ges while western 
version of the same 'pay-off period l doesnot include the 
same. 
The more capital - intensive project will be chosen 
if the CRE is larger than the standard pre"'Citermined norm 
(N) which typically should be the marginal rate of substi­
tutuion between capital and current production inputs valued 
at scarcity prices. It is obvious a project will be chosen 
if the eRE is greater than N. The conditions for compar~ng 
the effectiveness of two variants could be stlown by relatino 
• 
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c2+ NK2~ Cl + NK2 
< 
The more capital intensive variant will be chosen if the com­
puted period of recoupment (t) is shorter than predetermined 
frame of reference (T) and the less capital·intensive one if 
t is longer than T. The efficiency tests could be restated as 
a guiding rule, subject to whatever constraints are imposed, to 
seperate the technological variants of the project:to be imple­
mented from those to be implemented from those to be rejected 
for the project variant that would rDf1'nimize' the current annual 
operating costs, embrace depreciation charges and the scarcity 
of capital ie., C+ N+ K= Minimum 
In the opinion of Novozhilov, however,IIAll indicators 
of effectiveness which are in use are imperfect; they take in­
sufficient account of either outlay or return or usually of 
both. Yet in order to make economic decisions or to choose bet­
ween alternative plans (or profits) it is necessary to know 
the relationship between the overall economic effect and all 
the economic outlays involved for each of the variants being 
compared~' (1) 
I. Novozhilov, V.V. in Nemchinov (ed.) THE USE OF MATHEMATICS 
IN ECONOMICS translated from Russian, Ed'ihbrgh: Oliver & Boyd, 
1964, P 45. 
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Although one could see a number of attempts made by 
engineers to justify the use of interest during 1930s, it was not 
until 1940s that a more elaborate model was worked out by A. 
H;s views were similar to tho~e of Gottl-ottlibienfeld (1923) who 
approached the problem in terms of cost savings derived from the 
application of incremental investments. Lurels imputation of a 
cap; td I charge was to safeguard the eCQl.Jmy from the losses ens u­
ing therefrom - in terms of the larger economy of operating expenses 
that could have been achieved in alternative, more productive em­
ploymen~~ had the resources not been confined to the project in 
question. Moreover, Lure advocated the determination of the equi­
librium charge for capital, the norm of relative effectiveness 
by equating the demand for investments with the exogeneously r-
mined fixed investment fund for the economy ... Such a nonn must 
uni form throughout the economy, resulting in the allocation of 
investments in such a way that the marginal productivity of all 
projects would be uniform in alternative employments and there 
would be no opportunity to reduce costs, ceteris paribus, by re­
allocating resources among alternative uses. 
In the m; d 1940s Academi c; an Strum; 1in, contrary to Novo­
zhilov, did not develop nor advocate a single choice criterion for 
guiding project makers, but, rather,listed a number of investment 
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criteria that could be applied in choosing the capital intensity 
of projects. His main objection was use of any criterion with prices 
deviating from their values. His contribution was the stress on 
the impact of the time dimensions of production and the necessity 
of conducting calculations of increase of anticipated labour pro­
ductivity .. 
The "trulant attacks on the practice of imputing capital 
charges and its prQPonents was waged by P.Mstislavsky. The criticism 
was mainly directed against Lure, Novozhilov and Strum;l;n. Th~ 
irony of it all was that his own proposals are founded on the sub­
stitution of capital and labour and his solution is essentially 
similar to Lure1s. 
In 1954 a summary authoritative statement left· sorel ques­
tions unresolved, it up held the commensurability of operating 
costs and capital expenditures. In 1956 however temporary instructions 
for calculating investment efficiency were issued, followed in 
1958 by a conference in which the main paper was in support of 
capital charges. In 1960, by mutual accord between the scientific 
research institute of Gosplan and the institute of Economics of 
the U .. S.. S.R. Academy of Sciences , di finite instructions for evalua­
ting investment effectiveness were drawn up_ Since 1961, the insti­
tute of Economics of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences is publish­
ing number of papers intended to elucidate some further aspects of 
problem. 
Secti on C 

Liberman 1 Controversy: 

Though the ball of controversy was already rolling, a 
definite change in the momentum was given by Liberman. His ideas 
put forward in 1948were almost unnoticed. In the fifties three 
important articles2 gave concrete shape to this type of thinking. 
be~ame famous by his 1962 article'. But then he was not without 
1. Evesei. G. Liberman began questioning the prevailing conception 

of centralised planning after world war II. At a meeting of eco­

nomists in Moscow in 1948, he proposed the use of profit as a means 

of gauging enterprise efficiency. The proposal went unnoticed, but 

Liberman persisted in collecting data and in developing his ideas. 

He presented his doctoral thesis on the subject in 1956. His papers 

appeared in Veprosy Ekonomiki and Kommunist in 1955 and 1956, and 

he expounded his position at conferences and in survey reports to 

the soviet government. He gained prominence in 1962 when his c1e 

IIPlan Profits and Bonuses" appeared in Pravda, stimulating the public 

discussion which took place that year. The discussion resumed in 

1964 and led to the economic reforms adopted the following year. 

2. Liberman, E .. G., "Cost Accounting and Materi a1 lEncouragement of 

Industrial personnel", VEPROSY EKONOMIKI, 1955, No" 6.. 

--------------, "Planning Industrial production and Material stimuli 

for its Deve1opment ll , KOMMUNIST, 1959, No .. 10. 

--------------, uEconomi c levers for Fu1 fi 11 i n9 the 1'1 an for sovi 

IndustryU, e~1Uml. 1959, No.. 11. 

(45) 
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critics. The important critics includeL. Gatovski 1, A. Zverev2 
I. Kasitskii 3, B. Sukharevskii 4, K. Plotnikoy5, L~ Al rter6• Among 
the chief supporters Academician NemichinoY's7 support i UE=nced 
the whole way of thinking in the 1960s and paved the way for 
reforms. 
1. L.Gatovski, liThe role of profit in a socialist econoMj-n, 
KOMMUNIST, 1962, No. 18. 
2. A. Zverev!f "Against over simplification in soving complex 
problems", VEPROSY EKONOMIKI , 1962, No. 11. 
3. I. Kasitskii, liThe main question: Criteria for premiums and 
indices planned for enterprises" VEPROSY EKNOMIKI, 1962, No. II. 
4.. B. Sukharevskii, liOn improving the fonus and methods of 
materi al incentives", VEPROSY EKNOMIKI, 1962, No. 110 
5.. K.. Plotnikov, "E.G.Liberman Right and Wrong", VEPROSY EKONOIVlI 
1962, No. 11. 
6.. L. Aliter, IIIncentives must be linked with the long-tenn planning 
of an enterprise ll " VEPROSY EKNOMIKI, 1962, No .. II. 
7. Head of the Council on Scientific priciples of Planning of the 
U.S .. S.R. Academy of Sciences. See his article "Socialist Economic 
Management and Production Planning" KOMMUNIST, 1964, No.5. 
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The party programme adopted by 22nd congress of the 
C.P.S.U declared,IIThe economic independence and the rights of the 
local organs and enterprises wiJl continue to expand with in the 
framework of the single national economic plan. Plans and recommen­
dati ons made ,at lower 1eve1s, begi nni n g wi th enterpri ses, must play 
an increasing role in planning ••••••The entire system of planning 
and assessing the work of central and local organizations t enter­
prises and collective farms must stimulate their interest in higher 
plan targets and in the maximum dissemination of advanced production 
experience ll We already pointed out :a number of problems connected• 
with compromising the centralisation and decentralisation under 
a single scheme. The way in which soviet industries and agriculture 
developed under centralised programme to b~gin with and how they 
develpped various ingenious methods we pointed out earlier. 
Liberman in one of his earlier articles l declared that 
these shortcomings in economic management should be eliminated-
not by making pl anning more compli cated, more .detailed and more 
centralized, but by developing, economic initiative and independence 
of enterprises. 'The plan is a centrali'zed, foundation which ensures 
the necessary rates and proportions in the development of production. 
1. Liberman. E. G., "Cost qccounting and Material Eacouragement 
of Industri al Personnel", VEPROSY EKNOMIKI, 1955 J No.6 • 
." 
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Cost accounting must serve as a means for finding the best ways 
of fulfilling centralized directives on the basis of the active 
participation of the enterprise staff in the introduction of new 
equipment and new production processes. Enterprises must be given 
broader initiative. They must not be bound by petty tutelage and 
bureaucratic methods of planning from the center. But, on the other­
hand, the ".'ork of enterpri ses mus t be kept under stri ct control I 
and tendencies toward narrow departmentalism must be suppressed. 
This problem can be solved by the proper use of the prinCiple of 
material incentive. It should really reflect a combination of the 
personal and public interests, guarantee the observance of state 
interests and, at the same time, simplify control of the observance 
of state interest without leading to bureaucratic methods of manage­
ments. 
He laid down the principles of intra plant cost accounting 
as follows: (a) Bonuses for shop personnel must qepend on, and be . 
paid out of savings derived from cost reduction. (b) Progress out­
1ay norms shQul d be kept stab 1e for the shops for not less than a 
year.' (c) The simplicity and quality of planning are determined 
by the adequate preparation of norms. With well worked out norms, 
there is no need-to e1aborate production - cost plans or complica­
ted produc'tion estimates for the shops.1 It is enough that the shop 
knows the no.nns for materi al expendi tures and indi rect expenses. 
(d) The process of determining the results of the shops operation 
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should be, in addition, a process of determining the production 
costs for the entire plant. 
This of course is not substituting centralized planning 
but leading to precise and simpler planning. It has the advantage 
of not weakening the planning but strengthening it. From a scienti­
fic point of view this represents a higher level. 
In improving planning procedures, it is first of all nece­
ssary to find a simple, generalized qualitative norm of expenditures 
on production. If this qualitative norm is accepted, it will be 
sufficient to plan for enterprises from the center only one index 
profitability, instead of several indices of production costs. 
Then the profitability target would be the basic factor, while 
the technology of product1Qn, norms of output and of expenditure 
of materials, and, hence, the cost of individual articles, would 
be derivative factors. They should be established by the enterprise 
it self in its plan, and in such a manner as to attain the state 
targets for the volume of output as well as the qualitative norms 
for labour productivity and profitability. "Such a system would 
improve the performance of enterprises~ It would also relieve the 
planning bodies of unnecessary and at times even hanmful detailing 
of calculations and \'/ou,Td elevate planning to a higher qualitative 
plane". (1) 
1. E. G. L; berman, II Pl anni n 9 Industri a 1 Producti on and Mater; a 1 Stumul i 
for its devel opment", KOMMUNIST, 1956, No. 10 
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Profitability depends on (a) On the share .of total wages 
and salaries in production costs (b) On economical management i.e. t 
on the average workers' wages in the total wage fund: (c) On 
average workers' wages, or rather pn. their converse magnitude and 
(d) on the productivity of labour. Thus profitability can be rep­
resented as the product of a number of co-efficients (or factors) 
and the equati on becomes an identity. 
6WP WF WW NW OWP 
P = ----- = x --- x --- x ---­
C C WF WW NW 
Where P = Profitability 
OWP = Output in wholesale prices 
C = Cost of production 
WW :;: Workers I wage 
WF = Total wage fund 
Nw = Number of workers 
Among the various co-efficients, the share of wages and 
salaries in production costs is fairly stable for similar enterprises. 
Anothr factor, the share of workers' wages in the total wage fund 
shows how economical the management is. The higher this share the 
less, relatively ;s spent on remunerating the technical, engineering 
and office staff, and the higher consequently, is the profitability 
of the enterprise. It is quite possible from this to envisage ~ong-· 
term targets for raising the co-efficient of economical management 
by drawi ng on the experi ence' of the advanced factori es of the gi yen 
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group - and that irrespective of output assortment changes. 
Similarly, the third factor should be determined on the basis of 
general economic considerations and with approximately equal rates 
for a wide range of of similar enterprises. This helps to achieve 
equal pay for equal work. 'The fourth and important factor ;s the 
labour productivity. This must grow faster than average'wages, 
for otherwise society will not be able to create that part of the 
national income which is necessary for expanded reproduction and 
for for meeting social needs. Hence it is considered a decisive factor 
of profitaoility. 
From this it will be clear that long term or long operating 
norms of profitabi lity can be determined with sufficient accuracy 
on the basis of typical characteristics of enterprises by branches 
of industry. These long~term norms give an enterprise a clear per­
spective and make it strive for economy, for genuine cost accounting. 
It will no longer fear that a reduction in production costs this 
year wi 11 evoke a revi s i on of its qual i tat; ve target in' the plan 
for next year. From the economic point of view it is important 
to know not only what goods are produced, but also the objective 
conditions in which they are produced: the amount of equipment 
per un; t of 1 abour, the structure of the producti on assets, and, 
hence, the stable structure of expenditures on production. Where 
these condi ti ons are equal, soc; ety has the ri ght to demand of 
enterpri ses of the same type the sa,me degree of effecti veness. 
This is one of the poss"ib1e ways of consolidated, simple, 
52 
and yet scientifically sUbstantiated planning of qualitative 
indices of production. Here of course the usefu1ness of detailed 
planning is not denied. But as pointed out such calcu1ations can­
not be taken as a point of departure in planning, what can be taken 
as a basis is a gneralized economic target, a directive expressing 
law~governed development. And it is the business of the enterprise 
to sUbstantiate the fulfillment of such a directive by whatever 
calculations and detailed specifications are necessary for its 
internal purposes, for its technical, production and financial plans. 
In the opinion of Liberman a guarantee of conscientiousness 
in "planning from below" can be created on the basis of application 
of the II share-in-the-income" principle; The more values an enter­
prise has created for society, the larger the sum that must be 
channeled in to its financial incentive fund, regardless of whether 
these values have been produced with in the scope of the pl an 'or 
over and above it. 
According to Liberman! the Isharingl principle is realized 
in the form of a pl anned long term standard of profi tabi 1 ity of 
production. Indeed, besides the volume of output in physical terms, 
only one additional assignment must be handed down to. enterprises, 
viz., that of ioperating at maximum efficiency'. Firstly, 
1. E. G. Liberman, "Planning production and standards of long term 
operati on II , VEPROSY EKNOMIKI, 1962, N.o. 8. 
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efficient operation increases the profitability of production, 
especially if it is measured as the per cent profit on production 
assets (fixed and circulating). Hence, the index of profitability 
of an enterprise must be handed down as the second basic assign­
ment of the enterprise. This index should make enterprises uncon­
ditionally interested in improving all production indices both 
in the process of elaborating the plan and in the course of,its 
fulfillment. This may be done by drawing up for uniform groups 
of enterprises vdtl1in each branch of industry a standard scale 
of deductions from profits put at the disposal of an enterprise 
depending upon its level of profitability. There is no need to 
hand down any other indices to enterprises. Liberman illustrates 
the idea by evolving a scale of financial rewards for branches 
of the machine building industry which is presented below: 
As shown in the table higher the profitability (in % 
of assets), the greater is the amount of financial reward. As 
profitability rises from 5% to 60% the maximum size of the finan­
cial reward fund of an enterprise increases more than 2.5 times. 
However, incentives based on profits must meet two 
requirements: A" Norms should be constructed in such a way that 
the size of the incentive funds corresponds to the effectiveness 
t 
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Scale of financial rewards for enterprises depending upon level 
of profitability 1 
PRO FIT A B I LIT Y 
--------------~----~-----------------------------------------Financial Up to 
Reward 5 5.1-10.0 10.1-20 20.1~30 30.1-45 45.1-60 60.1-above 
In %of 
funds 2.1 3.0 3.9 4.4 4.9 5.3 
Addi ti ona1 
(in %of 
Profits 
exceeding 42.0 
the lower 
1;mit of 
the interval) 
9.0 5.0 3.3 2.7 2.0 
1. The total sum set aside for financial rewards may be increased 
or decreased by the following amounts depending upon the output 
of new (nen-comparable) products; decreased by 3.5% when the share 
of new output amounts to from 50.1 to 70% and increased by 25% 
when it amounts to· 70.1% and h; ghe r. 
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of production and the amount of labour inputs. B. The increase 
in effectiveness (profitability) should always ensure an increase 
;n the size of the reward per employed person, but in such a way 
that the share of the society rises rather than declines in the 
process. 
. 
There is no object; on to the propos i ti on A above" Regard­
ing B also there is no doubt as the effectiveness of social prOQUCC­
ion increases, the average size of the reward per employed person 
(or per rouble of wages) should increase. But objections are some-
ti mes rai sed that the share of the part of profit realised 
by society out of the overall profit should increase. It is moti­
vated by the belief that such a demand is incompatible with the 
condition of increasing incentives for each rouble of wages. This 
is no problem. Because, in the opinion of Liberman1, in accordance 
with the demands of the economic laws of socialism, the share of 
profit realized by society should i,ncrease. Growth of labour producti­
vity should surpass the increase in wages. But ultimately the growth 
of profit expresses, the effect of increased labour productivity. 
Hence, the rate of profit growth should also surpass the growth 
rate for incentive funds, whose resources are used to reward 
1. E.G. Liberman, ECONOMIC METHODS AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
PR9.D~CTIO~. , trans 1ated from Russi an:' New York: Internati ana1 Arts 
and Science press, 1971, pp 140-144. 
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working people responsible for higher net income under specific 
social conditions. 
In its general form, the scale is a tabular expression 
of such a function. 
Y= b log (x -.c) 
Y= Profit in per cent of wage fund. (Incentive norm) 
x = the criterion or the factor for which the incentive is 
offered. 
band c are parameters determined empirically for a given 
branch or group of enterprises on the basis of economic analysis. 
The following table as given by Liberman clearly summurizes the 
discussion above. 
Groups 	 Calculated Amount paid Amount left Amount of 
(net) profi t in to budget to enterprise prof; t rece; ved 
in % of wage in %of total in % of total by enterpri se 
fund net profit net profit in %of wagefund 
1 Under 120 84 16 16 

2 From 120 to 140 85 15 18 

3 From 140 to 160 86 14 19.6 

4 From 160 to 180 87 13 20.8 

5 180 and above 88 12 21.6 

As shown above when profit increases the reward for profit 
also increases. If the net profit is 100% of the wage fund, the 
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enterprises' reward amounts to 16% of the wage fund, but if profit 
increases 1.8 times and equals 180% of the wage fund the enterpris's 
reward increases only 1.,.3 times and amounts to 21.6% of the wage 
fund. Thus with an increase in profitability and incentives per 
rouble of wages, the share of the enterprise in overall profits 
declines whtle the share of the budget increases. From the above 
discussion we may deduce a principle: what is profitable for 
society should be profitable for every enterprise. 
To summarize, the entire discussion above, to develop 
a system of planning and assessing the work of enterprises so that 
they will be vitally interested ;n the hi~nest pnssib1e rl~n targets 
;n introducing new machinery and improving th~ quality of output, 
in a word, in the highest efficiency of production, a simple but 
substantiated solution is necessary. This can be achieved in the 
opinion of Liberman by presenting the enterprises with plans 
only with respect to the volume of output and the assortment and 
dates of deliveries. This must be done in such a way that suppliers 
and consumers come in to direct contacts as far as possible.{l) 
1. Liberman, E.. G. "Plan Profits and Bo.nuses~l. PRJ!VOA, Sept., 9,1962 
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All the other indices should be communicated only to 
the economic councils; there is no need to distribute them among 
the enterprises. On the basis of the targets for volume and assort­
ment of output, the enterprises themselves should work out a 
complete pl an that covers, among other things, labour productivity 
quantity of work force, wages, costs of production, accumulations, 
capital investments, and new machinery. 
How to overcome the present difficulties? This can 
be achieved if the enterprises have a maximum interest, both moral 
and material, in making full use of their reserves not only in 
the process of the fulfillment of plans, but also during the 
drafting stage. For this purpose it is necessary to work out and 
approve long term plan norms of profitability for every branch 
of production. It would be most expedient to approve these norms 
centrally, in the form of scales determining the size of bonuses 
to enterprise staffs in dependence on the attained level of 
profitability. This ensures an even more rapid. growth of social 
wealth and at the same time, insures against inordinately high 
deductions in favour of the enterprise. There is no danger for 
budget revenues on the contrary there is a possibility of sub­
stantial increase. The principle envisages that the enterprises 
will get bonuses on the basis of their share of participation 
in the income created: the greater the profitability in the plan, 
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which is compiled by the enterprise itself; the greater will 
be the bonus. This ~ansthat it will be unprofitahle.for the 
enterprise to work out plans below its capacity. 
With given prices, the enterprise will have to strive 
for the fu11est possible employment of capa~;ties and equipment. 
Moreover, the enterprise striving for maximum cost reduction, will 
not artificially overstate the norms for the consumption of 
materials, fuel, tool, and power. Finally, the enterprises will 
strive to raise their labour productivity to the maximum. Thus 
the system will achieve the' dictum 'what is profitable for society 
should be profitable for every enterprise ' • 
p 
Secti on 0 
The Critics 
As mentioned earlier in the early 19605 the Liberman 
proposals met with a number of criticisf!1s. L. (.iatovsky writino in 
1962 agrees with the role of profit in a socialist economY, but 
he views it differently. According to him,"The effort to raise 
profitabi1ity exerts a great stimulating effect on an enterprise. 
Its essence lies in systematic improvement of the organization of 
production, increasing the technical facilities per worker and 
labour productivity and in economies and rational utilization 
of producti on resources II. (1) He pro ceeds to assert ~hat prof; t 
is not the sole performance criterion. Another radica1 difference 
is that he refers to the use of the absolute amount of profit 
rather than rate. He asserts ," ..••••••• how·wrong is the position 
of the economists who claim that the average ra~e of profit 
in the national economyshould be the single standard of efficiency 
of producti on, serv; ng as· the. bas i s for all ocati n0 res ources 
Under capitalism, the spontaneous movement of capital inevitably 
gives rise to the tendency toward an average rate of profit. For 
us, however, this is an unsuitable scheme, which runs counter 
to the essence of the ,socialist economy. Some economists correctly 
wishing to elevate the role of profit in our economy, wrongly 
regard the growth of profitability as some kind of au~omatic 
1. 	 Gatovski. L., liThe rol e of profit in a soci al ist economyU, 
KOMMUNIST, 1962, No. 18. 
(60) 
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regulator which supposedly is capable, by it self, of directing 
the operati on of an enterpri se into the channel requi red by 
society. But experience constantly demonstrates that the level 
of profitability can in no way serve for us as a single absolute 
cri teri on of the s:ucces:s of an enterpri se and replace the other 
value indices of production not to mention indices in physical 
terms". He also argues that centralized fixing of prices is not 
compatible with :the profitability criterion as hiqh or low pr;c~~ 
are bound to distort the allocation of resources as the former 
directly affects the profit and further expansion. He is not 
inclined towards didpensing with major obligatory assignments such 
as accumulation, investments, wage fund, and number of employees. 
B.Sukhrevskii 1 approaches the problem from a different 
angle~ ~hile. agreeing with the point that profitability will make 
wnrkeri of an enterprise wi·ll themselves to s'eek and find 
internal reserves. This will make it possible to relieve the 
enterprises of petty patronage and will ensure their economic 
rights and independence. But he disagrees when he feels that 
profitability standard will not make it possible to limit the 
1. Sukharevski i. B., liOn ; mprovi ng the forms and methods of 
materi a 1 incenti veil, VEPROSY EKNOMIKI, 1962, No. 11. 
.. 
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plan indices for the enterprises to be stipulated by the 
economic councils to 'quantity assortment targets' alone. The 
root of the mistake of this proposal, according to him, lies 
in the fact that it ignores the unity of physical and value 
relati ons in social reproducti on, and confuses the cond; tions 
of reproduction of a single enterprise with those for the nation­
al economy as a whole. It may be possible to think in terms of 
labour saving, increase in wages reinvestment and so on for a 
single enterprise. But whenwe consider the national economy 
as a whole, the possibility of providing every enterprise with 
the required means of production and consumer goods. But the 
the profit regulator does not provide such a guarentee even if 
the quantity assortment targets are drawn up for every enter­
prise. This criticism can be easily answered. Onder Liberman 
proposal the production of goods and servi cesin the right 
quantity and quality is assured through linkage effects p w.hile 
piling up of unwanted goods will cause only consumption and 
production distortion. 
In turn Sukhrevskii suggests three criteria for 
evaluating an enterprise's work. a. Plan: Fulfillment and over 
fulfillment of the plan for the corresponding index •. 
b. Dynamics: The expansion of output, the increase in labour 
productivity the reduction in production costs, the increase 
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in profit, in short, the degree of improvement shown by an 

enterprise in the given index. c. Level: With respect to the 

production assets at the disposal of the enterprise and in 

comparison with the achievements of other enterprises. 

Zverev1 severely criticises Liberman proposals 
ttou9h there is not much weight in his arguments. The whole 
proposal seems to him I dub; ous, insuffi ciently tho,ught out 
and inconsistent'. In his opinion, SOMe republic, reqional and plant 
executives leads to the display parochial tendencies, result­
ing in appropriations of investments, disruptions of economic 
balance and disorganization and weakening of the planned basis of 
the economY. The ending of capital investment planning by the state 
planning committee and the economic councils and the transfer of 
these negative tende,ncies and in no way improve the utilization 
of resources for capital investments and the observa~ce of balance 
in the development of the econolllY. In his opinion,"it is impossible 
to replace the role and power of state planning by establishing 
an average profi tabi 1i ty rate for all enterpri se~". 
1. Zverev. A., Against over'simplification in solving complexII 
problems", VEPROSY EKNOMIKI, 1962, No. 11. 
64 

The criticism of Kasitskyl is based on a possible 
technical stagnation. According to ·the proposals the enterprises 
would be interested in a reduction of current and fixed assets. 
Kasitsky feels that with respect to fixed assets this would lead 
to technological stagnati'on: in their drive for a higher index 
the enterprises would stop improving their machinery and would 
reduce investment in fixed assets. He also points out that arbit­
rary price would lead to arbitrary profit which is not an indicator 
of effi ci ency • 
Plotnikov2expressed hts doubts in considering profit 
as the only index. An enterprise's work should be assessed with the 
help of a set of indices, both in value and physical terms. 
Horeover, he al so expresses his anxiety over instabil ity and 
according to him it is impermissable to have production plans 
changed several times a year. '. It would be better to improve the 
deficiencies of the existing scheme than introduci,ng a new one. 
He is in favour of training for managerial personnel in the U.SS.R. 
1. Kasitskii. I., "The main question: criteria for premiums and 
indices planned for enterprises", VEPROSY EKNOMIKI, 1962, No.ll. 
2. Plotnikov.K., "E.G. Liberman Ri ght and Wrong", VEPROSY EKNOMIKI, 
1962, No.ll. 
p 
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Aliter favouring centralized planning, he ~uestions 
Liberman proposals thus: "If centralized planning is brought dQlNn 
on1y to the economi c counci 1 1eve1, and the enterpri ses are per­
mitted to plan these indices themselves, then what is the point 
of planning at all 1eve1sdown to the economic council? with. 
an articia1 gap between planning for the national economy and for 
the enterpri se, the economy wi 11 be running i dl eU He further s U99­• 
ests that a system of continuous planning must be set up so as to 
have an annual plan, target figures for the following year, and 
a long term plan, within this lon~:'('tenTI plan, there can be a bonus 
scale of a long term nature, which would be substantiated by this 
plan but not necessarily based on profitability. In some cases 
the bonus scale may be based on profitability, in other cases 
on economies per rouble of marketable output, etc., It is 
essential that these scales be of a 10nq term nature 
and SUbstantiated by the state long term plan. All this must be 
part and parcel of the system of long term pl anni.og. This wi 11 
create the possibility of organically combining the unified plann­
ing of the national economy with a system of methods of economic 
incentives. 
Fedorovich2 advocates reconstruct; on of the reward 
1. All ter. L. "Incentives Must be Linked with the Long-Term Planning 
of an "Enterprise ll , VEPROSY EKNOMIKI, 1962, No .. l1. 
2. Fedorovi ch. M., PRAVDA, Sept., 3, 1962. 
;s 
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system to depend on quality of individual performance. He ;s 
for a departmentalization of premium criteria. His contention 
is that Liberman unnecessarily introduces an index that is even 
more arbitrarily made than costs of production. He criticizes 
profitability as the only indicator of efficiency with arbitrary 
prices. The problem is whether with fallacious prices, profitabi­
lity, cost reduction, or any other value basis should constitute 
the core of the incentive system. 
Liberman·ls scheme provides management with a large 
leeway for economic maneuverability, but the enterprises will 
simultaneously be constrained by compulsory plan assianments. 
M.Bor argues that the reconciliation of the latter with meaningful 
economic maneuverability is inconsistent as one precludes the 
other. Bor interprets Liberman1s proposals that the enterp.rise1s 
cardinal task is to produce a given volume and composition of 
output. Consequently, the reward system snould be geared to pro­
duction of givern assortments, the volume of output etc., and 
not profi tabi 1i ty and concl udes that Liberman has not chosen a 
proper performance criterion. 
The other maj or cri ti ci sms may be. summ,il,ri zed as fo 11 ows : 
Liberman is inconsistent and vague about the dismantlement of the 
centralized supply system. Supply difficulties may not be eliminated 
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and a seller's market will prevail. Given the existing value 
parameters, it is doubtful whether the planner will permit, or 
not drastically interfere with J substitution of inputs-even if 
such subs ti tuti on shoul d enhance en~erpri se I s profi tabi 1i ty. 
The feasibility of grouping enterprises according to 
similarities of technical and natural conditions for working out 
the numerous profitability norms was questioned because of sharp 
variations in conditions. 1 
Liberman proposals did not specify accumulation as 
a pl an ass; gnment. It was argued that accumul at; on must be 
ascertained in advance in order to assure the necessary flow of 
revenue to the state budget. 
These criticisms arose especially during the early 1960s 
and evinced their anxiety over-decentralization of planning. By 
1965 when Liberman Proposals attained refined form and gained public 
Moreover, most of these criticisms status they all subsided. 

were answered by Liberman himself in his later writings. 

1. Vesselkov. F., PRAVDA, Septerrber 16, 1962,p 3. 
68 
Support for Liberman1s proposals came from Academician 
Nemchinov1. In fact he went much further in many respects than 
Liberman. He declared categorically that, no superior agency can 
have as good a knowledge of internal resources and conditions as 
the enterprise :itself. Under the centralized system, therefore, it 
is especially important to observe the necessary measure of centra­
lization, so as to be able always to ensu.re,adequate scope for local 
planning and initiative. No increase in the number of indices can 
ensure rational economic interrelations between the centre and 
the localities, between the central planning bodies and the enter­
prises. Under his frame work, the cost accountlng system of plann­
ing aiuEd at combjning the procedure of nation~l economic planning 
with the contractual system of cost accounting. and the system of 
materi al incentives, consists of the following" structure: 
a) The enterprises ·submit to the planning agencies of 
.	economi c councils vari ants of pl an to expand thei r production capa­
cities, specifying operating and capital outlays. ~roceeding from 
the national economic plan and these variant plan program~s, the 
planni~g agencies distribute among economic organizations and 
enterprises the plan order, formalized in the shape of a contract 
i ndi cati ng the pri ce and other terms of deli ve~y. 
1. Nemchinov.V. S. "Socialist Economic Managenent and Production 
Planning", KOMt1UNIST, 1964, No.5. 
\ ,f 
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b) The enterprises calculate not only the production 
cost, but also the full factory cost, which is equivaJant to the 
present factory production cost plus compulsory charges on fixed 
and circulating assets, calculated on the basis of legislatively 
fixed long term norms. The results of economic activity are defined 
as the difference between the p1anned price and the full factory 
cost. A positive difference characterises additional profit, 
a negative difference - outstanding profit. The actual profit is 
defined as the sum total of compulsory charges on fixed and 
circulating assets, plus additional profit or minus outstanding 
profit. Compulsory contributions to the enterprise funds are made 
from the actual profit in accordance with lonoterm norms. Under 
certain conditions, contributions to enterprises are envisaged 
also from savings in production costs and the wage fund. 
c) The planned wholesale prices are fixed at the level 
of averaae branch cost. Agricultural prices and'enterprises are cushioned 
by a special insurance fund in the event of fluctuations ~ue to 
unfavourable conditions such as bad weather etc. A special system 
of plan calculations operates to exercise control over the correspon­
dence of prices to the level of the socially necessary outlays of labour. 
The current centralized procedure for drawinq up price lists is 
• 
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substantially simplified and decentralized. 
d) Instead of the system of physical funds regulating 
the use of mater; al resources, there comes into operati on a rami­
fied system of speci al purpose publ i c cost funds, whi ch regul ates 
the entire process of expanded reproduction both on the national 
economic and enterprise level. This fund not only covers specia'] 
cost funds of material resources (fuel and power, raw materials, 
spare parts and depreciation funds) but also the labour remuneration 
premium, material incentives, public consumption, and other funds. The 
replenishments and expenditure of this entire system of special 
purpose public funds are regulated l,egislatively on the basis of 
1on 9 te rm norms. 
e) With the aim of radically improvi~g the procedure 
and technique of planni!1g Clnd managing social production, it is 
intended to establish an automated ·,system for carrying out mass 
economic planning and optimal engineering technical calculations 
required for the adoption of substant.iated economic and planning 
decisions by the central and local agencies. 
The cost accounting system undoubtedlY has immense ad­
vantage over the existing system and also conforms to the princi­
ples of democratic centralism. It will help eliminate bureaucratic 
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methods in planning and in managing the economy. 
The entire discussion came to an end with the offi al 
policy declaration in 1965 by Premier A. N. Kosygin. The following 
important statements will make the purpose of reforms very clear1 
1I ... it is necessary to amass tremendous accu­
mulations for capital investments and at the same 
time, to secure a considerable increase in the 
material well~being of the people. This poses 
most sharply the problem of expanding the rreans': 
whi ch secure the growth of resources.. ' . 
This moves to the forefront, as the main 
problem, raising the efficiency of socialist 
production as much as possible, saving 1ive and 
materialised labour, and considerably and steadily
increasing returns from capital inve$tments and 
fi xed assets .. 
Of great importance"in this connection is 
intensification of the struggle against all 
forms of poor management, squandering, and un­
productive spending. We have considerable over 
staffing and unnecessary expenditures, the .price, 
requi red to obtain resul ts, and to the eff; ci ency
of labour of not only each enterprise but of 
each individual worker as well. 
~~------------~-~-~-----------------------The higher the national income, the more mepns 
can be allocated for the development of production 
and for raising the well being of the people. 
That is why we must achieve a constant increase 
in income from each rouble invested in fixed 
assets •. 
The fact that fixed assets are not yet utilised 
1. Kosygin. A. N., liOn improving industrial management 
perfecting planning, and enhancing incentives in Industrial production" 
IZVESTIA, September 28, 1965. 
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adequately in our country compels us to make 
tremendous investments in creating new fixed 
assets. This cannot but affect the distribut­
ion of the national income and the magnitude 
of the share which is allocated for popular 
consumption. 
The presidium of the CPSU central committ­
ee and the council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. 
are of the opinion that in tackling the problems 
of further developing industry and raising the 
people I s 1 i ving standards, the greatest atten­
tion should be focused on improving the methods 
and forms of industrial management, planning
and stimuli in industry are no longer in con­
formity with modern techni cal - economi c con­
ditions and the present level of the productive 
forces. 
The economic initiative and rights of enter­
prises are too narrow and their area of responsi­
bility is insufficient. The cost accounting 
system is in many ways a formality. The existing
system of materi a 1 encouragement to industria 1 
personnel does little to interest them in im­
proving the over all results of the work their 
enterprises and often operates in contradiction 
to the interests of the national economy as 
a whole .. 
Great flexibility and efficiency are needed 
in product~on management and planning under 
present conditions. It is extremely important 
to take in to account the changing economic 
situation, and to do so in a timely fashion, 
as well as to maneuver resources, to ski 11­
fully correlate - not only from the top, but 
also from below - production with the increased 
needs and demands of the population, to rapidly 
introduce scientific and engineering achieve­
ments 1n to production, and to find the best 
solutions for economic problems in the concrete 
conditions of each enterprise. 
73 
p:: 
The main aim of the measures proposed is 
to bring the p1anning system and methods of 
economic management in to conformity with the 
tasks of communist construction, to develop 
further the most important aspects and ad­
vantages of the socialist mode of production, 
and thus to secure a more rapid movement of 
our economy a10ng the road to communismu • 
;s 
Section ~ 

Reform proposals ;n the COMECON countries: 

By no means was the quest for eff; ci ency restri cted 
to the U .. S.. S.R. only .. We can trace discussions of.·a slmilar nature 
in all the fast European countries. In Czechoslovakia, the retard­
ation of growth and economic perfonmance in the 1960s and in par­
ticular calamitous results of 1963 prompted Czechoslovak economi~ts 
to take a hard look at economic realities. Though criticisms 
had been voiced in the late 1950s it lacked the fervor of their 
Polish and Hungarian counterparts. This may be due to three 
factors. 1. Living standards in Czechoslovakia were considerably 
higher than in other East European countries. 2. There was little 
turmoil and dissatisfaction at the grassroots •. 3" The fraternity 
of economi sts in Czechos 1 ovaki a was weaker than that of its nei ghbours" 
Perhaps the Czechoslovak refonn movement of the 19605 
had more ellan vital than that of other east european countries 
because the need came relatively late - at a time when economic 
performance joined forces to push through radical proposals. Also 
by 1963, a new generation of economists had come of age. They slowly 
became aware of the ferment in economic thought taki,ng place 
around them. The first art; cl es on mathe~lati ca 1 economi cs appeared 
during the period 1958- 59, but until 1963 the science of planometrics 
had not made noticeable inroads. Probably it was felt that planometrics 
could not offer immediate solutions to pressing problems and that 
(74) 
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their further refinement would dea1y cha~ges by another decade or 
so. Perhaps it was also due to lack of mathematical sophistication. 
In general, Czechoslovak economists were not attracted to push .' 
button economics hut found far more appeal in the possibilities 
of recusciating the market mechanism. 1 
While the Czechoslovak economists acknowledged some 
of the exogenous factors, such as severe drought, an excetional1y 
severe winter in 1963, deteriorating relations with Chinese and 
other tensions on the international scene, they realized that 
these were by no means the only causes for the failure of the 
economy. 
In 1963, Radoslav Selucky took up the call for reforming 
the planning system. He stressed that the traditional model was 
not the 'categorical imperative I for a socialist economy. He lean­
ed toward the decentralization advocated by the Polish economist 
W1odz·;mierz Brus and toward borrowing of such concepts like 'profit 
motive' market mechanism etc.,2 
1. Ota Sik., POLITIKA EKONOMIE, Ho. 1. p. 24. 
2. Radoslav Se1ucky, KULTURNI ZIVOT, August 10,1963. 
p 
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Ota Sik, the Director of the Institute of Economics 
of the Czechoslovak Acade~ of Sciences and member of the C.C. 
who previously had dealt with the problem of divergence of interests 
between the individual and the state and had emphasized the need 
for harmonizing these interests 'in a rationally operating economy 
was able to soften the radi cal ism of Sel ucky' s, yet emerqed with 
proposals very much akin to his. 1 At the Dec., 1963 meeting of 
the CC,Sik argued that Czechoslovakia had already depleted its 
manpower resources and did not enjoy the U.S.S.R.IS relative self 
sufficiency. It could no longer afford to model itself on the 
U.S.S.R. and must solve its problems boldly and differently by 
blending the plan and market. 
On october 17, 1964 Rude Pravo published the 'Draft 
principles of a system for improving the economy's planned manage­
ment l , whose outstanding architect was Ota Sik. Instead of approving 
the document at its December meeting the C C passed it to its 
economic commission, approved the document in principle but referred 
to the need for further elaboration of some of its concepts. The 
C C fi nally approved by the end of January 1965 .. 
1. Ota Si k, PLAN ~ID ~4ARKET UNDER SOCIALISM , transl a ted from 
Czech., New York: International Arts and Sciences Press, 1967. 
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In Czechoslovakia, intellectual . discussion is 
quite absent unlike the U.S.S1oR. because of political factions .. 
The same of course led to later crisis in 1969 when these propo­
sals were abrogated suddenly. Economic liberlization were stre'ched 
too far and more than what political conditions would permit. 
In fact knowingly or accidently political liberlization also was 
pushed alongside when the country was not mature enough for 
them otherwise. It is not very difficult to judge from the fact 
that Hungary could successfully implement more or less similar 
reforms at the same time with out any intervention by any foreign 
power .. 
In Poland, the discussion on economic reforms can 
be traced back to 1957. Oscar Lange gave a lecture in ,Warsaw 
entitled liOn some problems of the Polish road to socialism". This 
can be considered not only as an authentic interpretation of the 
Polish economic reforms but also as an authentic expression of 
the state of Marxi st theory at that ti me. 1 
Lange advocated that though the end is same viz., 
socialism,means toachieve it need not necessarily be the same .. 
Differences may exist in some areas like management of economy, 
planning, forms of organization of the national economy and so on. 
1. Radoslav Selucky, ECO~OMIC REFORMS IN EASTERN EUROPE-POLITICAL 
BACKGROUND AND ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE, Opa cit., Pp. 72-73. 
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For Poland he wanted to build socialism on a broader basis incl­
uding petty bourgeoisie, small businessmen and craftsmen. This 
was narrowed down when the soviet model was introduced. The ration­
ale of introducing a war type economy according to him was cold 
war, shortages of managers and 1ack of experi ence etc., However he 
wrote, II It is cl ear of course, tha~ the methods of war-time econoll1Y 
which replaced economic incentives by administrative decisions 
and by moral political slogans whcih may be necessary and useful 
;n a -certain period and cannot be considered as lasting methods 
of the management of national economy. This is why we are gradually 
abandoning such methods. Distortions stem from the.fact that the 
methods remained in use longer than necessary. As a result, 
the bureaucrati c, centrali sti c apparat became to an extent., an 
autonomous force with in the state apparat. Th'us the dictatorship 
of the proletariat was gradually replaced by the dictatorship 
of the bureaucratic - administrative apparatu~l 
Lange also felt that the farmers form a weak '.ink 
in socialist element. Though peasantry was in favour of socialist 
production relations in industry, it preferred small, private production 
in the village. His prescription for Polish economy was that it 
1. Os car Lange, ABOUT SOf'llE PROBLEr,1S CONCERNING POLISH WAY TO SOCIALISM 
Warsaw: Polonia, 1957, pp 13-14. 
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should aim ~t a synthesis of centralist planning of the national 
economy and a broad decentralization of management. Secondly, 
management of the econonw should be based on worker self manage­
ment within the frame_work of central pl anni'ng and management 
of the entire economy. The model would lie between Yugoslavia 
and the U.S.S.R. 
According to Lange, the planning authority.would 
conti nue to deci de the re 1 ati ve proporti ons of main branches 1 i ke 
between agriculture and industry, between consumption and production 
and so on. They waul d also determi ne the aggregate wage fund, 
aggregate fund of consumer and services, accumulation and consum­
ption. Here we must note that Lange does not speak about market 
mechanism unlike other late.r writers. Here we should recollect 
his article IOn the theory of Socialism', he resolved that the 
problem of rational allocation of production factors may be solved 
even with out a real market·· within the means of production1• 
On the whole his ideas to day appear to be' "rather moderate but they 
were considered a,s revolutionary and even heretical in 1957. 
There ;s no doubt that Poland had been theoritically 
ready for a reform of the centralized economic system earlier 
, ... , ........ . 

• • , ,I I • " '. 
1. Oscar Lange, ~IOn the;: ecorioiili c:·tfie~ry 'tif .Soc; al i ~mll, THE REVIEW 
OF ECONOMIC STUDIES IV 1936" - 37 
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than any other COMECON country_ Even prior to world war II Lange 
and Michal Kalecki belonged among the world1s outstanding economists. 
Brus'who significantly influenced Hu~gar;an and Czech 
economic thinking in the 1960s~had proposed that the market be 
taken intol consideration ifl planning and 'that enterprises should 
have 1 the right to decide on the volume and structure of their 
production as early as 1955. In 1956, he suggested that the fuaterial 
interest of enterprises and individual workers be tied to the 
profits they created. 1 In 1957, Brus and Kalecki proposed that 
enterprises be awarded bonuses for any increase in profits. Thus 
the main theme of Liberman's ideas had been fonnulated earlier 
in Poland and in a much more consistent manner. Moreover, there 
was a free discussion in Poland. Kurowski:who is criticized;n 
Poland for his views even to day, su,ggested as early as 1956 that 
the central plan play the ,role of a Jrere co-ordinator of production 
and that proportions be determined by a market mechanism. Wakar conceded 
that socialist economy need not be bound by central planning. 
Although the last two ideas were rejected in the Polish discussion 
of 1956, they certainly contributed to the willi~gness of even the advo­
cates of a r~gulated market to admit that administrative interventions 
should be an exception rather than the rule of central planning. 
1. Brus, THE LAW OF VALUE AND PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC INCENTIVES, 
Warsaw: PWN 1956, P 148• 
II 
CHAPTER III 
ECONOMIC REFORMS IN PERSPECTIVE 
In the Socialist economies methods of direct controls 
have hitherto been used, rather than any market 
mechanism, and there is deep-rooted objection to 
concepts, such as rent and marginal cost, drawn from 
the apologettcs of capitalism. It is only just beginn­
ing to be realised thata price system based on supply 
and demand, though a bad master, may be an useful 
. II 
servant. 

--Joan Robinson-­
Section A 
Introduction 
The economic discussion conducted in the Soviet Union 
from 1962 or even earlier to 1965 theoritically substantiated 
and the experiments carried out at some factories corroborated 
the practical advisability of measures impro~ing forms and 
methods of socialist planning and economic stimulation of enter­
prises, measures' providing greater personal incentives for the 
working people. The results of the experiments and the economic 
discussion were summed up by the central committee of the soviet 
communist party at its plenary meeting .September.,-.1965 and 
reforms were carried out subsequently. The following new ele­
ments appeared in soviet economic policy. 
1. The scientific level of planning was raised. 
2. An optimum combination of centralised planning with wide 
economic initiative of enterprises on the basis of compl~te 
Khozraschot was ensured. 
3. Greater economic incentives were provided for; as the eficiency 
of production rose, the amount of funds left at the disposal 
of an enterprise for developing production and rewarding per­
sonnel was also increased. 
4. The role and importance of profit in assessing the economic 
activity of enterpises were enhanced. 
(81) 
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5. Waqes of workers were made dependent not only on the results 
of the activities of the entire personnel. 
6.. Economic relations between enterprises were based on direct 
contracts and the principle of mutual material responsibility .. 
Though the main features remained the same and reforms in the 
U.S.S.R4'laved the green signal for major reforms in .,Eastern 
European countires, neither the year 1965 marks the beginning 
of economi c refonns nor were implemented in a similar 
manner. This obviously res,ulted in varied degrees of liberli ­
zation taking into consideration the political feasibility 
and economi c requi rements .. In fact at the 20th party congress 
in 1956, the soviet leadershipconcede~ the possibility ?f 
Idifferent paths to socialism·. Now as a direct result of 
different approaches to economic reforms by these co~ntr;es, 
they can be cons; de red as a huge econ.omi c 1 aboratory where 
different principles are being tested and various better sol­
utions ,ar.e evolved according to thi'r conditions and experiences. 
Disregarding pre 1950 period, earliest reforms 
can be traced in Yugoslavia (1950-52) then in Hungary (1953-54) 
Czechos 1ovaki a (1953-54) and the G. D. R. (1954-55). Among all 
these countires only in Yugoslavia decentra,lization took place 
mainly in the form of discontinuation of annual plans, restoration 
."ll 
83 

of pri ce mechanism (parti ally) t worker's sel f management and 
decollectivization of land 
, 
etc., 
The next w,ave of reforms occured during 1956-60. 
Yugoslavia made further progress in decentralization of 
planning, management and financing of investment(1958). 
Though ambitious plans were drawn up by economists in Poland 
and Hungary, as the political and economical atmosphere was 
not ripe enough and only few proposals were put through. 
Poland implemented legalization of workers' c~uncil in 1956, 
formation of industrial associations to participate in economic 
administration and management, and de-collectivization of land. 
Decentralization of economic administration to a certain extent 
was achieved in the U.S .S.R. (1957). Some decentral i zation of 
planning and price fixing was fntroduced in 'Hungary(1957-59). 
But these ea·rly reforms in the 19505, with the 
exception of Yugoslavia did not alter much the centralized 
p1ann; ng system of any of these soci ali st countri es of Eastern 
Europe.But reforms that were implemented closely following soviet 
proposals to begin with did alter the system to a great ex~ent 
that. Hungari an economist Varga observed, 1I ••• the· reforms 
have not been aimed at tinkering with the old sys'tem. The 
sine quo non of further rapid development in the long run 'is a 
comprehensi ve overhaul of the previ ous sys tem t going far beyond 
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merely removing its obvious failings". 1 
According to Zielinski, "All countries realized 
that it is necessary to abandon direct, administrati.ve planning 
and move to broader use of so called 'economic tools' in their 
management mechanism. ~'Jhether these tools should be based 
primarilly on the use of market mechanism, or be of the 
state parametric type has not however been decided, uniformly 
by all Eastern Europe. We are inclined to think moreover, 
that if the market or the state parametric model finally pre­
vails, it will not exclusively be due its economic merits or 
demerits, but equally important will be its political and 
social implications. It is however, a hypothesis for which we 
do not have fully val; d scienti fi c proof. 112 
Though all countries of our study were having 
similar degree of centralized planning before 1965 because of 
their different levels of economic development and political 
environment, causes for and consequences of economic reforms 
caused certain amount of diversity. Regarding causes of economic 
1. Varga. G., in Z.Lewandowicz and ~1.Misiak (ed.) ECONOMIC 
REFORMS IN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES~ Warsaw: PWE, 1967, p 336,. 
2. Ziel inski. J., G., II Economi c Reforms in Eastern Europe ll 
ECONOMICS OF PLANNING, Vol. 9, No.3. 1969, P 292. 
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reforms~n Yugoslavia, it was the expulsion from cominform 
in 1948. (whether it is the cause or consequence is a debatable 
point). In most other countries, Czethoslovakia, the S.D.R., 
Hungary, Pol and and U.• S.$. R. the reforms were adopted be~a1Jse 
of the ineptituQe and the waste of the old system became 
unbearab 1, e. , 
In Bulgaria and Romania though the extensive sources 
of growth did not show any appreciable inefficiency of the old 
system, the reforms were adopte~ in antiCipation of what ;s 
going to come, a lesson learnt from the experiences of the 
lother countri es •. In fact these countries, thanKS to, the ' 
experiences of other countries the reforms were more systematic 
and far reachi~g. 
In Bulgaria, the G.D.R., Roman;a and in Yugoslavia 
(1950-52) the initiative carne largely from above while in other 
countries there was a good deal of pressure from below. Especially 
in Poland, U.S.S.R. ,and Bul gar; a considerable hesitan'ce was 
shown and actual reforms introduces only after conducting practical 
experiments extending over one to three years. Widespread 
theori ti ca1 di scussi ons preceded and prepared the, ground for reforms. 
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Regarding implementation of reforms, in the G.D.R. 
the reforms had been most carefully prepared and carried out with 
precision in three stages. In Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary 
and Yugoslavia', the reforms of the 1960s were put into practice 
in one sweep. The reforms were effectively and smoothly implemented 
in Yugosl avi a and Hungary where as in Czechoslovaki a and Pol and 
because of political divisions there were many obstructions. 
Thus decentralization is most radica1 in Yugoslavia. 
followed by Hungary and Czechoslovakia, but least in Romania, 
the U.S.S.R. and the G.D.R. But again, the levels of decentralization 
in various spheres like price determination, Banking system, 
administrati on of wage funds, conduct of fore,; gn trade, workers I 
participation in management varied to a great extent. 
While makin~ a comparative study of these countries 
we must bear in mind that the U.S.S.R., the G.O.R., Czechoslovakia, 
and Hunqary are the more developed of the socialist countries as 
reflected in national and per capita incomes. These countries 
are cons; dered fa; rly advanced whi le the other countri es of our 
study are in a developino staqe comparatively. This is brouqht 
out clearly in the followinq Table. 
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Per capita Indices of National Income of six East European countries l 
Year G.D.R .. Czech .. Hunqary Poland Bulqaria Romania 
1955 100 97 60 61 36 35 
1964 100 101 68 63 59 50 
1970 100 90 64 56 31 37 
Amount of Per capita income in U.S.$ at 1970 Market prices U.S.S.R .. 
2930 2230 1600 1400 760 930 
The followina summary of reforms 2 will pive a bird's eye 
vi ew of the maior reforms adopted by these countri es: 
Bul qari a: 
1964 Capital charoes introduced 
1967 Reform of Producers' prices 
1968 Decentralization of planninq and manaqement: 
1968-69 Bankinq and credit reforms 
1. Source: First two lines, Zielinski, J.G., Economics and Politics of 

Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe, ECONmlICS OF PLANNING:. Vol. 9, No.3, 

1969, p. 290. Lines 3 and 4 tRENDS IN PEVELOPIN~ COUNTRIES~ 

World Bank~ 1973, Table 1.4 

2. Wi 1czyn sk i, J., SOCI ALI ST ECONO~~IC DEVELOPfYlENT AND REFORMS , 

New York: Prae~er Publishers, 1972, pp. 50-51. 
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Czechos 1ovaki a 
1965 Independent associations to play greater role 
1967 Decentralization of planning and management flexible 
price system; strengthening of economic levers 
1968 Second stage of price reforms 
1969 Banking and credit reform 
G.D .. R. 

1961 State National Economi c Council repl aced independent. 

ministries 
1963 greater role to be played by independent associations 
1965 S.N.E.C. abolished; increased self financing of enterprises 
1968 Banking and credit reform; strengthening of financial 
levers and controls 
1969-70 Reform of industrial prices 
Hungary 
1957 Some decentralization of planning and price setting; 
profit sharing introduced 
1959 pri ce mark ups to promote techni·cal progress 
1963 Some decentralization of Industry. 
1965 Increase in agricultural prices 
Substantial decentralization of planning and management1966 

Flexible pri ce system; extensi on o,f materi al incenti ves
1968 

; n agri cul ture 
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Poland 
1956 Workers' council legalized 
1957 decollectivization 
1960 Major revision of wholesale price 
1963 Some decentralization in Industry 
1966 Strengthening of financial levers. 
1967 Reform of factory pri ces 
1969 - 70 Banking and credit reform 
1971 Reform of producers· prices 
Romani a 
1963 Major revision of wholesale prices 
1967 Branch associations set up 
1968 - 69 Some decentralization in industry and foreign trade; 
strengthening of economic levers and financial controls; 
diversification of banking 
1970 - 71 Reform of Producers' prices 
U.S.S.R. 
1957 Most industrial ministries replaced by regional economic 
counci 1s 
1959 Greater central; zati on of banking 
1961 Domestic revaluation of the rouble 
1963 Savings banks taken over by the State Bank 
1965 Official acceptance of the profit criterion 
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Greater independence of enterprises and farms; 
Regional economic councils replaced by centralized 
economic ministries 
1967 Reform of producers I prices; extension of commercial 
accounting in agri cul ture 
1969 - 70 Rationalization of land use; increased commercialization 
of collective farming 
Yugoslavia 
1958 Further decentralization of planning, management 
and financing 
1960 Greater role of tariffs 
1961 Devaluation of Dinar 
1964 - 65 Banking reform 
1967 Anti dumping duties introduced 
As a direct consequence of these reforms each country 
is e.\tolving its own socialist path. There are no extremities of 
centralism or free market but a pea.ceful co-exixtence of central 
planning aided by market mechanism. In essence it represents 
Ithe dialectical unity of plan and market-. The deputy chairman 
of Czechoslovak state planning commission declared, We cannotII 
operate with a plan whi ch el iminates the market just the same 
as we' cannot operate with a market in the absence of a pl an, 
nor can the market be regarded only as an instrument for putting 
;:zz 
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the plan into effect. The market represents an objective 
economi c category whi ch constitutes an object for the recogni­
tion and function of the pl an" II 1 
Though Liberman disapproves with the term Imarket 
socialism'. the system in force in Yugoslavia since 1965 is often 
described by that term. Under this set~up there is maximum eytent 
of the social ownership of the means of production and minimuld 
degree of central planning are combined with a virtually freely 
operating market mechanism and workers' self management. A similar 
liberlized scheme has been advocated by many economists like 
G.Petrov, Ota sik, F.Behrens, P.Erdos, W.Brus, G.S.Lisichkin. 
In fact, V.Bakaric of Yugoslavia and E.Lobi of Czechoslovakia 
have urged the adoption bf market socialism without pl~nning. 
However, it should be noted here that these measures of 
decentralization should not be taken as an evidence of return to 
capitalism. As mentioned earlier, means and ends should not be 
confused. Many elements like profit, interest in these countries 
have different meaning. Both socialist and capitalist countries 
today "agree that the market is not the best mechanism to shape 
structural developments, new production capacities and progress 
in science ~nd technology in accordance with long~run social 
preferences. At the same time one should not fail to note 
1. Kohontek. M., liThe prob 1em of plan and market' ,PLANNED 
ECONOMY, Prague, 9 - 1967, ~. 17. 
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the practical difficulties of combining plan and market. In 
the opinion of Ota Sik, i.t is not difficult to link the planII 
and the market in a theoritical abstraction and demonstrate the 
necessity of their unity under socialism. It is much more diffi­
cult to work out concrete forms of their interaction under specific 
social economic conditions ll 1It is now a point of common obser­• 
vation that all countries (capitalist) public expenditure and 
thereby place of government in the working of the economy has ;vme 
to stay. But the socialist countries with sophisticated planning 
techniques may work well in combining market and plan and may 
prove to be more successful than capitalist countries have been '. 
in co~hatino the vaoaries and inequities of the market throuqh 
government control. 
1. Ota Sik, PLAN AND MARKET UNDER SOCIALISM, ap.cit., p142 
Sect; on B 
Planning and Management 
The old system of planning and management was known 
for the following features: a) Centralisation of decision making; 
b) hierarchical nature of economic relations; c) directive nature 
of planning and management; d) physical balancing. The new syctpm 
aimed at streamling in several ways of adopting to the needs of 
intensive growth. The new plans are constructed from 'below· 
(counter planning) where branch associations and enterprises 
participate in determining the structure of production according 
to demand and their own capacities. There is also introduction 
of a new feature called Ihorizontal planning' where enterprises 
enter into contracts with others directly, resulting in more in­
dustrial co-operation. In Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Yugoslavia 
annual plans are dropped in favour of long term planning. In 
Yugoslavia, compulsory targets have been dropped altogether. 
In other countries such targets have been reduced to around 100 
compared to several thousands under the old system. There is also 
considerable reduction in the number of directive indicators .. 
There is also an orientation of plan towards 
favouring consumer goods sector. It is called 'flexible planning' 
under which changes in production plan are allowed and the enter­
(93) 
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prises are entitled for a compensation if the C:hanges come from 
'above' or errors committed in the orginal plan. 
Another important change can be noticed in what is 
known -as • structural planning'. Traditionally plans are worked 
out by the relevant economic ministries with the participation 
of the branch associations and enterprises concerned. This ha~ 
resulted in narrow interests in ,several ways impedino. technolo~i­
cal progress. Under this new scheme planning will not concern 
with individual branches but with selected broad goals or problems 
like modernization, specilization, industrial cooperation, applied 
research and innovations. It no more attempts merely in extra­
polation of existing situations but attempts to anticipate the 
desired structure and direction of development in the future. 
It is more aimed at assimilation of new technology by providing 
plans based on economi c ·prognoses to promote the continuity of 
technical progress. 
U.S.S .. R. 
As pointed out earlier, 1965 reform~ in the U.S.S.R. 
was preceded by wide discussions and experimentation unlike ear-lier 
reforms.' These reforms consisted essenti ally of the abolition 'of 
the regi ona1 economi c counci 1s (sovarkhozy) and ina way return 
to the old system of union and union-republic industrial ministries 
as supervisory authorities for enterprises by industries. In addition 
a certain territorial decentralization was introduced i~to the 
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material and technical supply system. Enterprises coming under 
an industrial branch ministry (Union or Union-republic) are 
split up among a certain number of sub branches, each of which 
is directed by a central office (glauk) forming on integral part 
of the ministry. The ministries and glavki should no longer con­
cern themselves with the current management of the enterprises 
under their supervision. They are to co-ordinate plans and iriv~s~­
ments, to stimulate technical progress, and to ensure the financing 
of the. enterprises and their supplies of man power, raw material 
and eq ui pmen t. 
1965 reforms did not change the operating conditions 
of the unions of enterprises called ·soviet firms'. Since 1970 
certain interest was shown in this type of industrial concentration. 
These unions operate on Khosraschet principle. 
Af~er trying various methods in 1973 it was decided to 
follow a pattern similar to the G.D.R. From 1975 relations bet­
ween supervising ministries and the enterpri.ses are conducted 
through combinants, which in some branches are grouped in ·unions. 
The glavki will be abolished and the ministries will no longer 
concern themselves with the current management of enterprises. 
Combinats and unions will work on the Khosraschet principle 
and will enjoy wide autonom¥. 
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Bulgaria 
Reforms in Bulgaria were introduced in stages. when 
theoritica1ly accepted in 1963 these principles were experimented 
with few enterprises. Convinced of success ;n these enterprises 
the new system approved in 1966 and carre into operation from 
1st Jan.1969. This was a liberal scheme but the same was revised 
in 1970 which reinforced centralized planning. Again since 1972 
there is a tendency to further liberlize and further decem.. r ... 
lization is expected. 
The organization of production is based on the 
distinction between simple production units or 'enterprises' 
and complex one whic,h is a concentrati.on and int,egration of 
silJllle ones as 'economic unions'. Major production is carried 
through unions which corre directly under the council of ministers. ' 
Enterpri ses are not 1 arge in number and they are subordi nate to 
the competent industrial ministry. 
In 1971, new unions around 65 in number were formed 
out of some 120 unions which existed since 1963. These new groups 
besides exercising quasi monopoly, are responsible for all 
down-the line activitiesinc1uding marketing. These unions since 
1911 enjoy legal autonomY and are responsible for executing 
the plan for all their subdivisions. The union divides the 
overall production plan among various enterprises, fixes their 
norms and ind~ces, meets their needs for capital and raw material, 
= a 
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markets their output and so forth. Enterprises that form a 
part of the union like a branch of a big company enjoy­
ing monopolistic production. Their work is elevated on the 
basis of satisfaction of production targets fixed for -them, 
~uantity and structure of production, targets for increase 
in the technical level of production and utilization of pro­
duction capacity. 
The unions receive directly from the council of 
ministers the compulsory indicators for the establishment of 
.. 
their plans. The micro economic charater of the plan is limited 
to about 120 essential products. This may vary from one plan 
to another at-the discretion of the authorities. All other 
indicators such as gross output, the proportion of total output 
intended for sale, th~ assortment of products, total profit, 
improved labour productivity are merely 'statistical indicators' 
used ;n drawing up the national plan. Enterprises and unions 
based on these, establish their production plans and freely 
negoti ate buying and selling contracts among themsel ves. The 
plans of the unions and enterprises are used as a basis for 
establishing the national pl~n. 
£ 
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Czechoslovakia 
The principles of 'new mechanisml were voted at 
the beginning of 1965. They were further modified by increasing 
'autonomy of the enterpri se and 'greater use of the market 
mechanism. The party was divided on the issue of decentralization 
vs recentralization since April 1969. Jhe salient features gf the 1965 
reform are that central planning should be confined to the 
: 
basic macro economic magnitudes like distribution of the natL""r,..il 
income, pattern of consumption etc., Leading role was played 
by five year plans, divided into annual plans and accompanied 
by special plans like foreign exchange, regional plans, industries 
Union plans etc., Unions were free to draw their own plans 
within the frame wo'rk of over all plan. Under the federal 
constitution there are four centres of economic decision. 
a) The federal authorities consisting of three ministries and 
seven committees. Since 1971 economic policy and planning for 
the whole country and foreign trade have become the responsi­
bility of the federal authorities. b) The 'republ ican' authorities 
which up to 1971, included most of the individual ministries 
and committees. Since 1971 federal government is responsible 
for the greater part of the activities and 'republ ican' plans 
have become subordinate to federal plan. c) The trusts and 
lconcerns l ; 102 large production economic units were created 
to work under the principle of I Khozraschet' integrating the 
productive commercial, and research activities of member 
;:as 
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d) enterprises: which were intended to enjoy high degree 

autonomy, but whose prerogatives have been considerably dimi­

nished since 1970. Since then the power of the trusts and con­

cerns has been greatly strengthened. 

German Democratic Republic 

Centalized economy has had a long tradition in 
Germany. Though the soviet system introduced in 1929-30 and 
the Nazi system introduced after 1933 substantively differed 
from each other by di ffer4 ng forms of ownershi p, by an enti re ly 
different social base, and by differing ideologies, some of 
their principles were identical. Central management of economic 
processes according to political considerations, a rationing 
system, frozen or stable prices, and similar administrative 
procedures in allocating both capital and manpower were some 
of the common principles. Nevertheless, they differed' an their 
purpose. In Germany, it was preparation for war while in Soviet 
ijnion it was socialist industrialization. 
Because there were no socialist revolutions in 
East Germany, the social quality of labour and production relations 
changed only to a nrinor degree. Similarly, the basic principles 
of the Nazi centralized system were taken over; when the German 
Democratic Republic was forrred many rational elements of the 
Nazi command system were not eliminated but merely supplemented 
by and combined with ideological elements of the soviet centralized 
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system~ East German population does not consider the centralized 
economic system as something alien or imposed from the outside 
but as a system which fits the countryts economY further helps 
it to function more satisfactorily. An important part, in this 
respect, is played by the excellent German organisational skills 
and the high level of administrative efficiency, a particularly 
important factor in an administrative system•. 
The German system differed from other centralized 
systems in many respects. Though its industry was nationalized 
it was able to take advantage of of the entreperneurial skills 
of the middle petty bourgeoisie; as late as 1968 the share of 
the private sector in the gross industrial output was 12.9% 
Though the market mechanism' and rationing continued till 
1960s, tens of thousands of small business helped to overcome 
the imbalance between supply' and demand. The skills and capacity 
of middle class farmers were utilised by appointing them as 
heads and leading officials of collective farms. G.DaR. perhaps 
;s the only socialist economY where middle class potentialities 
were utilised or continues to be utilised. 
Nevertheless, it could not escape a decline of 
economic efficiency in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Although 
shortage of labour, a favourable industrial structure, the 
highly developed skills of the population, the pragmatic economic 
policy, and the relatively high level of technology should 
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all have encouraged intensive economic growth, the capital­
output ratio grew extremely quickly and confirmed that a decline 
of the investment effectiveness and of over all capital 
efficiency was taking place. 
The reforms were tried from 1963 onward in four 
unions of enterprises which were created in 1958. The detnils of 
the new economic system (NoS) were worked out between 1964 
and 1967. At the 7th congress of the United socialist party 
in April 1967, it was decided to bring all the reforms listed 
above between 1964 and 1967, into gradual application under 
the name of leconomic socialist system' (OSS) which replaced NoS. 
The main emphasfs is on the • perspecti ve pl ans' 
for 15 to 20 years based on vari ous factors 1 ike forecasts of 
technical progress and economic and social evolution. The 
Iplanning codes' for a shorter period like 5 to 7 years define 
the ways and means of achievlng the targets of the perspective 
plan while seeking to maximize national -income in that period. 
The resulting tasks are listed to the ministries, unions and 
enterprises responsible for carrying them out. Though annual 
plans are designed as sub.division of the medium - term 
plan, they are used for revising it. 
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Regarding the procec1Lire for drawing up a short 9r 
med; ~~m term pl an, 1 t starts wi th ~. general economi c concep ti on 
drawn up by the planning commission which outlines the main 
components of national inco~ ~nd investments for the planning 
period! The planning connission then distributes the tasks 
amo,ng ministries, which clistribute them among state owned 
enterpri ses (VVBs) whi en fi na11y di stri bute :;the ass-lgnmen ts 
for enterprises. The enterprises then work out the preliminary 
variQnts of their plans, wh.ich, go back through the arjministrative 
channel s and are used as a bas 1 s for qrawing up the pl ans 
of enterprises, unions and ministries. The difference between 
U,S.S.R. and G,D~R~ is that this system applies only to pro~ 
ducts granted absolttte priority (about aD}. Por all other 
products, centralised planni,ng is limited to defining basic 
indicators, the most import~nt of which a-re the profit plan 
and the 'new technique' plan. 
The compul sory i nct; c~tors, for Associ ati ons of state 
owned enterprises qnc.t enterprises are the value and quantity 
of output of the main groups of priority articles and the 
products of raw materi a1 s whose ba1 ances tonn part of the 
central plan, the main fore,ign trade targets, the wage funds, 
the price trends of the main group of products, and the long 
term state norms~ payments for capital goods, levies on profit, 
rate of depreciation, and payment to bonus fund. There are 
a 
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also many other statistical indicators. which are 
in principle not compulsory indicators but are also 
imposed upon enterprises, As tn Romania and Bulgaria 
the decentraltzatton cif d~cfstons is mainly to the benefit 
of VVBs and combinants~ But this decentralization does 
not affect essential products, the p1anning of which remains 
concentrated ~t the center. 
Hungary 
The first mod1f1c~tion~ were made as early as 
1 9 5 7. To beg t n \'Ji t h the n u m be r 0 f' cam pu1S 0 r yind tea t Gr s 
were reduced and a workers~ m~tertal stimulatton fund 
was tntroduced tn enterprises, ba.s-ed on profi,ts earned. 
Assoct~ted w'ith this, capital cha'rges, were introduced in 
1964, The central offices of the mtntstr1es for adm1n1stra~ 
tion of enterprises were replaced by unions of enterprises 
tn 1963. 
The new s c heme \fa. s i' mp,lemen ted bi 1968. This wa, s 
a.n i'ntegrated and complete system embodYi~g the whole, of 
the cauntry~s activity and fundementall~different from 
so,tet model, (with the exception of few products amount1~g 
to 1 0 % 0 f the' W'h ole 0 ut put t. Act t ve p' a'n ni ~ 9 i s con fin e d 
to ~ggreg~tes ltke nat1on~1 income. tndustria1 output, 
csnsumption, capital investment and for~tgn trade. with the 
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exception of a few compul sory products the nat; anal 
plan whether five year or one year lays down no imperatives 
for economic units, which are free to take their decisions 
in an economic context influenced by such instruments 
of the plan as credit policy, th& regulation of foreign 
t r a de, and price pol;' cy. The cen t r a 1 aut h 0 r i tie s howe ve r 
a11 0 cat e t he pro d u c t s t h at mus t be' comp u 1 so r i 1 y prod uc e d . 
The economic administration is at two levels. 
At central authority level there are the National planning 
commission, the Nati'onal Committee for Technical Progress 
the Ministry of Labour, the Ministry of finance and eight 
industrial ministr1es~ Their main objective and functiQn 
is to lay down the, genera.l, gutdeltnes for development 
and supervise the coordtnation of ~11 economic activities. 
The enterprises and the unions of enterprises 
form the lower level'! The association of enterpri ses no 
way limits the r~ghts of the enterpri~e; it merely acts 
within the powers delegated to it by its member enter­
prises. The ~trusts~ however limit the rJghts of the 
enterprises, which operates as the independent economic 
units with legal personality and thetr own funds~ 
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Poland 
Arnorin the countries studied here Poland was the first 
country to attempt si gni fi cant reforms of the central'ized 
system. However, the recommendations drawn up by the council under 

the chairmanship of Oscar Lange were 'never put in to effect. The 4th 

congress of the polish united workers party in 1964 and plenum of 

the central committee of the party in 1965 laid down the1new principles' 

of planning and management I. The central committee of the workers 

party in 1969 and 1970 added few supplementary provisions. 

The main objectives were: 

a) To enhance the role of decentralized bodies such as regional 

authorities and the industrial unions. 

b) To lay stress on long term p1anning and to introduce plans 

with a number of variants so as to increase the initiative of enter­

prises and other economic organizations ;n working out the central 

pl an. 

c) To rationalize. price fixing process and to make the system of 

incentives within the enterprise more efficient. 

d) To aecentrali'tethe ft1~jor part of the capital investment decisions 

and to replace the budget financing of capital investments by bank 

loans. . 

e) To enhance the role of workers organizations in planni~g on the 

principle 'planning from below'. 

In practice however there were economic and political pro-
b 1 ems. These events ·1 ed the team under Gi erek, who had replaced Gomul ka to 
;:::sa 
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initiate certain reforms of the system which emphasized IOOre the 
production of consumer goods and allied changes. The new mode1 drawnup 
by a special commission of the state and party was published in 
It was designed to enhance the role of centralized planning and 
simultaneously develop the autonomous activity of economic units 
and social groups. 
Under this scheme, the planning commission and the technical 
ministries will no longer be concerned with questions of day-to 
day management. Their role will be to draw up long term plans and 
five year plans and supervise their execution. The current manage­
ment of the economy, -including questions of investment and technical 
progress, will be ensured in the context of the plant by the major 
economic organizations which will operate on commercial principles. 
The long-term plan is to define a certain number of programmes 
concerning groups of problems like housing, standard of living 
pattern of production etc., 
The fiveyear plans will embody specific sections of these 
programmes to ensure that they are carried out during the planning 
period. They will define the capital expenditure necessary for this 
purpose and will fix the ceiling for capital expenditure previously 
left to~the discretion of the major economic organizations, but 
centkally financed. Capital expenditure financed from these organiza­
tions'own resources will be entirely free. But the major part is to 
be financed by bank credit. 
-
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Annual plans are to be much less detailed 'and thir main 
functioil will be to ensure the short-run equilibrium of the economy 
and to guide current government policy. The number of binding direc­
ti ves were cut down and are to be repl aced by economi c instruments 
like fiscal, credit and price policy. 
These reforms very closely resemble the G.D.R. reform 
but less liberal than the Hungarian reforms, where the unions are 
left to the free choice of enterprises. 
Romani a 
Though partial changes were made as early as 1965 basic 
reforms were introduced only by 1967. 
The micro economic and administrative charater of planning 
is preserved, but the number of compul sory indi cators transmi tted to 
the enterpri se is reduced from 13 to 7. Though in many respects the 
reform goes no further than the soviet reform, regarding decentrali­
zation of decision-making, it is ahead of the U.S.S.R. industrial 
•centrals' have been set up, combining either enterprises in the 
same branch or units in different branches which contribute to 
the manufacture of the same finished product. These centrals fall 
into two categories: those consisting of enterprises with a high 
degree of autonomY and those with a structure similar to that of 
a large enterprise, the subordiante bodies having a limited degree 
--
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of autonomy_ By 1971 nearly 70% of a.ll centrals were of the second 
type. A decree of March 1973 reduced the role of enterprises 
to purely technical functions. All economic decisions are noW 
concentrated at the level of the central. These centrals operate 
on the principle of autonornus accounting, have their own pl an 
and 'are provided with the necessary financial and material resources. 
Taking over part of the functions of the industrial ministries and 
of the technical and material supply agencies, their task is to 
ensure the better organization and more efficient specialization 
of production and co-operation among the different enterprises 
whose acivity they direct. They are responsible for the technical 
and material supplies of their enterprises and for coordination 
relations Between suppliers and customers. They supervise the 
execution of the plan by enterprises, provide them with technical 
and scientific assistance - for which purpose they have their own 
research institutes and design offices - help to finance their 
capital investments, and sell their products on the home and 
foregin markets. 
Certain decentralization has also been achieved in the 
matter of capital investments and their financing. The state budget 
finances only the construction of new enterprises and major 
extensions to existing enterprises. For the purposes of minor but 
urgent investments, the enterprises have their own funds financed by 
levies on their profits. 
1. 
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Efforts are being made for continuity of planned action 
by breaking down five-year plans into annual plans and by economic 
unit .. In drawing up the plan, the main stress is now laid on 
proposals by enterprises and centrals. But these enterprises and 
centrals follow the general directives issued by the party and the state. 
But the number of such directives are small. It is centrals 
who mainly add supplementary indicators which are compulsory for 
the enterprises. Once the plan is drawn up the centrals and enter­
prises freely conclude between themselves the contract needed to 
execute it. Thus while reserving the essential macro decisions to 
the supreme authorities the reform effects, at the same time, 
a certain decentralization at branch level by shifting the power 
of micro decision from the industrial ministries to centrals, and 
a very strong concentration at the lower level of enterprises, 
most of which disappear completely as autonomus economic units. 
Yugos 1avi a 
Strictly speaking Yugoslavia is not to be compared with 
the countries listed above since it differs so'much in its economic 
organization. The system has undergone very many changes and it is; 
today a type by itself. Nevertheless, we can summarize. the whole 
system by studying some of the salient features which ate as follows; 
worker's sel f management; central pl anning limited to macro economi c 
magnitudes; a market resulting in prinCiple, from the free p1ay 
of supply and demand, subject, however to the possibility of state 
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intervention in the form of general regulations and classical 

measures of economic policy. 

Worker's self management: 

The management of enterprises, which are owned by the· 
state, ;s in the hands of workers· councils, elected by the workers 
for a term of two years. Workers· council in turn elects a manage­
ment cormnittee and a manager, who is nominated by the people1s 
committee of the commune. The manager takes all day-to-day management 
decisions and represents the enterprise in its relations with 
state agencies and its legal relations. He engages and dismisses the 
workers who have a right to appeal to the management committee. 
Decisions -like distribution and allocation of profits, must be 
approved by the workers I council and in exceptional cases by the 
whole personnel. Any dispute between the workers' council and the 
manager is arbitrated by the commune. 
Workers' self management to day no longer covers the whole 
of the Yugoslav economy. This is mainly because of the growth of private 
enterprise"v/hich are multiplying, disgusing themselves where 
necessary in the fictitious form of self_managed enterprises. 
Moreover, the 1967 provisions throwing the Yugoslav market open 
to foreg;n investors imply a compromise between the interests of 
foreign capitalists and the'power of the workers· council. Finally 
the prodomi nance of technic; ans ; s hard to reconc; 1e wi th the 
equal itari an spirit of the counc; 1s. The proportion of workers 
-
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in the workers' council ;s steadily decreasing. The number of 
strikes, on the contrary is increasing. The new Yugoslav constitution 
provides' for a further strengthen,jng and further expansion of 
self-management principles, while at the same time limiting the 
prerogatives of business management .. 
Pl anning: 
Four stages can be traced in the evolution of the Yugoslav 
planning: the system of rates; the. profit saaring system; income 
sharing and the 1965 & 67 reforms. The' system of rates (1951 - 54) 
which followed the earlier centralized system was limited to the 
following spheres; fixing the growth rate of the national economy; 
~;stribution of the aational income between, consumption and capital 
formation; the distribution of the accumulations of enterprises' 
between the federal states, the republics, the communes and the 
enterprise; determining the' investments to be state financed; and 
allocati,ng resources amo,ng republics .. The link be.tween the plan 
and the activity of enterprises was ensured by the following 
mechanism; the plan fixed the maximum utilization of production 
capacity in each branch; it determined the minimum wage funds 
correspondi,ng to' the utilization of that capacity; it fixed the, 
rate', of accumul ati.on and the rate of s oci a 1 funds, that is the 
division between investment and consumption. Subject to these 
reservations the enterprise was free to decide its output, suppliers, 
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customers, employment and dismissal of workers and price. It 
was in the interests of the enterprise to maximize', its profits 
by matching output to demand. But centralization under this model 
was marked by the concentration of the banking syst~m. In 
1952, the National Bank absorbed the commune and republic banks 
and the State Investment Bank was the only source of credit. 
The profit sharing system (1954 - 57) marked sUbstantial 
progress towards greater decentralization. The autonomY of the 
enterprise was increased not only in the field of day to day 
management (w,ages) but also, though partially, in that of capital 
investment. Furthermore. the obligation to pay interest on the 
fixed capital employed should normally induce in the absence of 
inflation not to 1aunch'out into ill considered capital invest­
ments. The multitude of institutions like federation republic, 
communes, banks and enterprises, which decide the use of invest­
ment marked the centralized aspect of the system. 
Under :Incone sharing system, the wage system was completely 
abolished. The personal income of workers depends on the income of 
the enterprise after payi,ng taxes, duties on situation rents ,annual 
depreciation, and interest on the means of production, normally 
at the rate of s1 x per'cent. 
The income of the enterprise is .ivided into two parts. 
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One is social funds for consumption and capital investment. 
The other part which is the balance, is for the enterprise 
for distribution in the form of personal incomes to the workers 
and for the constitution of the enterprises own funds. This 
distribution is made by workers· council subject to ensuring the 
minimum personal income, guaranteed by law and of making the 
statutory provision for the reserve fund when the income attains 
the level specified by law. Accompanying this there were few 
refonns aiming at decentralization of the Banking system. 
The new constitution adopted in 1963, l~s stress on 
reinforcing the role of the market and on, greater decentraliza­
tion both of political power and of economic system. 
The Economic Council is the central authority in economic 
matters cons;,sting of 120 deputies of the federal parl; arrent. There 
are similar councils at republic, district and commune level. 
Regarding modified planni.ng'procedure, two drafts plans are 
considered simultaneously, one drawn up by the federal planning 
i nsti tute and the other by the economi c associ ations in each 
branch. The ensui~g di-scussion is designed to lead to a consolidated 
version whi ch after approval byparl; ament, becomes the national 
plQn. The function of this plan is purely informative. It includes 
no imperative stipulations. It is confined to an 'analysis of 
the trends resulti.ng from'technical progress and social and economic 
iJWUL 
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progress and to bringing out the needs ,of the nation. To attain 
the general targets of the plan, the state makes use purely of 
traditional policies such as credit and finance policy, fiscal 
policy customs policy, and fo~.i!Jn trade qutoas and price policy. 
The state intervenes in the distribution of incomes among 
the republics through the medium of a fund for under.. developed 
regions financed from part of the federation's tax revenue. The 
state also has a centralized investment fund that it uses mainly 
to finance infra.structure investments. But these now represent 
a smaller\fraction of total investment resources. 15.7% in 1966 
compared to 61.7% in 1961. All other investments are decided 
and financed 'by the enterprises and the banks. 
Section C 

Mathematical methods and optimal planning: 

Mathematical methods involve marginal analysis and 
valuation of all factors of production, and as such were con'sidered 
an ti.:..rtfarx ; an and hence anti soci al. Yet 'a number of economists 
carried on work on Linear progra.rrming and optimization models 
in research institutes privately. When the official attitude 
changed byf959 anumber of art; cl es and flri ginal works were 
published. 1 It is now agreed that Linear progratm1;ng 
was; fi rst dav.elopedd· at ,the un; versity of Lentpgrad:'in''''1939 
by Kantrovich • 
The whole system of planning and management ;s now revol­
utionized with the use of computers and advanced mathematical 
methods. They make possible the application of sophisticated 
statistical techniquein variant thinking, optimal calculations 
and equi1ibrium analysis beyond the ol'd fashioned empirically 
1. Kantrovich. L.V. THE BEST USE OF ECONOMlC RESOURCES 
Harvard: Harvard Un i versi ty Pres s, 1965 e· 
Kornai. J. MATHEMATICAL PLANNING OF STRUCTURAL DECISIONS. 
Amsterdam, North Holl and, 1967. 
O~car Lange, .INTRODUCTION :TO 'ECONOMErRlCS, Oxford: Pergamon, 1959. 
Nemchinov. V.S. Ced.), THE USE OF MATHEMATICS IN ECONOMICS , 
Edinburgh: Oliver and ,Boyd, 1964. 
'. Novozhi love V.V. PROBLEMS OF MEASURING OUTLAYS AND RESULTS UNDER 
OPTIMAL PLANNING, Newyork: I ASP , 1969. 
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developed method 'of physical balances. Computers and mathematical 
techniques are used to collect, transmit and process a variety 
of data. They are employed not only in planning but also in mechani­
zation and automation, in economic administration, transport, 
banking and warehousing. \~hat is important in this mathematizat;on 
and computerization drive ;s not so much the saving of immediate 
costs, but the placing of the economy on a higher and solid basis 
of e ffi ci ency .. 
In all these countries the state planning commissions 
have been equipped with con~uters, and computer centres have been 
established and are being developed to serve selected enterprises 
industries and regions. Given sufficient time an integrated 
computer net work nay embrace not only the. entire economY but 
all member countries of COMECON. 1 According to one socialist 
economi st, II it may be reasonably expected that the changeover 
from mechanized to automated production will be realized in its 
completeness only under socialist conditionsll.2 
I 
l 
1. Wilczynski. J. SOCIALIST ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND REFORMS 
op cit., p.71. 
2. Miszewski D B. ,11 Economi c progress in an industri al economy" 
Warsaw,.E!iL 19,68, p.59'•. 
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Optimal Planning: 
A striking feature of soviet economic discussion in 
recent year$ has been the development of the conception of ·optimal 
planning 11" Optimal planning can be regarded as the application 
of the techniques and approach of operati ons research to the nati onal 
economY as a whole. Many soviet specialists are of the opinion 
that a necessary condition for optimal planning is the social 
ownership of the means of production. On the technical level, the 
orthodox SlJli et - ~Mlrxi st vi ew is that there is bound to be a 
conflict between the interests of the national economY as a whole 
and that of independent private firms. On the social level the 
means of production inevitably leads to social conflicts which 
greatly hinder or render impossible, national economic planning. 
Many of those who advocate optimal planning regard 
it as hierarchical process, the first step in which is the elaboration 
of long-term tendencies in technology, consumption, national 
resources and population. The next stage is the elaboration of a 
national economic perspective plan which concerns itself wi~h 
the main propositions of the economy, identifies the chief bottle­
necks, and provides a framework for the perspective plans, using 
1. See for a deta,iled analysis, Michael Ellman, "Optimal Plann·jng", 
SOVIET STUDIES, July 1968. 
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where applicable; optimising techniques, which deal with such 
things as the location of enterprises, the capacity of ent,~rprises 
and the best use of deficit materials for which there are substitutes. 
Soviet economist Novozhilov has clearly explained that 
optimal planning is a system which incorporates elements both of 
planning and of the market. Planning is necessary to make structural 
changes in the economY, to determine its basic proportions, and 
to fix the parameters which regulate the behaviour of lower level 
units. The market mechanism is necessary because of the non-deterministic 
nature of economic activity and because the huge number of possible 
plans would overwhelm any central planning apparatus. 
Optimal planning differ from the old system in the 
following principles: It recognizes the useful role the market 
price mechanism can play increasing the efficiency of resource 
allocation; It recognizes the desirability of devolution of decision 
making; the theorists of optimal planning emphasise that the ob,;ect 
of production is the statisfaction of the needs of people, national 
economic planning should base itself on these needs. 
Optimal planning also involves two fundel11ental departures 
from traditional Marxian economics. It necessiates the evaluation 
of the non labour factors of production~ it resorts to marginal 
!U 
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analysis, that is, the determination of the marginal rate of 
sUbstitution of inputs and of outputs. The optimal plan provides 
the ultimate basis for the derivation of the optimal prices of 
the factors of production. Kantrovich calls them 'objectively 
determined values,.l 
The first practical optimization attempts were made 
in the U.S.S.R. in the early 1960s and other countries like the 
G.D.R., Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia soon fO,llowed suit .. 
So far it has been applied only to determine the optimum composition 
and distribution of production ;n selected branches of the economy, 
mostly on a regional basis and in those industries where possibilities 
for the sUBstitution of inputs are limited and fairly constant 
techni ca 1 co:"effi cients of product; on prevai 1. A good deal of 
work has been done on the optimization of the 1971-75 five 
year plans. ( 
I. Kantrovich.L.V., op cit., pp 5-12 
WCUEL 
Secti on 0 

Management of enterprises: 

As observed earlier, the earning and application of 
profits provide a unique link combining the interests of the state, 
the enterprise and individual worker. Profit can be used in different 
forms as cri teri on of enterpri se performance. There are two 
approaches in calculating profit: the rate and the absolute amount. 
The absol ute amount is the di fference between the total cost and 
receipts. A distinction is also made between the gross and net 
profit. The difference being represented by state deductions like 
capital charges, different~al payments for the advantages not created 
by the enterprise and in some countries payroll tax (Hungary), 
and where repayable loans are obtained from the state budget(U.S.S.R.) 
interest on such loans. The percentage ratio of profits to the 
prime cost is known as 'rentability· and the percentage ratio of 
profits to fixed and variable assets is generally described as 
·profitability' or the 'profit rate'. 
All the three concepts, profit, rentability and profitability 
have been used in the countries of this study but their exact 
calculation has differed from country to country. 
U.S.S.R. 
The major change in the U.S.S.R. reqardinq extension of 
autonomy to enterprises can be noticed by the revision of compulsory 
indicators used before. Their number has.been reduced and the 
(120) 

121 

stress is now on the economic efficiency of enterprise. 
The most important indicator is the ·output sold' 
instead of the old indicator'nross value of output· in the assessment 
of enterprise perfonmance. Output sold represents the output 
actually paid for by the customer. Coupled with this the customer 
has the right to W1thold payment in case of dispute regarding 
quality .. 
The problem of enterprises switching over production 
to dear products from cheap products is ensured by another indicator 
called "main assortment o:f goods'. That is the quantity in physical 
units of the most important products which are to be produced 
comp u1so ri 1y.. 
The third indicator 'wage fundi represents the simpli­
fication of old four compulsory indicators: labour productivity; 
size of work force, average wages and wage fund. Now the enterprise 
must r.1axirniz'e efficiency by slecting its workers in 
such a way as to obtain the best productive result with the funds 
placed at its disposal, funds that it must try to reduce to the 
strict minimum in order to increase its profit and maximize the 
individual bonuses of its workers. 
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The incentives allot~ed to the enterprise and workers are now 
directly linked to the amount of profit and the level of profit­
ability, which constitutes the fourth indicator. Major portion 
of the profit is credited into a special fund called 'production 
development fundi. Depreciation and other receipts from the sale 
of plant unused or no longer required is also credited in this 
fund. This fund ;s mainly used to finance capital investments 
and working capital. This of course is a major move towards the self 
financing system. The remaining portion is credited in.to two other 
funds, ·worker's material stimulation fundi which is used t6finance 
individual Bonuses and 'socio cultural development and housing 
fundi which is also used for the benefit of workers but in a collective 
way. These three incenti ve funds menti oned above are cal cul ated 
in such a way as to compel the enterprise to declare its potential 
production resources as accurately as possible. 
( 
In the case of an enterprise that has achieved 100% 
of the planned output sold target, the percentage Vof 
the book profit paid to the material stimulation fund and the 
percentage VI paid to the socio cultural fund are given by the 
following equations 1 
ra + pb 
andV = -------. s 
100 
ral+pb 
' 

VI =------ .s 

100 
1. See for a detailed analysis on Planning and ~1anaqement, r1arczewski, Jan, 
CRISIS IN SOCWJ5I ,PLMNING:£ASIEIft· £tmOPf 'AND .tHE .u.S .. 5.~ •• New York: 
'. Pr a eqer- 1l'trti:li:strer!f, 1974. 
;:at 
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Where, 
r 	(expressed as a percentage) is the book profitability 
ie., the ratio between profit less priority deductions 
( interest on capital, fixed payments designed to 
compensate situation rents, interest on bank loans) 
and the average annual value of fixed assets and 
working capital 
p (expressed as a percentage) is the inverse in output sold. 
a is the standard rate of levy in favour of the material 
stimulation fund applicable to the wage fund per unit 
variation in output sold (or gross profit) 
b is the standard rate of levy in favour of the mater; al 
fund applicable to the wage fund per unit variation ( 
in output sold (or gross profit) 
alis the standard rate of 1evy in fa vo ur of the soc; 0 .. 
cultural fund applicable to the wage fund per unit 
variation in the book profit; 
b I ;s the standard rate of levy in favour of the socio­
cultural fund applicable to the wage fund per unit 
variation in ouput sold (or gross profit) 
s 	is the wage fund. 
;e 
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If the plant target is exceeded or not attained a levy 
in respect of the excess is reduced by 30 per cent. As a result t 
enterprises are forced to calculate their capacity and sales possi­
bility accurately in order to attain maximum benefits. 
The above mentioned scheme for calculation of incentives 
did not result in increase in labour productivity because it is 
calculated on the basis of wages fund. In order to overcome the same 
a regulation of September 30, 1968, provides that in the event of 
the average increase in wages exceeding the growth in labour 
productivity, the corresponding proportion of the material stimulation 
fund must be placed to reserve for use in the following year to en­
courage a further growth in labour productivity_ 
The production development fund is fi nanced from the fo 11 owi ng 
sources: a levy of 30 to 50 per cent on the enterprise's provisions 
for depreciation; the proceeds of the sale of unwanted plants and 
machinery; a levy on the book profit according to the formula. 
r all + p bl! 
• k 
100 
Where 
a" is the standard applicable to the productive capital 
per unit variation in book profitability 
bl! is the standard applicable to the productive capital 
per unit variation in output sold. 
k is the productive capital 
r expressed as percentage is the book profitability as 
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r (expressed as percentage) is the book profitability 
as expressed above 
p (expressed as per centage) is the increase in output sold. 
The fifth indicator is the payments into and from the budget. 
Payments into the budget consist of : changes for the use of fixed 
assets and working capital; fixed payments levied on the excess 
profits earned by enterprises working under exceptionally favourable 
conditions; the return to the treasury of the balance of profit 
remaining after all these payments and the levies in favour of the 
enterprise's three incentive funds. 
An important charge is the interest charge levied for the 
use of capital which reduced unnecessary expansion of capital. 
The interest rate is six percent and varies from industry to industry 
and even between firms within industry. Grants from the budget 
are likely to disappear. They are now.used to finance centralized 
capital investment and working capital and off set the losses of 
certain enterprises. With increased role of banks they are likely 
to be taken over by them by means of a loan with varying maturity 
and interest rates according to the purpose. 
The seventh indicator sets the timetable for bringing into 
operation the productive capacities created by the centralized 
capital investment sch'eres. 
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The eighth indicator defines the main assignments for 
introducing new techniques, comprehensive mechanization and 
automation .. 
The nineth indicator concerns deliveries of raw 
materials, products, and equipment to be allocated to the enterprise 
by the central system for material and technical supplies. 
The new experiment started in 1964 in two clothing 
enterprises and was extended to some 400 in 1965. In october, 1968, 
it included some 4000 enterprises producing consumer goods. Since 
then it ;s extended to many branches. 
Bulgaria: 
The funds of the union or independent enterprises are 
similar to the soviet reform. The wage fund is in two parts: 
Material stimulation; additional incentive fund. The first designed 
to finance basic pay and bonuses, is fixed for a period of years 
as a proportion of output. The second is composed of a levy of 
3 per cent of the material stimulation fund, part of the extra 
profit earned by exceeding the planned targets, and a proportional 
levy on increased profit and profitab;lity. Like·other COMECON 
countries, the basic wage rates are fixed by the government. In 
1973 the sectoral wage differences were abolished and nature of 
work done alone is the criter; on of wage level. 
, 
I 
Substantial capital investments especially of infra­
structure ,nature are still financed by budget. The greater part 
~-.--------------------------------------------------------------~----------------..... 
127 
of capital investment is financed by unions and independent enter­
prises out of their own funds and bank loans subjected to a ceiling. 
Nevertheless, the unions and enterprises are free within the limits 
of their disposable funds to carry out modernization, reconstruction 
or to meet the needs of current production. I 
Czechoslovakia 
Under 1965 reform, the enterprise was free to choose 
the concern or trust it wanted to join and the concern or trust 
had to can form to the "j nd i cati ons gi ven by its member concerns. 
Since 1969, the power of VHJs has been greatly strengthened. The 
old quantitative indicators of success were replaced by a comprehensive 
indicator viz., gross revenue, equal to net value added before 
taxati on. Thi s was consi dered'at the iproducti on stage and not at 
realization stage as in the soviet reform. It included the value 
of un fi nis hed producti on and of unsold fi ni shed products and operated 
as an incentive to ~nterprises to maintain a high level of inven­
tories, which did in fact increase substantially, thus leading to 
inflationary pressure. In 1971 gross revenue'was replaced by profit. 
Enterprises paid to the state 6 per cent interest on 
the replacement value of fixed capital assets, 2 to 6 per cent on 
the value of worki'ng capital 18 per cent tax on gross revenue 
after deduction of interest paid, a stabilization tax equal to 
1 per cent increase in the work fund for each 1 per cent increase 
in the work force, plus 30 per cent of the average increase in 
wages compared with the previous year. Though aimed at discouraging 
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enterprises to reduce work force and wages, these measures proved 
to be insufficient and other steps had been taken. 
After these payments and tax, the balance of the gross 
revenue is shared among the enterprise and workers. Workers had 
three types of earnings: a fixed wage determined centrally; a bonus 
on the worker's individual performance; share in the profits of 
the enterprise. Acconl"ing to the new plans, 25 per cent of total 
capital investment should have be,en sel f .... financed. However, enter­
prises could not carry out any major capital investment project 
without the prior authorization of the central authorities like 
ministries or government. The sel f financing of enterprises was 
supplerrented by bank credits, whi ch was around 60 per cent. The. 
s tate was to f"j nance di rectly through s ubsi di es Or budget grants 
only those capital investments of nati onal importance whi ch was 
around 15 per cent of all capital investments. 
G.D.R. 
The 'Associations of state owned enterprises' (VVB s) " ' 
and combinants enjoy complete accounting autonomy. They have their 
own funds~ a profit fund, a depreciation fund, a reserve fund, 
a technical development fund. They are independent of the ministries 
and enjoy considerable powers over their member enterprises. 
The efficiency of the enterprise is now gauged by its 
net profit, after paying state dues on fixed and working capital 
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allotted to it. About one third of the net profit is levied by 
the state. The rest goes to two funds: enterprise1s resources fund 
(about 80%) and the bonus fund. 
In spite of the existence of the resources fund the enter­
prise has very little freedom in the matter of capital expenditure. 
Its freedom extends only to small-scale capital expenditure projects, 
known as rationalization fund. All other capital investment projects 
require prior approval of the VVB or the central authorities. The 
enterprise cannot obtain a bank credit for capital expenditure except 
on the twofold condition of having its own capital investment plan. 
The enterprise pays an interest of 3.5 to 4.0 per cent out of its 
resources fund for these loans. 
Hungary: 
Hungari!an enterprises in a way are highly concentrated. 
Major output is produced by a few hundred enterprises. With the 
exception of compulsory products enterprises have free choice of 
their customers and suppliers. Their profits are split among three 
funds: a reserve fund, a material stimulation fund and a develop­
ment fund. The percentage of profit paid to the reserve fund is 
proportional to the amount of fixed capital end the wage fund. 
Payments to the material stimulation fund are proportional to 
the amount of fixed and working capital. Enterprises are encouraged 
to save labour, since the increase of the wage fund lessens their 
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possibilities of capital investment. They are also constrained 
to save capital . since excessive capital 'investment reduces the 
material stimulation fund. 
The ent~rprises pay to the state a graduated tax of 20 
to 85 per cent on the material stimulation fund and a proportional 
tax of 60 percent on the development fund. Regarding capital invest­
ment there are two categories: centralized investments financed by 
budget which is declining. It fell from 80 per cent to 46 per cent 
in 1970; The decentralized investments financed by the enterprises 
and have become pr~dominantt In the matter of decentralized invest­
ments, state intervention is confined to fixing the limits and 
conditions of bank loans. In many cases they benefit from budget 
support also. This is especially so in agriculture and in industries 
to cope with the distortions between production and retail prices 
or home and foreign prices. 
Pol and: 
As pointed out earlier, the binding directives are now 
reduced and replaced by economic instruments. The performance of 
enterprises ;s measured by ,rofit and net value added of o~tput 
sold. Though wage fixing remains in the hands of the party and 
the government, the an~unt of wage fund left at the disposal of 
the major economic organizations varies in proportion to the increase 
in the value added of their output sold. Any increase in the fund 
2 
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;s freely utilized to expand its work force or to increase wages 
or bonuses. The balance of profit, unlike the soviet system' is 
retained by enterprise to augment its development fund. 
Yugos1avi a: 
Enterprises enjoy maximum freedom in Yugoslavia. The state 
does not interfere unless there is a breach of law. Enterprises 
have free choice to decide its output, and customers (includinq foreiqn) 
suppliers and bears full consequences of these decis;·ons, including 
bankruptcy. Pri or to 1965 these enterpri ses were to pay a number 
of charges, which were heavy and retarding their development. The 
1965 reforms reduced them. These charges which were spent on non­
producti ve spheres are now uti 1 i zed for the development of the enterpri ses 
themselves. The remuneration and other material incentives are 
decided by the enterprise themselves and shortages made good obtain­
ing loans from the banks whi ch are again 'based 'on the performance 
of the individual enterprises. Enterprises may also issue bonds 
and seek foreign capital up to 49 per cent of the capital of the 
enterpri se .. 
Secti on E 
Labour productivity 
The a.bove reforms regarding material incentives will show 
clearly that in the past it was not possible to evol ve the I new 
corrmunist man· devoid of the crude acquisitive instinct but imbued 
with a natural altruistic desire to give society as much as he 
could and claim no more than he was legitimately entitled to. 
Most wor~ers in spite of all transition were not unlike those 
in capitalist countries. The irp.estible trend towards ·consumerism' 
forced the planners to yield towards satisfying the needs of the 
present. Besides evolving the bonus and other material incentive 
schemes,it was shown by socialist market research that consumer 
goods such as cars, Radio and T.V. sets, refrigerators, washing 
machines, etc., have the strongest and most lasting incentive' 
effect on work and saving. 1So, steps have been taken to establish 
or expand these consumer goods industries. 
In the actual work-jng of the bonus schemes evol ved 
by these reforms, one can notice many difficulties. In some countries 
such - as the U.S.S.R., for example, the working of rentability 
or profitability is too complicated and beyond the comprehension 
of an ordinary worker •. Moreover, multiplicity of methods pursued 
1. Wilczynski. J., SOCIALIST ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT-AND REFORMS,' 
OPe cit., p 113. 
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for distribution coupled with the complications in working out 
incentives, weakens the spur of incentives. 1Because of the fluct­
uations in the market and hence profit, the incentive part of 
the earnings is also subject to fluctuations. In .a few countries 
1 ike Bu 1 gari a, Czechos1ovaki a', Hun gary and Yugos 1avi a, standard 
pay also partly depends on enterprise performance. This in effect 
has made the workers to assume greater risk while their capitalist 
counterparts share only profit and not r1.sk. Thus it has become 
necessary for the enterprises to have Irisk reserve funds l These• 
material incentives do not necessarily ensure maximum efficiency 
on the macro economic scale. This is mainly because of absence 
of free_prices. As long as price irrationalities remain, enter­
prise profit does not reliably reflect macro 
I 
economic gain. Thus 
labour may be induced to engage in sub optimal production because 
it may paradoxically lead to maximum enterprise profit. 
Under extensive approach it was the aim to create 
maximum employment. As the socialist state was responsible to 
provide everyone with employment, any addition to total production 
was socially gainful; the aim was to push employrrent to the maximum 
level possible. This possibly yielded several benefits like rapid 
growth of production enabling a mighty investment leap forward and 
incorporating hundreds of thousands of people into production 
process at a higher occupational levels. Nevertheless, this policy 
1. Artemov.J., "The distribution and utilization of the material 
i ncenti ves fund", VEPROSY EKONOMI KI, 5/ 1969, pp 29-39. 
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was not conducive to the growth of labour productivity as it 
led to over-full employment and ai: high labour turnover, and it 
weakened labour discipline and concientious application to work. 
With an emphasis on labour productivity optimum 
employment is left to market forces "in countires like Yugoslavia 
where now the unemployment rate is around 8 per cent. Other 
socialist countries aim at providing employment to 98 per cent 
which allows a frictional unemployment of 2 per cent. Since 
re forms to av; od excess 1abour demand and labour .; ndi s~i p1tne 
in countries like Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary a payroll 
tax has been introduced. A fe'tJ economists considered it is essential 
to keep a small pool of unemployment as a means of improving dis­
cipline and productivity. Many repudiated this view and an Hungarian 
economist declared,1I under socialist conditions the free flow 
of labour necessary for economic growth, structural changes and 
the equilibrium of employment must not only depend upon a reserve army 
of unemployed. Planned economy offers us other means and methods 
for this purpose. 1I 1 
Even optimum employment is not without any benefit. In 
these countries with in a short period of 20 years from 1950 the 
1. Timar.J., liThe level of employment and its equilibrium in 
socialismll , ACTA OECONOMICA, Budapest, Vol.4 No.2, 1969,p 173. 
Emphasis in original. 
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Agricultual working population declined from 50 to 30 per cent. 
Manpower and employment offices have been opened to re-distribute 
agricultural population to more suitable vocations. There is also 
acti ve co-operati on among these countries to promote mob; 1 i ty 
of labour within COMECON region. 
From the intensive growth point of view, as pointed 
out earlier, the following changes are likely to result in increased 
labour productivity: a greater independence of enterprises; 
the acceptance of profit as the main criterion; making enterprise 
profit the criterion for bonuses and in some case the standard 
pay; a greater differentiation of standard pay rates according 
to skills and productivity; introduction of special profit mark~ 
ups to spur enterprises and their personnel to technological 
progress. In some countires index of labour productivity is one 
of the bases for the determination of wages fund. 
::z 
Secti on F 
Pr; ces: 
Prices before reforms were fixed on the basis of Mandan 
philosophy. Thus they were based only on the cost of live and 
materialized labour. It excluded rent, interest, utility and 
scarcity, fluctuations in demand and supply. Price fixing was 
carried out by the state planning commission and the process was 
mainly guided by desired distribution of income. There was a two­
tier price system; wholesale and retail. Wholesale price was 
determined beforehand and excluded rent and capital charges. They 
also remained stable over long periods. Retail prices did not 
have any connection with the whole sale price and often same product 
was assigned different prices depending on the type of good, its 
use, and the class of user. Retail prices differed from producer1s 
price by turnover.taxes or subsidies. In short, the whole pricing 
system was so complicated that there were 100,000 centrally fixed 
prices for clothing and insignificant items such as fish hooks 
had 107 different prices. But it would be a hasty generalization 
to concl ude that the pri ce structure S were' i rrati ana1. They '-Jere 
not arbitrary and were logical within the context of the objectives 
adopted. In spi te of all these comp 1i cated pri ci ng sys tern'? the sov; et 
economy produced well over 10 million different types of goods. 1 
1. Fedorenko. N. "Pri ces and opt; mal pl anning ll , KOMMUNIST, 
Moscow: 8/ 1966. p. 93. 
(136) 
137 

N A 
u 
"0 
o 
o 
0". 
s.... 
~ 
:::::J 
ton 
s::::: 
C 
c....: 
B co 1Consumer ~ood c
 
Fi gure. 1. 

&1 
138 

, 

It can also be shown theoritically how such adminis­
tered prices can be superior to market guided prices. 1 In an 
economY with imperative planning of the soviet type t where planners 
aviod both surpluses and shortages of consumer goods, there could 
be a strong tendency towards an efficient allocation of resources 
from the consumer's point of view, in the production of consumer 
goods. It is worth elaborating on this point in order to put the 
actual soviet adjustment mechanisms and their constraints into perspec­
. tive. The Accompanying figure shows consumer goods production 
and disposal in an economY with two consumer goods C1 and C2 
in physical units that can be produced in a given period ranging 
from OA of C2 and none of C1 and OB of e1 and none of C2. This 
can be envisaged as a list of short ,term possibilities in any 
planning period, with the rates of defence and other government 
spending and of gross investment already specified, and the level 
of capacity in Cl and C2 production fixed for the period in question 
but output of Cl and C2 capable of adjustment with in the planning 
peri od by rea11 ocati on of materi a 1 s, 1abour and other current 
inputs between the two industries. 
1. Philip Hanson, THE CONSUMER IN THE SOVIET ECONOMY, London: 
Macmi 11 an and 'Co. Ltd., 1968, pp 168-170. 
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In the choice of combination of C1 and C2 for the 
period, the planners do not exercise complete 'sovereignity' since 
they are assumed to be prepared to make output adjustments in 
order to aviod surpluses and queues~ in the light of the actual 
composition of consumer demand. It may however, be assumed that 
the initiative in fixing output plans rests with the central planners 
even if they are guided by their past experience of consumer's 
demand. They may decide to aim for the maximum attainable output 
in which C1 and C2 are in the proportions indicated by the slope 
of OP, the planners assortment ray. This leads if production is 
efficient in a technical and organisational sense, to targets 
for C1 and C2 which correspond to point D on AB. 
Since the planners are concerned to clear the market 
they will try to set prices and consumers' disposable incomes 
in such a way that this will be achieved. Consumers are provided 
with a budget line that passes through D. It may not be tangential 
to AB ie., relative. market prices may not correspond to relative 
production costs. Let us consider a budget line whose slope 
does differ from that of AB at D. It is possible that the consumers' 
preferred position along the production possibility line is in 
fact at 0, but there is no particular reason for this to be so, 
since the plan in the short· run need not aim at maximizing con­
sumer's welfare. Even if it is, the provision of budget line KL 
will not lead to an equilibrium at D. If the consumers· preferred 
point on AB is at K, their preferred point on KL must be between 
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K and 0 ie., they will demand more C2 and less C1 than have 
been made avi 1 able .. However', the consumers f preferred positi on 
along the budget line may be at D. In this case there wi11 be 
an equilibrium which is satisfactory from the planner's point 
of view but not optimal from that of the consumer: there ;s a 
clash between consumers' and planners· choices. In other cases 
this may not occur. If it turns out that the preferred position on 
KL is say between 0 and L, there will be queues for C1 and unsold 
stocks of C2• This is not the state of affairs to which officials 
and managers will be indifferent, and some attempt will probably 
be made to improve things. In other words, in situations like 
this the planners' assortment ray of consumers' goods must be 
al tered. 
If adjustment is made to a point between D and L on 
the budget line, (0 and K is out of the question) the market price 
be cleared but production will not be optimal by the planners' 
own criteria; it will be below the production possibility line. 
In other words, where 0 is not the preferred point along the budget 
line, the situation does not appear to be stable. One solution 
would be to alter the relative prices of C1 and C2 until the b 
budget line is tangential to the production possibility curve AB. 
If the consumers' preferred position on AS is at the point of 
tangency, the situation is optimal from the consumers' point of 
view: If it is not, production may be adjusted until the market 
is cleared, when the consumers' position will become optimal. 
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An alternative solution is to alter KL until preferred 
point on it is at D. Retail price ratios are then different from 
marginal cost ratios must be assumed to prevail in any economy 
where differential ratios of indirect tax exist. In principle, 
there would be no di fference between this sort of I adjusted' 
planned system and any actual market system. The argument can 
be extended to more than two products. 
In fact, the planned system can be superior because 
pri ce can be equated to average cost if needed. Full capaci ty 
producti on can be easi ly achi eved i rrespecti ve of pri ces, where..­
as the same is not possible under market system. 
It is now accepted in order to relieve the planning 
authorities the burden of constantly adjusting the prices., the 
following conditions must be satisfied: 1 
Prices must bep.ither determined in free competitive mar­
kets where consumers' soveriengty prevails or derived(computation­
ally from the optimal plan. 
The contribution of all inputs to production must be 
accepted as cost and reflected accordingly in prices. 
l~ilczynski J., SOCIALIST ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND REFORMS, 
OP cit., P 78. 
142 

Prices must be based on the costs of marginal enter­
prises in the industry producing a particular article. 
There ought to be a closer correspondence between 
retail and producers' prices. If they must differ the rates of 
turnover taxes should be reasonably uniform, at least for 
broad classes of products. 
Prices must be fairly flexible to indicate the supply 
and demand as reflected in oonventiona1 markets or in computation­
ally simulated 'shadow markets'. 
Domestic prices of internationally traded products 
must be linked to those prevailing in world markets. 
Mostly in accordance with the above principles the 
Eas t EJropean countri es have adopted pri ce reforms. The s.a1 i ent 
features are as follows. 1 
As the basic principle governing price formation, the 
Marxian concept of 'production price' as distinct from 'value price' 
has been adopted. This full co~t price includes the capital 
charge but excluded ground rent. This would reflect value more 
closely than before and has resulted in economizing the use of 
capital. Steps have also been taken to include differential 
rent in prices. 
1. \~i lczyns~i. J. SQCIALIST ECOriOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND REFORMS, 
op cit., pp 79 - 82. 
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Producers' prices have been increased resulting in 
increased profitability and considerable reduction in ·planned 
deficits·. Since the price reforms the average gross profitability 
in industry has been as follows: In Yugoslavia 10%, in Bulgaria· 13%, 
in the G.D.R. 15%, and in the U.S.S.R. 15%, in Hungary net profit­
ability 8%, in Czechoslovakia (gross) 6 percent. 
The opposition to marginalism, at least on the production 
side, has weakened, and such concepts as the marginal rate of 
substitution, marginal cost, marginal land, marginal enterprise 
have been generally accepted ~s economic realities. Fixing of 
producers' prices were partly guided by production costs in such 
marginal enterprises. 
There is an increasing inclination on the part of the 
authorities to revise prices where they are centrally fixed, more 
frequently according to changes in cost and demand. Even in the 
G.D.R., noted for its rigid price structure has enunciated what 
is known as 'dynamic price policy' to promote technical progress 
and desired structural changes in the society. Flexible price 
policies are also adopted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary 
and Yugos 1avi a. 
The differnce between retail and producers' prices 
has been considerably narrowed. Turnover taxes and subsidies 
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have been drastically reduced and share in enterprisels profit 
Bas become the source of stat~ revenue. Yugosl avi a and Czechoslo­
vakia have departed most in this sphere. 
There has been considerable decentralization of price 
determination - most in Yugoslavia, Hungary, Czechoslovakia 'and 
Bulgaria and least in the G.D.R. and Romania. 
U.S.S.R. 
The formula (1967) adopted for price revision is based~ 
as we pointed out earlier:, on the princi,ple of lithe production 
price". This consists of total cost plus a profit margin of the 
order of 15% for the average firm. The formula is as follows: 
Pri ce = C+ a.S + S k + D 
C is the unit production cost, including depreciation 
but disregarding interest on invested capital and 
social contributions; 
is the rate of social contributions in relation 
to the wage fund S 
S 	 is the rate of profitability of fixed assets and 
working capital K 
D 	 is the different; al income embracing the rents of 
particularly favoured enterprises and turnover tax 
if any_ 
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In most branches D is nil, since the price is calculated so as to 
leave no rent to the average firm and the turnover tax is levied 
at the marketing stage. This price formulation constitutes an 
irnt1l!nse step forward compared to pre ....reform years. 
Bulgaria (1968 - 69) 
Three categories of prices are distinguished: the 
prices of basic capital and consumer goods that are fixed by state; 
the prices of products that are the subject of free contracts 
between enterprises for which the state confines itself to fixing 
maximum and minimum limits; and the prices of products sold on 
the market, which are fixed by contract system between producers 
and distributors according to the law of supply and demand. 
In fixing prices the authorities now take account of 
the production costs, the degree of capital-intensity in the 
different industries, differential rents, and the volume of demand, 
for some products the world market pri ce ;s also taken into 
account. Some unions have been given the right to negotiate directly 
with foreign countries. 
Czechoslovakia 1967 - 68 
The whole sale prices were arrived at by a complicated 
computerized procedure. These prices were split into three 
categories. 
The prices of capital goods produced in the country, raw 
materials and energy, representing about 16% of output, could not 
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be varied without the agreement of the S,tate Committee on Finance, 
Prices and Wages. 
The pri ces of 1 ess -i mportant arti cl es, whi ch were very 
numerous but whose total value amounted to only 4% of output became 
enti rely free. All other pri ces representing about 80% of output 
~t' 
were to be'limited'. Their average growth rate was the subject 
of a contract between the enterprise and the state committee. 
So long as it respected the average rise specified in the contract, 
the enterprise was free to fix the price of particular articles. 
The committee could impose a minimum output on enterprises enjoying 
a de facto monopoly of the production of an article in considerable 
demand. The retail prices of consumer goods remained temporarily 
untouched, but they had to be brought progressively into the same 
category as the wholesale prices of the same goods. 
G. D. R. (1964 - 66; 1969 - 70) 
There are four categories of prices: fixed prices for 
goods and services of strategic importance. Ceiling prices for 
1 ess important goods and servi ces; di rected pri ces determined 
by the enterprise with the approval of the authorities for spare 
parts, accessories etc., ; and contract prices negotiated by the 
parties on the conclusion of delivery contracts between enterprises. 
The founcil of Ministers and Prices department plan 
and establish the price level by groups of products (about 37% 
of the volume of production) the ministries also fix the prices 
4 
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for approximately another 37% of this production; and the 

VVBs and enterprises determine the other prices. The refonn made 

no change on retail prices. Unlike other countries it dis­

regarded world prices. 

Hungary (1968) 

Prices fall into four categor~es: 
1. Fixed prices, determined by the state in the light of production 

costs and world prices. These prices cover about 12% of the total 

output. 

2. Ceiling prices, fixed by the state. 

3. Prices fluctuating between two limits set by the state, and, 

4. Free prices, which in 1971 represented 51% of the output of 

the consumer goods. 

Poland (1967 &71) 

There are several categories of prices: The price 
of bas i c cons umer products fi xed by the government; The pri ce of 
certain products desi gnated by the governnent, for w~1ch the 
price commission will fix an absolute ceiling; the price of other 
products designated by the government, freely negotiated between 
producers and their customers; the price of products exchanged 
between enterprises and establishments of major economic organiza­
tion fixed by that organization without any out side intervention; 
Export and import prices calculated with the aid of foreign exchange 
mul ti p 1 i ers, fi xed by the government; the pr; ce of all other 
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products determined by the free play of supply and demand. 
Romani a: 
In principle, prices are still fixed by the authorities. 
But wholesale prices must now be determined on the principle of 
production costs and for some products with due regard to world 
market prices. Furthermore, certain prices may be fixed by industrial 
centrals within limits set by the council of Ministers and the supreme 
coordianting bodies. The retail prices of the main products are 
fixed in the national plan,which lays down criteria on which they 
may be varied by the, economic organizations. In some cases the 
state indicates the maximum price level and the compulsory quantities 
of cheap goods that must be produced and sold ;n the light of consumer 
interests and the real wages of workers. 
Yugos 1av; a: 
The enterpri ses are free to fi x thei r pri ces. But the 
state reserved the right of control &ver the general level oJ prices' 
In fact the powerful inflationary drive which followed the application 
of the reform and the deval uati on of Dinar compelled the federal 
state temporarily to freeze all prices. 
In fact, the arguments for the determinati on of pri ces 
; n accordance with market demand are stronger in the case of a 
socialist economy than a capitalist economY. Under capitalism, 
the distribution of purchasing power amongst families depends largely 
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on the distribution which is justified neither on economic nor 
on eithical grounds. Thus prices may be a desirable instrument 
of correcting the maldistribution of national income. 
Above discussion will show in socialist countries how 
prices are administered to keep the real income of the people 
stable with out losing its effective role in resource allocation. 
Most of the western writers speak of 'irrationalities' of socialist 
prices. 1n the writers opinion, no country in the world to~day 
follows strictly rational price in its economic meaning. There are 
excise duties and sales taxes levied. Different states and provinces 
! ,. 
follow their own pattern of taxation. Even in countries like-U.S. 
and Canada price ceiling is in vogue. Wage controls have come to 
stay in these countries. But these affect only the poorer sections 
of the community. With the existence of inequalitites of income and 
wealth, poorer sections of the comnunity will have to bear the burden 
of government's .(irrational?) controls. Whereas in socialist countries, 
with the absence of such great inequalities of income and wealth, 
c()ntrolled prices favouring consumer necessaries will always insulate 
the majority from such hardships which are currently experienced by 
the poor in:the capitalist countires. It ill behoves the pot to call 
the kettle black. 
-M 

Section G 
Banking and Finance 
From the ideological point of view money has no place under 
communism. However, money was retained under socialism but its role 
was limited to passive recording and accounting. Nevertheless, in the 
labour market, the distribution of predetermined mass of consumer goods 
and in the private sector money played an active role within a strictly 
planned framework. Thus Banks did not play the usual role they play under 
the' papitalist system. The main function of the banking system 
was to administer the distribution of finance for the purposes pre­
determined in detail in the economic plan. 
Since the reforms, with more decentralization monetary and 
'bank-ing pol i cy. assumed a more important pl ace. The banking system 
has been changed in three respects: the structure, the priciples 
governing the functioning of banks and relation between banks and 
enterpri ses. Banking reforms have been ,carried out in the following 
countries: Bulgaria (1967,69), Czechoslovakia (1969), the G.O.R.(1968) 
Poland (1969-70), Romania (1968), the U.S.S.R. (1959, 1963) and 
Yugosl avi a. 
The structural changes have assumed two forms:- diversi­
fllcation and centralization. In Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, the G~D.R. 
and Bulgaria the number of seperate banks catering for different needs 
has increased. In 'Yugoslavia, the three old specilized federal banks, 
the six republic banks, and the two banks of the autonomous regions 
(150) 
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were converted into investment banks controlled and financed by the 
econom; c organi zati ons (enterpri ses, un; ons) and the governments 
concerned. The old commune banks were converted into commercial banks 
or investment banks. Any group of economic or sociopolitical 
organizations may create a bank, provided they can put up enough 
money, .. Banks, like any other enterprise may issue bonds and borrow 
abroad. They may compete wi th each other throughout the country. 
For each bank recourse to the National Bank ;s subject to a ceiling 
proportional to its sighted commitments, subject to the minimum reserve 
ratio fixed by the National Bank. 
In Czechoslovakia, up to 1969, central banking functions 
were centralized and concentrated in one bank. In 1969, seven new 
banks were set up: two banks to share ;n some central banking res­
ponsibilities, two general purpose banks, a bank for financing non 
productive and new centralized investments and two savings banks. ' 
New banks have been set up in Bulgaria; the Maritime eommercial Bank 
(1968), the Bank for Agri cul ture and Commerce (1969) and the Bank 
for Industry. In the G.D.R., the Bank for Industry and eommerce(1968) 
and in Romania, the Agricultural Bank (1968) and~the Romanian Bank of 
foreign trade.(1968) 
There is greater centralization of the banking institu­
tions along with decentralizations of other institutions, primarilly 
to compensate for the dispersion of finance at the enterprise level 
;a:aa 
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and to prevent intentional and unintentional misuse of cash and 
credit. Relaxation of price controls, increasing role of material 
incentives and the closern~nks established with foreign markets 
are offering new problems which demand efficient monetary management 
and balance of payment equilibrium which in turn enhanced the role 
of central banks. Regarding other banks, they are no longer adminis­
trative offices of the ministries of finance merely enforcing financial 
plans, but have become active promoters of efficient investment, 
production and trade. The role of savings banks have been considerably 
extended. Now their main areas include to provide credits for peasant 
farming private plots, small workshops, private and cooperative 
housing and for the hire-purchase of consumer durables. This function 
of consumer credit is more used for adjustment of demand and supply 
of consumer goods. 1 
There are three main sources of finance for investment 
purposes: budgetary grants, enterprises· own accumulated funds and 
bank credits. Before reforms budgetary grants played an important 
role, amounting to two thirds of the total investments. Since reforms, 
bank loans pl ay an important role. Though budgetary interest free 
grants have beenreduced considerably they mainly finance the following 
1. Wilczynski. J. t ~OCILAIST ECONOMIC DE~ELOPMENT AND REFORMS, 
op cit., p. 155 
;;;::s 
153 

areas: 1 

a) The establishment of new enterprises. 

b) Projects which are too large for the financial resources of 

ordi nary enterpri ses and branch associ ati ons. 

c) Undertakings which have long; gestation period. 

d) Schemes which are of decisive significance in changing the structure 

of the economY in desired directions. 

e) Industries incurring planned losses or earning very low profits. 

f) Entities which are not on commercial accounting. 

Normally these grants are not repayable and interest free.in some 

cases repayment and interest rates are specified. This practice 

however is likely to be extended further. 

Now enterprises develop their own funds as a result of 

reforms. They can reta"in 1arger porti on of depreci ati on allowances, 

dispose of unwanted capital earn interest on their deposits. In many 

. countries like Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, the G.D.R. and Poland 
self financing of enterprises plays an important role. 
1. Wilczynski. J., SOCIALIST ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND REFORMS, 
op. cit., p . 159. 
-M 
WilL 
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In addition to above soUrces following occassional sources 
are also used: 
In countries like Czechoslovakia, the G.D.R., Hungary~ 
Poland and Yugoslavia the,re are companies where initial capital 
provided by other enterprises. In Yugoslavia they may be provided 
by individuals even provided they work in the enterprise concerned. 
Raising capital by means of debentures exist in Yugoslavia. Credits 
are also made available by richer or developed countries to other 
COMECON countries for medium ( 5 years) or long ( up to 15 years) 
periods. A few joint ventures with western capital (not exceeding 
49% of the total investment) is also coming up in recent years. 
As an'otlook for future self financing of all banks·will 
playa greater role if things either continue as it is or further 
decentralization takes place. In the writers opinion it is too early 
to say whether furtherdecentralization would take place. Regarding 
i 
other sources of finance they are as it is not very significant 
but can assume greater proportion if further decentralization ;s 
attempted. 
Secti on H 
Structural Changes: 
When the socialist revolution took place in the U.S.S.R. 
it was predominantly an agricultural country. Even in the fifties 
the socialist countries of the present study were predominantly 
agricultural with the exception of Czechoslovakia where 39% of the 
population were engaged in agriculture. As pointed out earlier the 
centralized economic system was able to transfer majority of its 
population to the industrial sec~6r. This is true with all the socialist 
countries except of course U.S.S.R. where the contribution of agriculture 
to NMP is fairly stable. This was primarilly because of its respon­
sibility towards other COMECON members who depend on U.S.s.R. for 
their raw material. 
While during the pre reform period structural changes 
were merely confined to major branches of the economy ( and are likely 
to continue for some more years) the post reform period is marked 
by intra branch developments. This is known as structural pOl.icy· ..I 
It consists chiefly in the development of those products and techno­
logies which exert a revolutionizing effect on the methods of 
production, and which decisively shape structure of production upto 
world standards. 1 
1. Teuben. L., I Pl anning o.f structural developments of the economy I .. 
East Berlin: THE ECONOMY, May 8, 1968 p. '3. 
(155) 
------------------------.--.~~---
156 
The i ntroducti on of new methods and technologies and of new types 
of products inevitably leads to changes in the structure of production 
the emergence of new branches of industry and the acceleration of 
the rates of growth of some industries and a decline in others. 1 
The emphasis is now on development of research specialization in 
production, industrial cooperation, standardization and, above all, 
on the improvement of quality and efficiency. Implementation of this 
policy is done mostly by the use of financial instruments such as 
quality mark-up~ interest rates, depreciation rates, taxes and subsidies. 
Nevertheless, in countries like the G.D.R., Poland and Romania 
direct intervention is still in vogue in addition to above methods. 
In the sphere of impr'ovement of quality and efficiency 
the role of enterprise integration is very important. In many industries 
aiming at rationalization require large capital outlays. If production 
is carried on in large enterprises, society can benefit from the 
economies of scale, deriving from a better utilization of expensive 
capital equipment, management talent and expert advice, and a greater 
specilization. Larger entities are in a better position to undertake 
research and engage in innovation. 2Integration in the opinion of few 
1. Kheinman. S., ·Scientific and Technical Revolution and Structural 
changes in the Sovi et Economy I, KOMMUNIST_, 14/ 1969 p 64. 
2. Wilczynski. J., SOCI8LIST ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND REFORM~ , 
9p cit., P 199. 
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writers, even in these countries may result in monopoly elements 
along with evils attached to it. In the writer's opinion it is not 
possible because with several indicators, output restriction is not 
possible. Price though fiexibl~ is till under careful scrutiny of 
the planners who can take effective action immediately. Similarly, 
the fear of turning out poor quality product is also taken care of 
by reserving the right of consumers withholding payments in case 
of doubtful quality. 
• I 

Sect; on I 
Changes in Agriculture 
As pointed out earlier, by 1960, 40 per cent of the 
working population were engaged in agriculture. Though it has come 
down to 25 per cent now it is still behind advanced capitalist 
countries. By 1973 agricultural income constituted 22 per cent in 
Bulgaria, 11 per cent in Czechoslovakia and the G.D.R., 19 per cent 
in poland 22 per cent in Romania, 20 per cent in U.S.S.R. and 19 
per cent in Yugoslavia. In any standard the East European countires 
are more agricultural compared to some developed countries. This 
is the major cause for fl uctuati ons in the rates of growth. Naturally 
these countries were more concerned about agriculture and economic 
reforms in this sphere started much earlier. But major reforms 
were mainly aimed to improve planning and management. Old methods 
were replaced by economic instruments like prices, taxes, subsidi.es 
and cred; to The reforms al so increased the autonomy of the farms 
and harness private material interests with the planners' objectives 
and induce greater efficiency. 
Increased prices of agricultural products, the relaxation 
of restrictions on private farming, the extension of some social 
services to farmers and the lightened burden of taxation have all 
raised agricultural income substantially. At the same time the 
authorities realize that, in the interest of intensive economic 
growth, it is highly desirable to continue transfers of rural labour 
(158) 
159 

to the more efficient branches of the economy. Even by pr~~~nt pricing 
agriculture is still less efficient than most other productive branches. 
On the whole larger proportions of investments are now allowed in agri­
culture, and the consequent improvements and the mechanizations tend to 
release more than in the past. 
Under the new scheme compulsory deliveries to the state at 
artificially low prices have been abolished and the contract system has 
been adopted, whereby price incentives playa key role in stimulating 
production and deliveries.Not only the level of agricultural prices have 
been raised but also prices of industrial goods have been brought dm·m 
, 
to increasethe real income of the rural people. There has also been 
liberalization of credits avilable to socialized entities and private 
farms and personal holders. 1 The role of financial incentives in 
agriculture has come to be known as the • commercialization and indus­
trialization of agriculture l Now not only they are free to sell• 
their products directly and also can engage in non agricultural activi­ \ 
ties like industrial production using their agricultural raw materials 
and even to run local workshops and restaurants. It is described 
as lagro industrial symbiosis·or the highest forms of agro industri'alI 
integration It whereby the Marxist ideal of equalization between town 
and countryside will be realized. 
1. Wi 1czynski. J., SOCIALIST ECONOMIC DE~ELOPMENT AND REFORMS. ' 
op. cit., pp 203 - 206. 
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Now there is an increased cooperation among COMECON 
countries in the agricultural sphere. The Pennenant Commission for 
Agriculture prepared a five year plan for 1971-75, designed to pro­
mote a systematic rationalization and intensification of agriculture 
in the menDer countries. It provides for joint planning and prognoses, 
the coordiantion of scientific and technical research, further 
improvement in the strains of crops and the breeds of animals and 
extended specialization and cooperation in the production of arti­
ficial fertilizers. 
In spite of all out efforts, agriculture has been one 
of the weak spots of all these countries. A perusal of the average 
annual rates of growth of NMP by kind of activity will show that 
though the period 1965-70 shows improvement over the period 
1960-65 the achievements are riot so spectacular as in other fields. 
Here the efforts of Hungary, Poland, Bu1garia, Romania, the G.D.R. 
and YugoslaVia are worth noting. During the period 1970-73 these 
countries have done well in agriculture. But in Czechoslovakia and 
U.S.S.R. the rates are declining. As an outlook for future in the 
sphere of agriculture further liberlization and free market is necessary 
to achieve stable 'growth. 
Secti on J 
Evaluation of Economic Reforms 
It is very difficult to evlluatethe economic refonns in 
all these countries. Extent of reforms vary in these countries. The 
reforms have not come to a final stage. They have begun and the economy 
andsociety have to adjust. This will lead to new reforms of decentrali­
zation or recentralization depending upon the reactions of the individual 
countries. It is incorrect to say that all these countries have achieved 
same amount of centralization or decentralization. However, we may 
compare the first half of the sixties "'hen major reforms were adopted 
with the second half. 
Rate of growth of national income is usually adopted 
(with all its defects) as point of ·comparison. From tab le B. 
we observe that of eight countries five experienced accelerated rates 
of growth, whereas three experienced;the reverse. Secondly, in the 
second half of the 1960s the range in the growth rates of national 
income was smaller than in the first half. That is, the growth rates 
evened out to a certain extent, while the highest rate of growth of 
national income in five countries was larger than slowing down in the 
remaining three. In a general way we may conclude that an acceleration 
of the rate of growth took place in the second, half of the sixties. 
Obviously the problem is whether and to what extent this occured 
because of reforms. 
(161) 
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The next indicator is the rate of industrial growth. 
Acceleration of the rate of industrial growth took place in only 
three countries Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and the G.D.R. In the 
remaining there was either a fall or stagnation in the rate of growth. 
The range was greater in the first half compared to the second. There 
is also not always a corre 1 ati on between annual rate of growth and 
annual rate of growth of industri al growth. This proves firstly, 
the economic reforms did not have a great effect on the growth rate 
of industrial production and secondly, the national income was greatly 
influenced by the agricultural production. 
One of the important indicators to be used in judging the 
character of planning is the steadiness of the rate of growth. Table C 
gives the largest differences in annual rate of growth and annual 
rate of industrial production growth rate. The basic goal of planned 
economic development is the securing of a relatively steady rate of 
growth. This is primarily because a part of the national wealth remains 
unuti 1 i zed and the rate of growth fl uctuates. In 'none of the soc; al i st 
countires exami ned ,was there' a steady rate of growth in the five year 
periods'examined, not in the sense of no change from year but an 
extreme devi ati on of no more than two poi nts during the fi ve year 
. dperlo • 1 
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1. Kleer, J., "Economic Refonns in the Socialist Countries in the 
Sixties", Eatern European Economics, Winter 1974-75, p.21 
--~---------------------------------------------------------------------~~--~ 
Tabl e B 
Country 
Bulgaria 
Czechoslovakia 
G.D.R. 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania 
U.S.S.R. 
Yugoslavia 
Table C 
Country 
Bulgaria 
Czechoslovakia 
G.D.R. 
Hungary 
Poland 
Romania 
U.S.S.R. 
Yugoslavia 
Average Annual Rate of 
Growth of Nati oan 1 Income 
1961 	 - 65 1966 - 70 
6.7 8.7 
1.9 7.3 
3.4 5.2 
4.5 7.0 
6.2 6.0 
9.1 7.8 
6.5 8.1 
7.6 6.0 
Largest differences in the 
Annual Rates of Growth 
1960 	- 55 1966 - 70 

7 4 

9 5 

3 4 

5 4 

6 6 

8 3 

3 3 

9 8 
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Average Annual Rate of 

Growth of Industrial 

Producti on 

1961 	- 65 1966 -: 70 

11. 7 10.8 
5.2 6.2 
5.9 6.3 
7.5 6.0 
13.8 11. 8 

8.5 8.3 
8.6 8.5 
5.9 8.6 
\. 
Largest differences in the 
Annual Rates of Growth of 
Industrial Production 
1960 	- 65 '1966 - 70 
5 4 

10 3 

2 1 

5 6 

5 2 

3 3 

3 3 

9 12 

Source: Ibid., pp. 19-20

-
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From Table C it is apparent that the extreme deviations 
were smallered in the second half of the 1960s than in the first 
half, but they were still large, especially in Poland and Yugoslavia 
and that the remaining countries they were never less than three 
percentage points. While looking at the industrial production 
one could clearly say that fluctuations in the rate of growth of income . 
was due to agricultural fluctuations and hence growth process could 
not have been too efficient. One may conclude from this that changes 
in the system of administration probably contributed to d"iminution 
of the ranges in the growth rate although, with the exception of 
G.D.R. these ranges are no where eliminated. 1 
One of the bas i c cri teri a for evl uati ng the eff; ci ency 
of development is its cost. These costs are conceived in two ways. 
On the one hand, they are the ratio of the increase ;n investment 
expenditures to the increase ;n national income: On the other,hand, 
the ratio of the increase in investment expenditures to the material 
production to the increase in national income. Both aspects are 
basic, above all because - with ~es~ect to the first - at a certain 
1eve 1 of economi c development, the degree of development of infra­
structure has essential importance for the growth rate of national 
1. ·Ib;d.,~p" 21. 
.---------------------------------------------------------------------------.---­
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Table 0 
Increase in investment per.l% of increase of National Income 
Country 1961 - 65 1966 - 70 
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia 
1.18 
1.15 
1.42 
1.05 
G.O.R. 1.48 1.88 
Hungary
Pol and 
1.05 
1.13 
1.54 
1.40 
Romania 1.24 1.40 
U.S.S.R. 0.97 0.91 
Yugos 1avi a 0.91 
Tab le E 
Increase in Investment in Material Production per 1% increae in 
Nat; onal Income 
Bulgaria 1.3 1.5 
Czechoslovakia 1.35 1.15 
G.O.R. 2.0 ' 1.8 
Hungary 1.2 1.4 
Poland 1.4 1.6 
Romania 1.5 1.5 
U.S.S.R. 1.1 0.9 
Yugoslavia 0.91 1.4 
Table F \Rati 0 of Average Rate of Growth of· InVestment to Average Rate of 
Growth of Industrial Production 
Bulgari a 1.5 1.1 

Czechoslovakia 0.9 1.d 

G.D.R. 1.5 1.2 
Hungary 0.8 1.1 
Pol and 0.9 1.2 
1.0Romania 1.0 
U.S.S.R. 0.8 0.6 
Yugoslavia 0.5 1.8 
Source: l!?:UI., pp. 22 - 27 
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income. 
~Je may conclude from the Tables D & E that a) In the 
socialist countries the capital intensity coefficient is in general 
very high, higher than in the developed countires especially in the 
second half of the 1960s. b) Analysis of the incrmental capital intensity 
co-efficient tells us nothing about the level of economic development 
or the direction of economic expansion. 
We should look at this problem again in the context of industry 
itself. Let us compare investment expenditures and net ou~put. 
Analysis of Table F does not essentailly modify the previous considerations •. 
The most favourable co-efficients appear in the first half of the 
1960s in Bulgaria, the G.D.R., and the U.S.S.R., the worst in 
Czechoslovakia. It does not appear possible to make an evaluation 
of the cost of development so as to be able to determine unambigously 
the effect of the economi c refonns on that phenomenon. The behavi our 
of the co-efficient of incremental capital intensity is devergent 
and does not fall within any series that we might press into particular 
solutions of the model. 
Increase in production is almost always the result of an 
increase in employment and of labour productivity. It is essential 
whether we have to do with extensive or intensive growth or a mixture 
of both. 
In the first half of the 1960s there was intensive industrial 
growth in the G.D.R. In the second half in the G.D.R., Czechoslovakia 
and Yugoslavia. If in the. two ~ountries there were objective premises 
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for this in Yugoslavia it was the result of economic reforms. 
The only deterioration of the proportions in Hungary in connection 
with both with the 1968 economic reforms and with the shortening 
of the work week. On the one hand, the improvement of the proportions 
in Czechoslovakia was unconnected with the reforms, because the 
proporti ons increased in the second half of 1968. It appears to be 
impossible to interpret unambigously the effects of the economic 
reforms on intensive growth. 1 
Table G2 
Proportion of increase ;n employment and increase in Labour 
Productivity ;n the Increase of Industrial Production (in %) 
Country Emp 1oyrrent Labour Productivity 
1960 - 65 1966 - 70 1960 - 66 1966 - 70 
Bulgaria 40 34 60 66 
Czechoslovak; a 34 15 66 85 
G.D .. R. 7 12 93 88 
Hungary 37 60 63 40 
Poland 40 41 60 59 
Romania 44 35 56 65 
U.S .. S.R. 45 33 55 67 
Yugoslavia 40 41 60 84 
1.~., pp. 26-27 
2.. .l.b.i.Q...., p 27. 
9 
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Prob1ems of economi·c re forms: 
The economic reforms though designed to remove certain 
problems, have caused .a few problems in return .• On the economic front 
we have the following: 1 a) The reforms so far adopted have been 
far too limited to eliminate the problems of the old system. For 
example, enterprises have continued to receive impossible plans long 
after the beginning of the 'planning' period which are followed by 
numerous alterations to them. Enterprises are still finding that it 
pays to agree to plans that are lower than the maximum possible. 
Enterprises are still reluctant to innovate because of the temporary 
adverse effects of innovation on their indices. b) Now that industry 
is once more organised in ministries, the old phenomenon of 'minister­
ialism l (each ministry to look after its own affairs regardless of 
its effects on national economy) is re-appearing. c) Abolition of 
Sovanarkhozy (Regional Counci1s) will probably result in a lack of 
attention to regioanl planning. d) The rules governing the formu1ation 
of enterprises have given rise to various problems. e) In most 
;nsustries the rate of interest which enterprises have to pay to the 
state on their fixed assets has set at 6% in some at 3% and in some 
there is no charge at a11. How to determine these rates, whether they 
should be differentiated by industries and whether capital should 
1. Ellman, M., ECONOMIC REFORM IN THE SOVIET UNION, london: P.E.P. 
1969, pp. 305-322. 
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be reckoned at hsitoric or depreciated values, are controversial 
issues. f) Some industries earn profit because of some natural 
advantage unconnected with labour. If nothing is done those who work 
there wi 11 get a pqyment whi ch they do not deserve. If on the other­
hand if the whole of the'differentia1 rent is taken by state on 
grounds of equity, then enterprises will have no incentive for 
efficiency. g) The material technical supply is posing problems. 
Goods often arrive late resulting idling of other factors and some­
times when they arrive they are often of unsatisfactory quality. 
The supply organizations are still materially interested in supplying 
the more expensive goods. Many measures have been taken towards solving 
these prob1ems. h) The stress on prof.it and the increase in the auto­
nomy of enterprises and replacement of supply system by inter enter­
pri se trade has °i ncreased the importance of pri ce system. The hal f 
hearted attempt to restore competitive prices has its own strength 
and weaknesses. i) Another issue is the extent of enterprise autonomY I ( 
in the field of investment .. The problem is" even when enterprises have 
the money to undertake decentralized investment, this is often impossible 
as the necessary investment goods are, available only to those with 
the appropriate allocative forms. j) It is believed that the present 
generation of enterprises· management does not have the training and 
experience necessary to operate the system in which enterprises have 
more autonomY than formerly. k) The reform is largely concerned with 
increasing the autonomy of the -individual enterprise. ~any existing 
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enterprises are not suitable as independent individual economic 
units, and there has been an extensive process of horizontal and 
vertical integration of smail enterprises in to larger combines and 
fi rms. 
From the social point of view there are a couple of problems: 
In the post refonn period the: problem of wage differentials would 
be further aggravated. Reforms have created an incentive for 
enterpri ses to economi se the us~ of 1 abour. A feature of economi c refonns 
in Yugoslavia has been the emergence of large scale unemployment and 
large scale emigration of workers in search of employment. In 
Czechoslovakia, the period gan-Aug 1968 there was much discussion 
of the need to close uneconomic enterprises. In the U.S.S.R. also 
it ;s not uncommon to shut down a firm which is unable to cover their 
costs. This would unleash a pandora's box of social and political 
problems. 
Problems and Promises: 
The following intensive sources of growth will enhance 
the pace of development of the socialist countries compared with the 
pre reform period. 1 A more efficient use of labour is likely to 
result. Shortages and hoarding of man power will be less prevalent 
which together with a greater possibility of dismissal, should 
1; 
1. Wilczynski, 	J:, SOCIALIST ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND REFORMS, 
OPe cit., pP. 322~40 
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contribute to a greater productivity of labour than in the past. 
The same logic applies to capital also. A greater 
effectiveness in the use of capital is likely to result. Capital 
charges, higher interest charges flexibly applied depreciation allow­
ances and the increased practice of self financing will discourage 
extravagent demands for fixed capital , the concealment of idle 
capacity and unwarrented extensions of the construction periods of 
investment projects. The discontinuation of quantitative targets and 
the system of incentives based on them will encourage a greater economy 
oj n the use of raw materi a 1 and components. 
More economical patterns of utilization of land is likely 
to result. The implicit or explicit application of differential rent 
wi 11 provide a restraining effect on the taking over of 1 and for non­
agricultural purposes. It should also contribute to the distribution 
of different grades of land to their most effective uses. 
Prices are more likely to be related to scarcity than to 
the redistributive or rigid centralized planning needs of the state. 
An extension of the operation of the market mechanism or optimal 
planning or perhaps both at the same time will be enlisted in evolving 
such prices. A greater capacity for technological progress is likely 
to result. This will be aided by more initiative allowed to enterprises 
and research establishments and by the special research and innovation 
mark ups on costs. This system will be more conducive to structural 
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changes in favour of the technologically most progressive industries. 
Progress in international trade is likely to continue 
growing at a faster rate than national income. Gain from trade should 
be enhanced by closer links between domestic and foreign markets and 
by the multilateral payments. 1 
Waste on macro economic scale, consequent upon the mis­
allocation of resources and recurring bottlenecks common in the past should 
-h~ reduced in the · future owing to the elimination of directive cen­
tralized planning based on incomplete and biased information. The 
substantial decentralization of management, the wider operation of the 
market mechanism, the improved system of incentives and the strength­
ening of cost accounting should all prevent some errors from being com­
mitted and administrative machinery is likely to minimize the errors 
and losses in case where they do occur.2 
While looking at the promises one should not lose sight of 
the problems we cited earlier. The discipline and concentrated drive 
for growth under centralized syste~~s lost now and working of centralized 
system with free enterprises may bring new problems to be effectively 
solved. Enterprises in fact have tended to produce the most profitable 
items at the exclusion of less profitable items, however, indespensible 
they mi ght be to the economy. 
1. Wilczynski, J., OPt cit., pp. 3Z3- 24 
2. Ibid., p. 325. 
i no -, 
_ The freer operation of the market 
mechanism appears to be generating or accentuating economic 
f1 uctuati ons! Since the reforms of 1952, Yugos1 avi a has experienced 
at least four recessions (in 1956~ 1962, 1965 and 1967) Similarly, 
Hungary also experienced fluctuations. As pointed out earlier, unemploy­
ment is no more an exclusive feature of capitalism.It is not unlikely 
that the liberalization produced by the reforms may lead to an 
increasing criticism of the communist parties. There is little doubt 
that the official policies will be directed first of all at the preser­
vation of the party power, even if it is conflict with economic 
efficiency. If social or political disorder~ ensues, economic qrowth 
will suffer the more. 
There are other factots also not directly associated with re­
forms which might inhibit growth. A declining rate of population, 
declining rates of increase in employment, reduction in the hours of 
work, lagging agriculture, raw material deficits and difficulties 
which are likely to be experienced. It is probable that the socialist 
economic system \'lil1 continue to be improved and more reforms will follow 
in the future. J~s greater insight is ~ained in to the operation of 
the new system, more effective measures will be evolved to cope 
with new problems. 
1. Garubuzov, V., "Economic Reforms and Financial Matters", 
KOMMUNIST , 3/1968, p. 45. 
-I 
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It is not unlikely that the socialist countries may evolve 
a system by which the growth rates may be maintained for a longer period. 
According to some economists, Ithe languishing growth curve l will 
not apply to socialist planned economies. It is claimed that the 
socialist state is in a position to control the major proportions 
in the economy, and moreover it can increasingly activate intensive 
sources of growth. 1 According to Pervushin that a long run annual 
rate of 10 - 12% is feasible. 2 Though one may be reluctant to agree 
with 10-12% growth rate unhesitatingly, we may conclude the rat~ would 
be higher than the capitalist countries. 
S"ince 1970, there is a tendency of recentralization in most 
of the countries of this study. This however, need not be interpreted 
as failure or there is a tendency towards reverting to the old system. 
So far reforms have taken place in a zig zag manner and this being 
attributed to economic and political reasons. Recentralization since 
1970 in few countries have resulted owing to economic reasons and 
there is no evidence to attribute them to political reasons. Here we 
may observe" that countries like the U.S.S.R., the G.D.R. did not 
attempt a greater degree of decentralization to begin with and enjoyed 
a more stable growth rates compared to other countires. 
1. Gorbunov, E., liThe Efficiency of Accumulation and Growth in 
Soc; ali st Countri es", NEW PATHS, Warsaw: 1/1968, pp. 85-93 
2. Pervushi n, S. P., "Producti on and Consumpti on at a New Stage ll , 
PROBLEMS OF ECONOMICS t Jan.,Feb., Mar., 1967, p.l1 
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These attempts towards recentralization can then be 

interpreted as correctional and not reversal. Many writers haveexpre­

ssed their predictiontowards a 'convergence l In the writer1s opinion, 
• 
these reforms cannot be taken as convergence as the two systems 
differ so much in their basic composition like private ownership, 
inequalities of income and wealth, laws of 'inheritance and so on. 
Decentralization therefore, is not a signal for further dilution of 
socialsit principle. Decentralization will take place in areas 
where economically necessary and where will improve further socianst 
principles. Nevertheless, after certain amount of decentralization 
a process of recentralization for further consolidation is likely to 
take place as a means to achieve stable higher levels of rates of 
growth. In this regard decentralization like many other inputs is 
effective only for a while. Simple laws of diminishing returns may 
operate in this sphere also, necessiating curtailment of decentralization 
after pushing it to the maximum extent possible economically. It is 
too much to expect I decentra 1 i zati on I ,to work wonders. Economi c growth 
in these countries like any other country depends on its natural 
resources. Absolute decentra1izatibn canntt achieve effective 
uti 1 i zation of these, resources from the long run poi nt of vi ew. 
Centralized planning will prove a better tool for achieving such an 
objective. Moreover, like many other countries as the economY matures 
and enters higher stages of production the rates of growth are likely 
to come down. In this also centralized planning will help to lower 
the phase of deccelaration and achieve stable long run growth rates. 
As pointed out earlier, the experiences of the U.S.S.R. and the G.D.R. 
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though considered to be conservatives as far as the reforms are 
concerned were able to achieve more stabiltiy than other countries. 
Thus we can predict in future the zig zag pattern of decentralization 
and recentralization will take place making effective use of plan 
and market aiming at a harmony between these two to ensure stable 
economic growth. 
We know from our experience that it is not always.desirable 
for all social choices to be decided by market. Socialist experience 
also shows that it is undesirable for all social choices to be decided 
administratively. Rational strategy lies somewhere in the middle. If 
the economic goal is rapid growth, regional planning, and equality 
(econ~nic and other opportunities) the major requirement ;s the 
political will. This has been successfully demonstrated by the experi­
ences of these socialist countries. The same experience has- also 
shown that it is not wise to neglect the pleasures and desires of the 
people alive today and focussing everything on the 'glorious aim'. 
Socialist experiences show that it is possible to have a society in 
whi ch the means of producti on are owned by the state and there is no 
income from property. It has also shown that this is not a sufficient 
condition for an .egalitarian distribution of income and power. Liberalism 
has always stressed the importance of 1 imiting the power of the state. 
Socialsim on the otherhand has stressed the desirability of using the 
state to reform society. The correct path is to utilise the 
advantages of both. liThe efficient attainment of the obJectives of 
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economic policy requires," in the words of Ellman,"a contJination 
of administrative decision making and the use of the market mechanism 
the proporti ons in whi ch the two methods are needed varyi ng from 
objecti ve to objecti ve and economy to economy". 1 
Many writers project a picture of these countries when they 
write about the reforms that their economic conditions were chaotic 
and he~ce the reforms~ They also cone1ude that these countri es have 
adopted capitalist strategy and moving towards the same as capitalism 
is the only answer for all their problems. A Russian anecdote 
ci ted by Ell man 2 shows that we may have to search in some other 
globe for an ideal country. 
* There are several indicators of a country's advancement 
and economic development. The present writer is not aware 
of any work 1inkino sports and economic development.
Nevertheless t sports can to a ~reater extent show a country's 
economic achievement since this requires better health, 
physical facilities, encouraqement for individual efforts 
and so on. I f sports can be accepted as one of the many i ndi cators 
of economic advancement, it can be easily shown how these 
East European countries are as ~ood as their capitalist· 
counterparts if not better (in fact they are the best). 
The results of the recent Olympics at Montreal will clearly 
show how uniformly all these East European countries occupy
a reasonably oood position. 
1. Ellman, M., EC0NmUC REFORt1 IN THE SOVIET UNION, OPe cit., pp. 359-60 
2. I bi d. , p. 32 L 
( 
iJ 
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Besides all these indicators, what is more important is what 
the people of the concerned countries feel. If the people are satisfied 
with their system then there is no point in others telling them what 
is best for them. Unfortunately there is no realible indicator on this. 
But one can always estimate it by incidence of crime, rates of suicide, 
attitude towards work,society and other people and so on. Then the 
conclusion is obvious. The past, present happenings and future evolution 
of these socialist countires ;s a matter for people of these countries 
to dec; de, and a subject on wh; ch the opi ni ons of fore; gners are of 
little value. Nevertheless, outsiders are more concerned with the 
general lessons that ca~ be gleaned from the socialist experience 
for rational decision making. 
Concl us i on: 
To summarize the present author draws the following conclusions: 
Wi th reference to the count ri es of the present study: 
a) The reforms were not the outcome of chaoti c economi c condi ti ons 
prevai led but adjustment of the economy towards present economic, soc; al 
and political requirements of the society instead of aiming at 
long term I Glorious Aims I. 
b) The reforms adopted do not point out any convergence towards planned 
.capi ta1; sm as ass umeG by l'1any wr; ters. 
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c) The reforms adopted so far have helped these economies satisfactorily. 
d) The future reforms are likely to aviod the pitfalls created 
by decentralization.4than attempting further decentralization. 
e) Recentdecentra1ization is not the direct outcome of any political 
strife but only represents the adjustment procedure pointed out in 
(d) above. (with the exception of Poland) 
f) Future reforms will also follow a zig zag pattern as in the past. 

g) The reforms will be aimed at stabilization of growth rate at a stable 

higher (compared to their counterparts in west europe) rate. (:entrali­

zation will help to achieve the same. (in some areas). 

In general: 

a) These socialist countries have shown developing countires that 

backwardness is not inevitable. 

b) They have also shown how pl an and market can and shoul d be combi ned 

for satisfying the present and the future, individual and social needs 

of the society.l 

The present writer is in agreerrent with the view that, lit is 
not a correct deduction from the principles of economics that things 
are what they are and they could not be anything different. The economic, 
social and political institutions that we see around us were made by 
man for the benefit of some men. Those features of them that we 1 i ke 
we can keep, those features of them that we dislike we can change'. 
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Table H Net r1aterial Product by Use and Activity 
Year Net Personal Net Fixed 
& r1ateri al Consump- Capital A!Triculture Industries 
Country Product tion Formation 
Bulqari"a
fH 11 ion Leva 
1960 4488.8 64 14 32 46 
1961 4715.8 67 15 32 46 
1962 5158.2 67 14 33 44 
1963 5675.8 67 17 33 45 
1964 6203.7 64 20 34 45 
1965 6635.6 64 15 33 45 
1966 7273.9 62 16 35 45 
1967 7853.0 63 21 31 45 
1968 8556.0 65 19 26 46 
1969 9349.8 62 22 25 49 
1970 10527.4 63 19 23 50 
1971 10411.4 13 24 49 
1972 1124·1. 7 16 23 51 
1973 12147.5 22 51 
Czechoslovakia 
1000 f1i 1 , i on 
Korunas 
1960 161.9 66 11 16 63 
1961 170.9 64 12 14 65 
1962 174.1 65 10 12 67 
1963 171.4 68 :.S 14 67 
1964 168.1 71 12 14 64 
1965 172.3 72 9 13 65 
1966 195.5 67 11 14 63 
1967 233.0 59 13 13 61 
1968 257.0 60 13 13 60 
1969 292.6 59 13 12 59 
1970 311.1 57 16 11 61 
1971 325.4 57 17 12 61 11· 611972 342.7 56 17 621973 357.7 57 19 11 
G.O.R. 
TImOr1;11 ion 
ODR Marks 
1960 74 15 17 58 
1961 75 15 14 61 621962 73 14 14 
14 621963 74 14 
15 621964 73 14 
15 621965 72 14 
1966 70 16 14 62 
1967 70 17 15 62 
1968 71 19 14 62 12 631969 69 21 12 631970 67 20 641971 67 19 11 19 631972 68 12 
67 11 
'1973 ... 19 64 
Contd. 
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Table H (Contd.) 
HUNf'.1ARY 

1000 Mill; on 

Forints 

1960 142.0 68 17 23 59 
1961 148.9 65 15 21 62. 
1962 156.7 64 15 21 64 
1963 165.1 64 17 21 63 
1964 173.5 65 17 22 65 
1965 170.5 68 13 21 60 
1966 189.7 66 15 23 58 
1967 207.5 65 14 21 Sa 
1968 224.7 64 15 21 44 
. 	 1969. 253.1 60 20 21 42 
1970 272.4 61 20 18 43 41 .1971 294.3 60 20 18 
1972 319.4 59 21 17 42 
1973 354.0 58 21 19 42 
Poland 

1000 Mill ion 

Zlotys 

1960 375.6 68 17 26 47 
1961 410.7 66 17 27 48 
1962 426.1 68 19 23 50 
1963 460.1 66 17 23 49 
1964 497.0 65 17 22 50 
1965 531.3 64 18 23 51 
1966 567.2 64 18 22 51 
1967 605.6 64 18 21 49 
1968 668.8 62 20 21 49 
1969 696.1 63 20 17 51 
1970 749.2 62 19 17 55 
1971 855.0 59 22 19 51 SO1972 947.8 58 25 19 
1973 1062.5 58 28 19 51 
Romania 
Million LEI 
1960 	 33 44 33 451961 29 491962 
30 4719.63 30 481964 29 491965 31 491966 29 521967 26 541968 24 571969 19 581970 22 571971 22 571972 
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Table H (Contd.) 
U.S.S.R. 

1000 Million Roubles 

1960 145.0 65 17 20 521961 152.9 63 17 21 521962 164.6 64 17 22 521963 168.8 65 17 21 541964 181.3 64 16 22 541965 193.5 65 14 23 521966 207.4 64 14 24 501967 225.5 64 14 22 511968 244.1 64 14 22 52
.1969 261.9 15 5463 191970 289.9 61 18 22 511971 305.0 62 18 21 511972 313.6 63 18 19 521973 337.2 62 18 20 51 
Yuqoslavia 
1000 Milli on Ne\,1 Dinars 
1960 28.9 51 33 26 491961 33.7 51 35 25 41 
1962 37.7 51 35 26 46 
1963 45.8 50 34 25 4S 
1964 61'.0 47 33 25, 44 
1965 79.5 50 27 25 42 
1966 99.0 51 27 26 38 
1967 103.7 54 29 24 37 
1968 112.• 0 55 31 21 38 
1969 132.0 54 31 21 31 
1970 157.2 54 33 19 38 
1971 204.. 5 53 32 . 18 38 
1972 245.4 56 30 17 39 
1973 306.4 55 28 19 39 
Source: U.N. Year Book of National Income Accounts 1974 
. U.N. 1975. pp. 57-59 " 92..95. 
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Table J 
Average Annual Rates of Growth of Gross Domestic Product at Constant Prices 
By Type of Expenditure and Kind of Activity 
( in Per Cent) 
Country Period N.li.P Consumption' Net ARriculture Industrial 
A B of the Fixed Activity 
Population Capital 
Formation 
Bulgaria 	 1960-65 7.0 6.1 6.8 12.4 2.9 9.1 
1965-70 8.6 7.8 7.2 16.1 -2.5 12.9 
1970-73 7.6 7.0 1.9 8.R 
Czechoslovakia 	 1960-65 1.2 0.5 2.9 1.1 -4.2 3.1 
1965-70 6'.9 6.4 6.0 4.3 6.3 6.0 
1970-73 5.1 4.5 5.1 8.2 2.7 4.7 
G.D.R. 	 1960-65 3.5 3.8 2.0 3.4 1.5 4.6 
1965-70 5.2 5.2 4.5 12.7 1.0 5.8 
1970-73 5.3 5.5 5.4 2.7 3.2 5.5 
Hungary 	 1960-65 4.5 4.2 3.7 7.2 0.7 6.7 
1965-70 6.1 6.4 5.8 13.5 1.2 7.. 0 
1970-73 6.3 6.0 4 .. 6 5.2 6.2 7.1 
Poland 	 1960-65 6.0 4.6 4.4 7.9 1.1 8.6 
1965-70 6.0 5.1 5.1 9.6 -2.1 7.9 
1970-73 10.0 9.1 9.0 22.2 5.5 10.4 
Romania 	 1960-65 8.9 8.2 -0.1 13.7 
1965-70 7.6 6.2 -1.1 12.6 
1970-7:3 11.5 10.4 .... 18.2 10.4 
u. S.S.R. 1960-65 6.4 4.9 1.2 8.9 
1965-70 7.6 6.6 ... 0.8 10.0 
1970-73 5.7 4.8 -1.2 6.9 
Yugoslavia 	 1960-65 7.7 ~ 6.6 7.4 6.6 2.1 11.0 
~~ 5.01965-70 6.0 4.6 8.0 2.8 6.7 
1970-73 6.0 5.0 5.8 3.8 4.2 7.6 
N.H.P. Net Material Product 
A. Total 
B.. Per Capita 
Source: U.N. Year Book of National Income Accounts 1974, 
U.N. 1975. pp. 128-129. 
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Table L Index Nos of G.D.P. Exclud;n~ Services of general 90vernment 'and of 
Private organizations 
Year M.D.P. 

. Total Per capita Aor; cul ture Industry
ABC ABC A 
V 
B C ABC 

1960 	 52 59 62 58 72 67 87 80 83 43 53 571963 	 60 68 72 64 78 76 82 82 88 55 63 661965 	 70 77 79 73 85 82 81 87 91 65 73 751966 	 75 82. 82 78 89 84 100 90 91 70 78 791967 	 81 85 85 83 90 87 100 94 97 77 82 80
1968 88 91 90 90 95 91 101 96 99 85 89 87
1969 	 92 96 95 93 98 96 93 95 98 92 96 951970 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
1971 106 105 103 105 103 102 98 101 103 107 104 103
1972 111 111 108 109 107 106 90 98 103 115 112 108
1973 120 119 114 117 111 112 103 105 106 123 121 116 
A- Denotes 	Albania, Bulqaria, Czechoslovakia, the G.D.R .• Hungary,
Poland, Romania, the U.S.S.R., and Yugoslavia. 
B- Denotes 	World. 
C- Denotes 	 Europe exclu~in~ countries listed in A above. 
Source: 	 U.N. Statistical Year Book - 1974, 
U.N., 1975, pp. 10-14. 
, 
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Table H. Index Nos. of Food and Total A~r;cultural Production 
1961 - 65 = 100 
Country 1963 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1972 
Total Agricultural Product1on 
A 95 105 121 122 127 124 131 134 134 147 
B 100 105 109 113 116 . 117 120 124 124 129 
C 101 103 106 113 114 114 117 121 120 123 
Food Production 
A 94 105 122 122 128 125 132 134 134 148 
B 100 105 110 114 117 118 122 126 125 131 
C 101 103 106 113 115 l15 117 121 121 124 
Per Capita
Apri cul tura 1 
Production 
A 95 103 117 117 121 l17 123 124 123 134 
B 100 101 103 105 105 104 106 107 104 107 
C 101 101 103 109 109 109 110 113 112 11:4­
Per capita
Food Production 
A 94 102 118 117 121 117 123 124 123 135 
B 100 101 104 106 107 105 106 108 105 108 
C 101 101 103 109 110 109 111 114 113 115 
Source: U.N. StatisticatYear Book - 1974 

, U.N.: 1975, pp. 23-24. 

leQend: A- Includes Albania, Bulqaria, Czechoslovakia, the G.D.R. 
. Hun9ary, Poland, Romania, the U.S.S.R. and Yuqoslavia 
8- World 
c- Europe excludinq countries listed in A above. 
p 
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Table tI 
Index Nos. of Industrial Production 
1970 = 100 
Country 1953 1958 1960 1963 19,67 1968 1969 1971 1972 1973 
Bul !lad a 14 25 34 47 76 83 91 109 119 131 
Czechoslovakia 29 45 56 64 83 88 92 116 131 131 
~.D.R. 31 46 55 65 84 88 9.4 106 112 120 
Hun~ary 35 42 51 66 86 91 92 107 112 120 
Poland 36 4422 56 77 85 92 108 120 133 
Romani a 15 3023 44 71 80 88 
U.S.S.R. 21 36 44 57 79 86 93 108 115 123 
Yu~oslavia 19 35 45 60 77 9283 111 119 127 
Source: U.N. Statistical Year Dook: 1974,D.N. t 1975, pp. 153-55 
Table 0 
Index Nos of labour Productivity in Industry * 
1970 = 100 
Year A B C 
1958 54 62 65 

1960 62 69 
 71 

1963 70 
 76 77 

1968 89 
 91 92 

1969 93 
 96 97 

1971 107 
 104 103 

1972 113 
 109 108 

1973 121 

A .. Eastern Europe and the U. S. S. R. 

B - !World 

C - Market EconoMies of Europe 

Source: lI.N Statistical Year Book: 1974. 
U.N. 1975. p. 157. 
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Table P 
Va 1ume of External Trade (i n r1i 11 ion Il.S Do 11 ars) 
l3ul~aria Czech. G.O.R. Hunqary Poland Romania U.S.S. R. Yuooslavia 
Imports 
1938 60 239 123 248 137 273 115 

1948 681 167 516 1224 368 

1958 367 1357 1680 631 1227 482 4350 685 

1963 933 2160 2331 1306 1979 1022 7059 1057 

1966 1478 2736 3215 1566 2494 1213 1913 1575 

1967 1572 2680 3279 
. \ 1776 2645 1546 ·8537 1707 

1968 1782 3077 3393 1803 2853 1609 9410 1797 

1969 1749 3294 4105 1928 3210 1741 10327 2134 

1970 1831 3695 4847 2506 3608 19GO 11732 2874 

1971 2120 4010 4981 2990 4038 2103 12480 3297 

1972 2567 4662 5905 3154 5335 2616 16047 3233' 

1973 3266 6137 7854 3919 7814 3468 21108 4775 

Exports 
1938 68 295 155 225 157 255 117 
1948 753 166 533 1308 304 
1958 373 1513 1890 684 1060 468 4298 441 
1963 834 2462 2713 1206 1770 915 7272 790 
1966 1305 2745 3205 1594 2272 1186 8841 1220 
1967 1458 2864 3456 1702 2527 1395 9652 1252 
1968 1615 3005 3791 1790 2858 1469 10634 1264 
'1969 1794 3319 4153 2084 3142 1633 11655 1479 
1970 2004 3792 4581 2717 3548 1851 12800 1679 
1971 2182 4180 5076 2500 3872 2101 13806 1836 
1972 2627 4915 6184 3292 4927 2599 15361 2237 
1973 3301 6035 7520 4433 6374 3698 21462 3024 
Source: U.N. Statistical Year Book: 1974 
U.N. 1975, pp. 408-409. 
CHAPTER IV 
REFORMS AND ITS LESSONS FOR INDIA 
'Socialism is not an economic policy for the timid' 
- Oskar Lan~e ­
To the extent that one can estimate the historical 
significance of any recent development, the U.S.S.R. and,the East European 
countries seem to have opened a new chapter in world economic history 
the era of forced economic growth in agriculturally over populated 
countries. The U.S.S.R. produced the world's first example of rapid, 
centrally planned and directed economic development; and planning 
procedure - exercises today a deep influence on the underdeveloped 
countries. lIt is the contention of the above writers that 'these 
positive lessons, if followed, do not necessarily lead to a soviet type 
political system since the characteristics of the soviet industrial 
model which we have discussed are compatible with varying degrees of 
governmental intervention or control. 2 In the opinion of the present 
writer, though political freedom is not incompatible with rapid economic 
development adopting soviet strategy, it did not work hand in hand "in 
the case of India. In the case of India 'political freedom,3 along with 
inefficient planning and implementation has resulted only in a big 
fa; 1urerather than to' pull i tse1f out of the shackles of poverty. 
1. Dodge, N.T., and Uilber, C.K., 'The Relevance of Soviet Industrial 
Experience for Less Developed Economies', SOYIET STUDIES, Vol XXI, 1970, 
p. 330 
2. Ibid., p. 349 
3. The prsent writer means by 'politcial freedom I only the way in which 
it operated "in India till recently. 
(191) 
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Indian planning for industrialization suffered from excessive 
attention to targets down to product level, and a wasteful physica1 
approach to setting and implementation thereof, along with a generally 
inefficient framework of economic policies designed to regulate the 
growth of industrialization. 1 In fact India did not plan too much; 
in certain important w~s it did not plan adequately, physical, 
cost-benefit ignoring and choice-negligent plann-ing, combinin~d 
wi th deta.i 1 ed regul ati on of such ; neffi ci ently determi ned targets, 
really proved to be a negation of rational planning. 2 Socialist 
objectives such as distributive justice, equality and the eradication 
of material poverty have been frustrated by the existing pol iciest 3 
Industrial regulation did not serve its intention but it resulted in 
gross inefficiencies. 'Ad hocism' at the top and corruption at the 
bottom', might have been an apt description of the state that adminis­
trati ve machi nery was to reach eventually as it increasingly concerned 
itself with detailed control of decisions in the private sector. These 
failures have, however, been not merely of administration: they 
refl ect a more basi c· fa<;tor the then -current economi c phi 1osophy that 
the best form of planning;s physical and involves detailed c~ntrols. 
The bureaucrats, espec; ally at the top 1eve1s, have tradi ti onally taken 
1. Bhagwati, J.N., and Desai.P. t INDIA: ~LANNING FOR INDUSTRIALIZATION, 
Paris: Development centre of the O.E.C.D. , Oxford University Press, 1970, 
p. 499 
2. I bid;" p. 499 
3. Ibid., p. 500 
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to this doctrine with some enthusi asm, for it has conferred on them 
great power and re-emphasized their inherited notions of omnipotence. 
For much the same reason, many politicians in power (and in search 
of patronage) have also embraced these policies of detailed regulation. 
Before analysing the problems of Indian economy, let us briefly 
point out the problems concerning economic planning "in under developed 
countries in general. The general problem of an under developed economy 
is the insufficient capital to employ the available labour force. 
In consequence this may end up in two alternatives. One is to adopt 
primitive labour intensive production the other is to adopt 
advanced techniques and render major 1 abour force unemployed or under­
employed. Ironically both are found in these countries. Labour inten­
sive fonn of production exists in spheres where capitalist mode of 
production has not yet' entered or unprofitable to enter. These exists 
where it is profitable and has replaced existing cottage and handicrafts 
and driven them to decay. In agriculture, it takes the form of feudal 
types of 1and ownersh"i p or capi tal i st p1antati on' system. 
T~e problem of an under developed economY may be sunmarized 
2 
as fo 11 ows : 
1. Ibi d., p. 134. 
2. Oscar Lange, ESSAYS ON ECONOMIC PLANNING, Second Edition, Calcutta: 
Indian Statistical Institute, Statistical Publishing Society, 1961, pp .32-33. 
• 

194 
Let C denote the value of total stock of capital goods 
available and V the value of the total labour force employed. 
Let a be the average degree of Icaptial intentensity' of production. 
Then we have 
c 
a =-~- --------(1)
V 
If N is the total labour force employed ( in man hours) and Wis the 
wage rate, we have, 
v = N vi 
--------(2) 
the total employment is thus 
t 
N= 
--------(3) 
a W 
If NO is the total available labour and N< NO ' the economY is 
under~veloped. The ratio NINO may be considered as a measure of 
the degree of under development. 
As W cannot be lowered below subsistence, N can be raised to 
NO by two ways only. Either a is lowered and the economY kept at a 
low level of productivity, or C must increase sufficiently with a 
value of a corresponding to modern techniques of production which r 
requires capital accumulation. As a result of low productivity and 
unemployment economic surplus which ;s crucial for capital accumulation 
is small. But paradoxically the major obstacle is that such surplus 
as is available is not utilized for capital accumulation. 
The causes whi ch prevent. such uti 1; zati on of economi c surp lus 
p 
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are the following. 1 a) The feudal mode of production and the 
corresponding way of life of the old feudal class. b) As a major 
part of the under developed countries became subject to colonial ru1e 
the drain was increased by the very expensive colonial administration 
and when it remained independent the drain was performed by the 
domestic monarchy and its officicals. c) Foreign capital comes to 
these countries and treats them as sheltered reserves for monopolistic 
exploitation. Major part of their profit is taken out and. used for 
the economic development of the metropolitan countries. In case they 
are reinvested, they are invested in such ways as not to create 
competition for basic industries owned by them. They are also often 
invested in consulTer goods industries and in the production of raw 
materials and staple food products. 
Elimination of such problems is a pre-condition for economic 
development. A characteristic feature of these countries is the lack 
of sufficiently broad and wealthy class of domestic industrial 
capitalists which would command the resources for substantial 
investments in industrial development. Thus economic development 
can take place only on the basis of public investment which seems 
to be the major strategy. 
The physical resources for public investments exist in the 
form of unemployed and underemployed labour force and under employed 
natural resources. The task is to absorb this unutilized power and 
utilize in the production of producer's goods. This is the basic instru­
ment of economic progress of under developed countries. When full 
~., p.~ 34 
Ii, 
p 
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labour force and other natural resources can not be absorbed, 
a part can be absorbed by means of land reform which distributes 
land to 1andless peasants and employt more labour on new land reclaimed 
by irrigation projects. Another part can be absorbed by labour 
intensive vi1lage industries which can survive on new demand 
created by 1and reforms and pub1 i c i nves tment. 
Industrialization and economic development by means of public 
investments imply the development of a nationalized sector in the ­
economY. This sector not 'only' initiates the process of.-creati:n~ new 
employment and income, but also, directly through its own purchases 
or indirectly through income created creates additional ,demand for 
cons umer goods produced by the pri vate sector wi th excess capaci ty 
wi1l now earn more profit which becomes available for taxation 
or borrowing for reinvestment in the nationalized sector. 
The development of nationalized sector and its more rapid 
growth than that of private sector of the national economy is a 
necessary condition for the rapid industrialization of underdevelped 
countries. Where such a pattern is absent economic progress is 
impossible. 1 
The deve1oprrent and more rapi d growth of the nati ona1i zed 
sector is not sufficient for economic development. Alot depends on 
the purpose of such graNing nationalized sector. This sector should 
1. Ibid., p. 39
-
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be used to serve the economic, social and cultural develpproont 
of the whole nation. Then it oecomes the nucleus and start-ingpoint 
of development. On the contrary, if this sector become subservient 
to the interests of existing concentrations of private economic power 
then it is an instrument of s'tate capital i sm. Even though state 
capitalism may initiate the progress for an underdevp.loped economy, 
it cannot sustain such progress for a long period; nor can it assure 
balanced development of the whole economY. 1 
With this background we may aAalyse the experiences of 
Indian planning. Congress party was voted to power in the union govern­
ment since independence. The Congress under the leadership of Nehru 
to begin. with had been corrmitted to the objective of socialism. A 
Socialist pattern of society was accepted as the objective of planned 
development with effect from the second five year plan. The strategy 
followed was a growing public sector dominating the basic industries 
and capital goods leaving a sizable share for the private sector to 
operate in consumer goods and the other spheres where desirable. 
A new Industrial policy replacing earlier resolution of 1948 was 
adopted in April 1956, which states,IIThe adoption of the socialist 
pattern of society as the nati onal objective, as well as the need for 
planned and rapid development, require that all industries of basic 
and strategic importance, or in the nature of public utility services, 
should be in the public sector. Other industries which are essential 
and require investment on a scale which only the state in the present 
Ibid., pp. 40-41
-
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circumstances could provide, have also to be in the ~ublic sector. 
The state has therefore to assume direct responsibility for the future 
deve1opment of indus tri es over a wi de area". Thus lndi a adopted the 
soviet planning strategy in two ways. It rightfully avoided 'war commu­
nism' of soviet early stages of "economic development and straight away 
1aunched IN. E. P. '. Strategy of I bi g-push I and unbalanced growth was 
also adopted. Looking at the results, in spite of exceeding the invest­
ment targets both in the publ ic and private sector, the growth rate (industrial) 
was only 7% for the second plan same as the first plan where industry 
played a minor role. The national income increased only 20% as against 
planned increase of 25%. The achievements recorded during third plan 
was no better. It aimed at an increase of industrial production at a 
compound rate of 11% a year. It also planned for a growth of 30% 
increase in the national income and ended up with only 12.5% almost equal 
to the popul ati on growth. Agri cul ture suffered the most on "~ccount of 
severe drought and suspension of foreign aid. Nevertheless the early 
years even dild not achieve the target of 11% a year. Added to the 
difficulties pointed ou~ the failure was largely due to administrative 
rules and procedures lacked the flexibility to meet changing needs 
and the necessary changes in them had not come about. The annual plans 
that followed and the fourth plan as well did not accomplish the tasks 
ass i gned. 
'Turning to the other objective ~f reduction of inequalities 
of income and wealth, the plans did less than nothing. This objective 
requires a two fold process of raising incomes of the low income groups 
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and reducing incomes at top level. The first calls for an expansion 
of social services and provision of increasingly large volumes of employ­
ment. The latter requires corrective fiscal devices and prevention 
of the flows of the gains of development to top income brackets. It 
was proposed repeatedly that income tax, corporation tax, wealth tax, 
gift tax, capital gains tax and estate duty should be employed in an 
integrated manner to bring down incomes in the high brackets to 
reasonable levels. The second and the third plans as usual triumphed 
that,ll steps must be taken to ensure that such incomes (from trading 
and speculative profits) as do accrue are fully taxed, evasion of 
taxation is severely dealt with and opportunities for tax aviodance are 
reduced to the minimum. II Yet hardly anything was done. 
Regard-jng the uplift of the low income groups obviously nothing 
was done. The planning commission did not have even any data on the sub~ 
ject. Nevertheless, few estimates were made by some scholars which throws 
some light on this acute problem. In 1962, the government set up a 
study group as to recommend the national per capita minimum consumption 
expenditure. They recomended a per capita expenditure of Rs. 240* a year. 
According to an estimate made by Minhas, the per capita consumption 
expenditure for more than 50% of the population did not exceed Rs 238 
per year. In other words more than 50% of the popul at; on were in abject 
poverty after 15 years of planning! Other studies undertaken by Rath 
and Dandekar vouched the same pathetic condition. 
* C$I= Rs. 9 approximately. 
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Closely associated with the problem of poverty is the regional 
di spari ti es. The second plan declared that, II .:; n any comprehens i ve 
plan for development, it is axiomatic that the special needs of less 
developed areas should receive due attention ll Again, the Industrial • 
Policy Resolution declared," ••. in order that the industrialization 
may benefit the country as a whole, it is important that disparities in 
levels of development between different regions should Be progressively 
reduced". But in practice it was often pointed out that dispersal can 
be taken up only when a minimum in terms of national income and growth 
in different sectors is reached. There may be justification in such an 
approach, when growth is of primary importance. But the assumption that 
after some time. it would be possible to spread the benefits increasingly 
to backward regions becomes unrealistic. If for overall growth, reliance 
is placed on the usual market forces, new enterprises would gravitate 
to areas and centres where external economy is present and this accent­
uates regional disparity. After a certain period it would become 
impossible to redistribute and would increase reqional tensions. There 
would have been a constraint to this development, if from the out set 
programmes and undertakings in the publ i c sector had been expanded in 
underdeveloped regions as a built-in strategy of development planning. 
If 50% of the total population are below the poverty line, the percentage 
must be larger in the backward regions. How can the problem of poverty 
be solved without special efforts to level up these underdeveloped states? 1 
1. t1isra, S., 'Socialism in Planninq', THE INDIAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 
Vol XIX, No.2, Oct.- Dec. 1971, pp. 107 - 127. 
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Planning in Soviet Russia and other countries of our study 
was largely adopted to tackle three objectives: a) Growth within 
a short period of time; b) Reduction in inequalities of income and 
wealth; c) Reduction in regional disparities. In all the three 
objecti ves they were successful though they were to adopt di fferent 
strategy for intensive growth after certain level of maturity. Their 
growth process should have helped the Indian planners to aviod pitfalls 
of their planning methods and should have planned more efficiently. 
But the facts read a diiferent story. Indian planners were only successful 
in combining the demerits of planning and capitalist systems. Is then 
planning unsuitable to India? why then the Chinese were able to achieve 
tremendous success with their growth process? 
Willingness and ability of people to work relatively hard 
and effectively on a national scale for goals that inspire them are 
perhaps the most important factors in explaining a country's economic 
development. Harvey Liebenstein has viewed motivation as being a major 
element in connection with x - efficiency, as well as other factors 
like knowledge, information and training•. Barry Richman 1 and 
1. Richman Barry., 'Chinese and Indian Development: An inter disciplinary 
Environmental Analysis', THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Papers and Proceedings 
of the American Economic Association, May 1975, pp 345- 355. 
202 

Thomas Weisskope 1 have recently shown that because of this character 
of the chinese government and the people, there were able to surpass 
Indi a in the process of economi c development in the past tWellty five 
years. 
Economic development comes largely from the willingness 
and ability of people to work hard and effectively for inspiring goals 
which in turn is a result of social development - ie., progress in 
human welfare, attitudes and institutions. Social development ;s mainly 
a matter of good ideas, of ideology and the strength of the commitment 
to it. Chinese superiority therefore lies basically in her superior 
ideology, which has speeded her social development, thereby raised 
the productivity of her people, and so boosted her growth rate of output 
per capita. It follows that India1s performance could be much improved 
if the Indi an government would fashi on and promote an ideology more 
conducive to development. 
The greater success of the chinese in overcoming inequalities 
and unemp 1oyment is attri buted to the character of the basic economi c 
institutions,,2 Elimination of virtually all forms of individual private 
property removed the biggest source of income inequality. Secondly, 
1. Weisskope, Thomas. E., China and India: Contrasting Experience inI 
Economic Development I, THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIE~I, Papers and Proceedings 
of the American Economic Association, May 1975, pp. 356 - 364. 
2. Ibid., pp. 360 - 362.
-
the greater degree of centralized public control over. resource 
allocation and lesser reliance on the market mechanism hav~ permi 
a more equitable allocatiofl of resom'ces among income classes 
regions. Another aspect of the chinese approach that has contributed 
to greater economic equity is the effort to 1imit the scope of 
individual material gain incentives; this has allowed for reductions 
in labour income differentials at the enterprise level. The greater 
stress on the mobilization of labour in the O"linese approach facilitated 
by an institutional framework involving strong public control over 
labour market has enabled ehina to combat unemployment and under employ­
ment more successfully than India. China's success is also attributed 
to its self reliance. The Chinese delibrately pursued conservative inter­
national financial policies to avoid long term indebtedness after the 
19605. Another important feature is that the Chinese government's 
strong control over the economy. The dominant position of the state 
planners.in China contrasts with a complex diffusion of power in 
India among government planners, private business and various other 
interest groups.1 
India's failures are attributed to the following causes: 
a) Attainment of independence brought about no major re_distribution of 
power between previously dominant and dominated classes. b) India's 
parliamentary democratic system has enabled certain intermediate groups 
1. Ibid., p. 361.
-
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 - well to do peasants, organized urban workers, professional 
politicians and so on - to have a decisive voice in natio~al affairs 
but the vast major; ty of poor peasants, 1 andless 1 abourers, and 
unorganized urban dwellers remain as powerless as ever before. 
c) Decisive government action is also limited by 1. Parliamentary 
democracy, 2. Federal structure and share of power between state 
governments ( some times hostile~and region oriented) 3. Extensive 
protection of private property rights guaranteed by the constitution. 1 
t~i thout undermi ni n 9 the achi evement of Chi na, the present 
writer hesitates to accept the above views about China as, I .... the 
bits and pieces of information which are allowed to trickle in from 
China are certainly inadequate to provide answers ••• 12 'Moreover, 
as we have pointed out earlier, centralization can help only to a 
certain extent. Hedonistic tendencies are very difficult to curb and 
absolute equality is very difficult to achieve as each system has 
its own hierarchical levels. How long enforced discipline can promote 
\ ' 
growth? The ~ast european countries have already provided an answer. 
In fact the author of the above discussion himself has revealed 
his doubts declaring, If China does evolve into a truly advancedII 
1.. Ibid. It p. 363 
2. Padma Desai,'China and India Discussion', THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC 
REVIEW, Papers and Proceedings of the American Economic Association, 
May 1975, p. 367. 
• 
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economY, it would seem that some of the mDre important aspects of 
pure Maoist-Marxist- Leninist ideology would have to be compromised 
considerably in the process. III ~10reover, most of the stral;egies 
attributed were rather forced on them and the C.hinese had no choice 
over thema The turn of events in both the countries are products of 
the history of the respective countries. 
Nevertheless, the present writer would agree with the short­
comings of India pointed out by these authors and agree that India lacks 
·political will' which contributed to the growth of Russia, East European 
countires and most recently China and Cuba-: 
Comparison apart, as we have pointed out earlier, India 
has failed to achieve any spectacular achievement in the important 
spheres of econom; c growth, reducti on of inequal ities of income and 
wealth and regional plann"ing for which the planning was introduced. 
We may analyse the reasons for the apparant failuresa 
In the sphere of administration, India was better placed 
than any of the other under developed countries. But this administrative 
1. Ri chman Barry, op. ci!., p.354. 
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machinery was of no great use to changed economi c condi ti on. 
Geared to the efficient running of the British law and order machine, 
and occupying a position of unrivalled power in a politica', system 
which involved alien rule, the I.C.S. ( Indian Civil Service) 
had inherited, by and large, work methods and an attitude of omnipotence 
which were to interfere seriously with the vastly different and 
complex administrative tasks of a modern, planned India where 
administration and implementation extended into fields as diverse as 
public sector investments in industries and agricultural extension 
and developmental programmes. 1 The dominance of the generalist often 
resulted in lack of coordinated view and of a frame of considered 
policy. Another important difficulty was(and is) sheer incompetence 
resulting not only from the lack of exper.t knowledge of the general ist 
but also equally from the degradation and frustration of the experts 
and specilists in government service. With the increase and complexity 
of administrative work, the availablepersonnel are not adequate in 
quality and numbers. As its size increases, it becomes slower in its 
functioning. Delays occur and affect operations at every stage. and 
the expected outputs are further deferred. These delays cause 
corrupti on whi ch becomes more rout; ne than excepti on. For many jobs 
in the government offices it has become an accepted practice and also 
many employees calculate their salary including this source of income 
as a part of their s~lary·as if it is an allowance. 
1. Bhagwat!i, J.N., and Desai, p. Opt cit., p. 130 
~------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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In brief, the administrative machine has failed to adapt it 
self so far to the needs of the state which aimed at planning in 
depth. The effect of this on the efficiency of the public sector 
industrial undertakings, which have absorbed an enormous amount of 
investment, has been seriously adverse. 1 
The public sector under various plans 
was to play an important part in shaping future India. It was. desiqn­
ed to become the nucleus and starting point of economic development 
to serve the economic, social and cultural development of the whole 
nation. But the tendency has been to reduce it as an instrument of 
state capitalism. Two problems may be traced in the working of the 
public sector enterprises: a) The apparent, gross economic inefficien­
ci es of the pub 1i c sector, as refl ected in its producti vi ty. b) The 
growing infiltration of politics. 
As for the performance of the public sector, most of the 
enterprises are standing examples of incompetence, and inefficiency. 
This is in spite of substantial concessions such as supplJl 'of capital 
on easy terms, interest holidays and moratorium on loan repayments. 
As the bulk of the investible resources had been employed for the 
expansion of, the public sector, it would not b~ wron~ to conclude 
that the declining trend in the rate of growth of,the economY is, 
in no small measure, due to the poor performance of the public 
Ibid., p. 134. 
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enterpri ses. 1 
In the sphere,of private rates of return very few enter­
prises are functioning efficiently~ while most of them are reporting 
a huge loss thereby un~ble to create any surplus and further 
expansion and sampening the morale of further public sector expan­
sion. In cases where observed profit rates are high, the presence 
of effective monopoly power may lead to inefficiency in production. 
However, the former case req ui res furt11er analys is. In the actual 
working of the public enterprises it is an observed fact that they 
exist for the benefit of private enterprises either as suppliers 
of input or users of the output. Thus the continuance and growing 
increase of the publ i Gsector ;s favoured by the pri vate sector. 
Public sector pricing is more conducive for private gain rather than 
for other intended purposes. Under pricedsteel for instance, may lead 
to sub optimal use of it. Moreover, there is no regulation of the 
prices of end products of the user industries, implies that the 
profits foregone by the public sector enterprises wind up with the 
users, who eventually tend to be in the private sector which helps 
to redistribute revenue in favour of the private sector. 2 
1. COMMERCE, March 9, 1968, p. 645 
2. Report of the (Raj) Committee of Steel Control, Ministry of 
Steel and Heavy Industries, Government of India., New Delhi: 1963 
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'Ttim; to soci a1 rAtes of return and choi ce of projects, 
a 1 methods adopted to plan for the projects and several 
reports underline~ the extremely poor 
11 of the work both from a technical point of view 
t analysis. These reports show that. no syste­
yen to questions of project appraisal and that 
haphazardly incomplete reports were often 
erriHtrkinq upon quite expensive investments. 1 
th many hune i rri gat1 on and other projects too. 
mostly on political and other basis rather 
1 in implementation and increasing . 
preparation can be assigned as the major 
so much t1 tie to be approved and ; n each 
political involvement and as a result it 
any project is commissioned. These 
to suit political requirement and as such 
various input suppliers the time, size, 
nq undergoing a change. For instance, 
are constructed wi th every pub1i c sector prpoects 
on constructi on of houses and so on but 
of ordinary and economically weaker sections 
.ftt\t""mt~tu« t'HJi~f"rt,f"ltll~ 
J P. op. cit., p. 158L 
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In the sphere of Labour t personnel and Nanagement, the 
political involvement in public sector enterprises has helped in 
contributing to its over staffing of unskilled labour ana payment 
of higher average unskilled wages than in the private sector. 1 
Political involvement has also contributed to poor handling of 
1abour re1ati ons whi ch resul ted in heavy loss. The c; vi 1 servi ce 
background of the managers, also act with bureaucratic caution and 
unimaginativeness rather than in bold and inventive ways. Actual 
management has been hemmed in by traditional audit procedures 
which entered beyond mere certification of expenditures to an evalu­
ation by the Auditor GeneralIs office of whether these expenditures 
h'ere properly incurred wi thi n the framework of the authori zati ons. 
Since this scrut"iny is intensive and any departure from its 
exacting standards can lead to censure and disgrace, the scope 
for imaginative and quick action in the interest of better economic 
performance is inevitably jeopardized. 2 
Industrial Licensing: 
The Industrial policy resolution of 1951 was designed to 
implement : 
a) The development and regulation of industrial investments, and 
1. l!li.s!.., p. 163. 
2. Ibid L , p. 165. 
• 

211 
production according to plan priorities. 
b) The protection and encouragement of small scale industries; 
c) The preventi on of· concentrati on of ownershi p of i ndust ..-; es; and 
d) Balanced'economic development of the different regions in the country, 
so as to reduce disparities in levels of development. 
In order to pursue these objectives, the Act conferred powers upon 
the Government, that I no new industrial undertaking could be established 
nor any Isubstantial expansion' effected to existing plants, without 
the prior procurement of a licence from the central government. But 
such a policy of licensing yielded only negative results. Throughout 
the planning period, target setting had a weak economic basis, was 
overly detailed and comprehensive, and was taken too seriously in 
industrial licensing as far as restraining, the growth of capacity 
was involved. At the same time the licensing procedures were not 
desi gned to ensure or encourage ful fi lment of important targets, the 
fo11 ow-through was \'/eak, the cri teri a of eff; ci ent choi ce among 
applicants were not defined, and the licensing procedures were designed 
so as even to rule out the consideration of such choices, and 
objectives such as balanced regional growth and prevention of 
concentrati on in ownership were reiterated, but no procedures 
were devised to achieve them at minimum economic cost. Indeed, in 
some cases the procedures even encouraged the frustration of these 
very objectives. 1 
1. Ibid., p. 273.
-
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Reliance on physical controls, rather than the price 
Illechansim, without any success was a characteristic of Indian policy 
on price and distribution of several manaufactures and :;emi manu­
factures and was not confined to Industrial licensing. The Raj 
Committee reported grossest abuses of the control mechanism that 
could be feared. Priorities were not defined and allocations were 
chaotic and often prompted by graft. Price control merely irrplied 
that public sector steel was sold to private sector users at 
con troll ed pri ces, v/hereas these users were under no ob1 i gati on 
whatsoever to price their outputs on a cost-plus basis and hence 
priced what the market would eear.. Thus in effect price control 
enriched the private sector which could have been appropriated by 
the pub1 i c sector. Regardi ng the distribution of sotre of the i terns 
like cement, automobiles etc., lead to other problems. The distribu­
ti ve agencies were frequently known to demand graft which tended 
to offset the differential between the controlled and market prices. 
But the price obtained by the procedures was fixed at too low a 
level to permit the expansion of supplies in the long run. The bulk 
of the control over prices and distribution which were exercised by 
the government, were ill advised and formed a part of the general 
economi c phi 1osophy of di rect i nterven ti on wi thout careful 
examination of direct efficiency and of efficiency vis-a-vis alter­
native ways of achieving given objectives. 1 We saw earlier in the 
1. Ibid., p. 278.
-
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experience of the socialist countries, in some way controls 
can be a rational form of policy but in the case of India there 
is little evidence of any such rationality. 
On locational policy, the Industries Act {1951), the 
Industrial Policy Resolutions and Five Year Plan I,documents have 
been equally articulate in stressing the need for balanced develop­
ment. The federal nature of the country and the anxiety of the 
state political leaders to bring as many industries as possible 
within their state boundaries distorted often the working of 
the Licensing Committee. The failure of the Indian planners to 
work out the space-dimension of their industrial targets, on the 
basis of economic efficiency constrained by state targets of over 
all industrialinvestments designed to assure the states, that they 
would get some minimum industrialization, in effect left the 
field almost entirely to political pressures. Licensing committee 
aided in turn by no clues to optimal size, location, and phasing 
of expansion of plants by its I techno-economic' consuel, these, 
political pulls often ruled the day.l As a result as pointed out 
earlier 'planning has not even touched a fringe of the problem 
. ld* *t,2of reglona lsparl y. 
In the sphere of Agriculture especially in the sphere of 
reforms twenty five years of planning has done nothing more than 
1. 
p 
Ibid., p. 268. 
2. Radhakrishnan, 'Regional Balance in Economic Development', 
ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, Sept. 1962, pp. 432-8. 
p 
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abolishing the ~am;ndhars and Jagirdhars at a huge compensation. 
The reforms were designed in such a way that they sounded more 
socialistic than any country could attempt but in fact did not 
alter the structure in any appreciable manner. In fact more land 
was made available for distribution by individual efforts of 
~charya Vinobha Bhave through his vOluntary', Bhoodan' movement 
than by any legislation seeking Iland ceiling'. The community 
development schemes, Panchayat Raj and other measures taken to 
implement 'Democratic decentralization' have ended up with carrying 
the message of corruption at the grass root level. The co-operative 
movement in all spheres have resulted only in introducing white 
collared crime in the country. 
India has definitely economic potentialities to record 
reasonable level of economic development. Its failure is to be 
attributed to only the lack of 'Political will' as explained earlier. 
This was the root cause for the early economic development of the 
socialist countries .. There is no difference of opinion among economists 
that a backward country .1auric'hing a' ·progral11JTle.. 'of rapid economi c 
development has to approach the problem like a 'war economy' .. Thus 
centraliZation as it helped the early stages of economic develop­
ment of socialist countries of our study, can be adopted as a suitable 
strategy for rapid economic developme'nt. After achieving certain level 
of economi c maturity this strategy may become obsolete and may hinder 
further growth but in the case of Indi a thi s stage ri ght now is 
i r re1evan t . 
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lndi a I s fai 1 ure can be di rectly traced 1 nits po 1 i t i cal 
structure. Congress party though returned to power si nce independence 
has undergone several changes andgave birth to new groups and even 
to new parties. Following multi-party system there are several 
other parties ranging extre~ right to extreme left. In recent 
years regional parties have emerged and some of them were successful 
in capturing power in some of the states. In addition, the federal 
structure divided by language, culture and so on has created its own 
problems. Elections arevery expensive and parties can not contest any 
election unless they.have the material support given by the richer 
section of the society. Candidates are often rich people representing 
industrial capitalists or rich land lords or their representatives. 
Thus no legislation can be effectively passed antagonising this 
section. ~~oreover, government functions with the only objective 
of winning next election, Projects are also selected ;n such a way 
that they help promoting I mass appeal· .rather than fulfilling any 
economi c object; ve. 1 Federal ism has contri buted its own share tn the 
economic unmaking. Each state government with its own anxiety to 
return to power, try to get as many industries as possible with in 
the state boundary whether the location ;s suitable or not. Thus 
1. For example, Tamilnadu government's expenditure on erecting 
statues, construct; ng monuments and so on have no economi c si gni fi cance 
except used as an election stunt. Other states are no better! 
--
216 

steel Mills, fertilizer plants, oil refineries have become more 
a status symbol than anything else. This is the case whether th~ 
state ruling party is same as the centre ruling party or not. With 
the regional parties coming to power 'mass appeal' does not stop 
with 'status symbols' but extended to issues like language, secession 
unnecessary charater assasination etc., which is hardly conducive 
for economic development. All these have helped on1y to promote 
corruption, graftand indiscipline as result people have lost faith 
in working hard, sincerity,healthy attitude towards society especially 
when they could see others making easy money the 'demonstration 
effect' was disastrous. This is the result of'democracy' 1 as in 
India democracy could mean only elections and nothing more than that. 
In spite of all these odds India did achieve something: 
a) It has effected a break with stagnation; b) It has significantly 
raised the national income per head; c) It has strengthened the 
infrastructure of the econon~. But what Indian planners were supposed 
to achieve and did not achieve was a consequen~e of 'the objective 
situation'. It may well be that however completely the planners 
do,their work, various factors built into the Indian socio-political 
situation will persistently undo it. In a society as divi~ed and 
1. It is not the intention of the present writer to critiie democracy 
as it is commonly understood. 
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tradition, bound as India, effective planning may be imp6ssible.so 
long as the pl anners have to operate wi thin the framework of the 
present political system. The limitations imposed both by the social 
and political structure are indeed severe. The qUestion is whether 
they can be transcended. In the long run, no doubt transcendence~ 
will be achieved; but we are concerned with the short run. Experience 
of socialist countries of our study suggests that a significant 
acceleration in the rate of development requires a dramatic break 
with the old social and political order, and that India may well be 
one of these. The introduction of democracy gave the manifold interest 
groups, both old and new, a degree of political influence which 
would have been denied to them under a more authoritarian regime, and 
made political stability dependent upon the government's capacity 
to effect viable compromises between a multitude of conflicting 
demands. I'pl anning by consent I , whi ch can never be of the more dynami c 
kind, therefore became the only kind of planning that could be 
attempted. 1 
If India is to remain democratic and Indian planners 
are to achi eve the modest yet encouraging success whi ch are the most 
that can be expected of democratic planning under conditions of 
extreme economic backwardness, social fragmentation, and incipient 
1. Hanson, A. H., THE PROCESS OF PLANNING, London: Oxford University 
Press, 1966, p. 526. 
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disorder, they must have become more oriented towards their own 
society. Only thus can they become better aware of the real limitations 
under which they labour and the real opportunities with which they 
are presented. India is characterized by her 'reconcilliationl approach 
to political and economic problems. The outstanding feature of this 
system is the high value it places on compromises between groups which 
express prevailing political objectives and views. In such a system 
rapid economic growth is possible 'only if there are extensive self 
discipline, popular participation, and great civic devotion'. It is 
obvious that weakness of such pre conditions in India both limits the 
rate and effects the kind of economic growth that can be achieved. It is 
possible, therefore, that quantitatively and qualitatively satisfacto~1 
growth presupposes a change over to a 'mobilizationl system, attainable 
only through a political revolution. If this is so, the sooner it is 
recognized the better. 1f t on the other hand, the existing system is 
to be retained, the planners must learn to understand its distinctive 
characteri stics and work wi th them rather than against them .. Self 
discipline, popular participation and great civic devotion cannot be 
conjured into existence, and plans which presuppose their presence 
will come unstuck. It is useless, while retaining a 'reconciliation' 
system. It is equally useless to imagine that a reconciliation structure 
can be combined with 'mobilizationl system. 1 
1. ~, pp. 265-66. 
li'lY 
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Though the above view was expressed a decade ago, nothing 
was obviously done in this direction because of the attitude of 
compromise. The results were obvious. Violence, indiscipline, disorder 
and chaos had marked the situation in the country till july 1975. 
The government was held in check because of the mis-emphasis on 
fundemental rights, excessive protection for private property, which 
encouraged mi sused freedom. The government ri ghtly decl ared emergency 
last year and the achievements during the period elapsed since then 
clearly marks what way to go in the future to consolidate economic 
gains achieved so far and march on to further progress. Indian economy 
eluded all able economists all these years from offering a solution 
for all the riddles experienced so far. The period July 175 to present 
day shows how without major changes a strong 'political will' 
can convert a si ck into a galloping economy. 
alone 
As a result of the emergency, the country is now 
stable politically and completely viable economically. Inter­
reqional and inter cultural conflicts are firmly helf 
more 
in check. Inter-state disputes that had defied solution for decades 
lwere sorted out. Political discipline had grown. The violence 
that had marked academic life in universities js now a thin9 of the past. 
Also gone are the agitations and disruptive actions that had been 
1. HINDUSTAN TIMES, New delhi: July 1, 1976. p.l 
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been indulged in by bank and insurance employees, factory workers 
the educated unemployed, even the police, and the confrontations 
between political parties. 1 
According to an official review reported, with all 
round improvement in several directions the Indian economy is on 
the threshold of a major phase of an expansion. 2 The rate of Indus­
trial growth has improved, the price situation continues to be 
under check and the foreign exchange reserves have increased sub­
stantially. A sizable ihcrease of Rs. 7.14 billion in India's foreign 
exchange reserves during the last quarter of 1975-76, resulting 
mainly from the larger inward remittances through officjal channels 
and enhanced proceeds from external assistance in the course. of the 
year, have put the country in a comfortable foreign exchange position 
despite a large trade gap. The external reserves at the end of 
1975-76 stood at record level of Rs. 18.69 billion as compared, to 
9.69 billion a year ago. 
Regarding purchasing power of the people, it has gone 
up by 19% in the case of government employees and by about 15% 
in the case of .industrial workers. Political climate has contributed 
this directly because it resulted in more production and productivity 
1. Ibid., p.1. 
2. !.I2..i9.:, p • 7. 
.... 
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ina11 the spheres of economy. ~1onetary demand was restri cted 
and a massi ve effort i au~ched to mobil ize resources accompani ed 
by cuts in non-developmental expenditure. 
The output of food grains during 1975-76 is conservatively 
estimated at 116 mi11ion tonnes as against the target of ~114 million 
tonnes and the earl~r peak of 108.4 million tonnes in 1970-71. On 
the industrial front, the situation is equally encouraging. A substantial 
acceleration in the grmJth rate of industrial production has taken 
place since the second quarter of 1975-76. Judging by recent trends 
the rate of growth in the first quarter of this year is likely 
to have reached 8%. Industries such as coal, electricity, steel, 
nitrogenous fertilizers, cement, non ferrous metals, vanaspati, jute 
manufactures and several other critical industrial goods have shown 
a remarkable increase. The public sector has recorded an increase 
in production of 15.7% in 1975-76. Public sector consisting of 120 
companies made a combined profit of 312.4 crores in 1974-75 and 
expected well over 350 crores in 1975-76, as against 148 and 81 
crores respectively.1 During 1975-76 the capacity utilization also 
increased well over 75% for the majority of the companies. 
Over the year ended March 1976, the general index of 
wholesale prices recorded a decline of 7.8% in contrast to a rise of 
8% in the previous year. For 1975-76 as a whole the average index 
1. THE STATESr·1AN WEEKLY, New Del hi: Apri 1 10, 1976, p. 1. 
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stood at 302.7 as against 313 for 1974-75 which is a fall of about 
3.3%. Its impact is again shown on consumer price index which at 
286 for r'arch 1976, was 10.9% lower than the 1eve1 a year ago. 
During 1975-7Q sank credit registered a larger increase of Rs. 20 .. 49 
billion compared with that of Rs" 12.8 billion in 1974-75 ma"inly 
to meet the rural demand. The provisional estimates of collection 
of major central taxes during 1975-76 indicate an increase of 18.2% 
over the actual collections for the preceding year. Tax evasion is 
largely put down within a short period of one year, with strong 
actions taken by the government. Voluntary disclosure of income 
and wealth is likely to yield a larger revenue. As a result, in 
spite of slashing down of various direct taxes more revenue is 
expected in the ensuing years. 
In spite of an increase in production ;n a large 
number of industries, stagnation and slow growth in some industries 
are noticed. This ;s largely due to the emergence of buyers market 
in many commodities has shaken the confidency of an over protected 
entrpreneurial class. Private investment is likely to respond to the 
incentives provided in the budget and to other policy changes. 1 
Nevertheless, to compensate the same public sector investment is 
being increased by 31%.Under conditions of price stability, this 
is a very sizable increase and should have a SUbstantial impact on 
1. Quarterly Economic Review: India and Nepal, London: The Economist 
Intelligence Unit, No.2, 1976. p.. 15. 
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demand particularly for construction materials, machinery, equ"ipment 
and subsequently consumer goods. Recently changes in the sphere of 
industrial licensing have been made to stimulate investment ;n the 
priority sectors, and to ensure fuller utlization of installed 
capacity. 
Taking into account the various factors, the prospects for 
industrial production in 1976-77 to 1978-79 are considerably better 
than ;n the immediate past. Industrial level studies suggest that 
given the emphasis on coal and petroleum, the mining sector could 
expand at an annual rate of over 11% and the manufacturing sector 
at approximately 7%. The favourable factors are the improving trend 
of investl11ent generally, the various incentives and relaxations that 
have been provided, the expanded programme of investment in the 
annual plan for 1976-77, a gradual commissioning of the plants under 
constructi on, improvement in export demand and the far better per-' 
formance of the agricultural sector. 
As for the longer term, much will depend upon the economy 
capacity to maintain the growth in the rate of investment in the 
public sector ~nd improve it in key industries, such as steel, 
non ferrous metals, fertilizers, petroleum and petro chemicals. 
These ongoing programmes are bound to lead to substanti ally greater 
production. But, for this growth to be kept up on a susstained 
basis,a large number of new investment decisions will have to be 
1taken before the beginning of the sixth pl an period. 
l.HINDUSTAN TIMES, July 1, 1976, p. 7. 
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No doubt the impressive results have made the world Bank's 
vice president Ernest Stern to say that,IIIndia had an exceptionally 
good year. Very considerably credit goes to the Government of India 
for thi s improvement ll ~Jorl d Bank I s assessment speaks very favourably• 
about India's achievements. For the first time perhaps a report of 
the World Bank speaks with considerable optimism about Indian 
economy .1 
Thus we can see India has potentialities but lacks political 
wi 11. But how long such a I political \'/i11' can be enforced? To 
depend too much on enforced discipline cannot offer any permenant 
solution to the problems of Indian economY. Astrong political 
system as in these socialist countries i:s not without any economic 
advantage. But these countries also show that such a system inhibits 
economi c growth attempted through economi c reforms in so far as 
2they are allowed only to that extent which is politically al1owable. 
Thus the political system itself becomes a constraint to economic 
development. To suggest what ,political system India should pursue 
or willemerge.-eventually is beyond the scope of this work. But 
last year's experience shows that sorre discipline is necessary for 
economic develop~nt. By which method such a discipline can be 
1. HINDUSTAN TIMES,t~ay 27, 1976. p. l. 
2. F,lakierski, H., liThe Polish Economic Reform of 197011 , THE CANADIAN 
JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Vol. VI, Feb.1973, P 14. 
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achieved ;s upto the people to decide. However much the foreign press 
may decry the present constitutional amendments it is far 
from denying the people of their rights. Nevertheless we should 
remember that if the mobilization system fights society, the 
reconciliation system is a prisoner of society. India now attempts 
some political centralization which is just necessary to remove :. 
any impediments that maY inhibit economic progress. 
In terms of economi c strategy for rapid development, as 
mentioned earlier, these socialist countries show that economic 
backwardness is not inevitable. This itself will give the necessary 
motivation for economic development. Planning as a strategy for 
economic development has a greater role'to play with reference to 
India. In this sphere these cou~tries show how techniques of planning 
can be improved adopting latest techniques. India is thus ;n an 
advantageous position to adopt technically superior planning avioding 
the pitfalls of these countries in their early stages. However, 
the immediate necessity is to train planners and allied tools and 
necessary statistical infonnati on to meet this upheaval task. 
Adoption of 'unbalanced growth I strategy itself is a borrowed 
technique from these countries. This further necessiates growing 
public sector in the basic and capital goods industries. But before 
any atte~pt "in this direction is' made care must be taken to 
demonstrate the economic soundness of the public sector by their 
performance. If once' this ;s achieved the surplus can be utl;zed 
for further expansion. Thus 'profitabiltiy' plays a different neverthe­
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less an important role. 
In the case of socialist countries decentralization was 
adopted 1 arge ly as a meas ure of compromi sing the present and future 
and was due to failure to achieve the 'g10rious aim'. This role 
is largely played by the private sector in India, whose production 
and profit and further expansion will help increased consumption 
and provi de necessary incenti ve to work and save to acqu; re materi al 
requisites. Certain important changes are to be made to achieve 
fuller realization of the benefits of the same. Licensing policy 
is to be reviewed as it helped only to achieve concentration of 
economic power. Decentralization will help larger participation 
of investible funds and competition which in tum will increase 
total production. Necessary supervision however may be introduced 
for uti 1 i zati on of capaci ty. Moreover, corporate taxes shoul d be 
devised to prevent these enterprises emerging into giant monopolies. 
Taxati on can be success fully' adopted to transfer resources from 
private to publ ic sector. 
One may wonder why a large scale nationalization should 
not be purs ued. The answer is obvi ous. Performance of the public 
sector enterprises so far did not justify the same. Secondly, India 
has not developed so far a sophisticated planning technique,. to 
handle all these enterprises under a single programme. This involves 
working ~ut of input output tables, plans, prices detailed study 
of supplJ' and demand situations and so on. Finally, the experiences 
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of the countries of our study show that mere nationalization alone 
cannot ensure economic growth. They bring along with them innumerable 
problems which are to be effectively tackled by some other technique 
and ultimately compromise with some kind of decentralization. This 
zi 9 zag patter:n can be avi oded by retain; ng pri vate sector and 
preserving the autonomy of the public sector enterprises. 
Indian economy is largely an agrarian economy. Agricultural 
development therefore plays a very vital role. The experience of 
these countries point out several valuble lessons. It was tried 
during war communsim to squeeze out agricul ture whi ch ended up in 
a great disaster which was soon rectified. Nevertheless agricultural 
sector was made to share the major burden of the process of economic 
developnent in these socialist countries in general and in soviet 
Russia in particular. Recent reforms are ailred at changing this 
situation. The share of the agricultural sector has been increased 
and the prices of agricultural goods reflecting more close to actual 
supply and demand position. One reason for these socialist countries 
not producing sufficient food may be largely attributed to artificially 
fixed low prices and low share of income for those who are engaged 
in agri cul ture. In Ind; a there seems to be no rationality in 
fixing such low prices. As a result neither they could sequeeze 
agriculture in developing industries nor produce sufficient food 
for consumpti on resulting infl ati on deterirrental to both urban and 
rural workers. Under the present system of state procurement at 1()'tN 
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pri ces to meet thei r requi rements for statutory ration"jng has resu1 ted 
in sub-optimal production. Rationing along with its administration 
increases the cost and as a result the final consumers end up by 
paying a higher price! Added to this dividing the country into 
food zones and restriction of movement of grain between even taluks 
( about 50 sq.miles) is completely devoid of any economic rationality. 
In addition paper tiger legislations on land reforms have virtually 
nullified any further investment and improvement on land nor it 
ensured equitable distribution. All these have resulted in sub-optimal 
production which a country like India cannot afford. The lessons that 
we learn in this regard is sub-optimal production caused by irrational 
prices and artificially depressed income share for agriculture in 
the long run will only inhibit further progress. This is especially 
so in an agriculturally predominant country like India. Though 
rationing and procurement may be continued for a while, artificial 
barriers should be eradicated. 
Another important question with regard to agriculture is 
the problem of collectivization. In all the countries of our study 
except Poland and Yugoslavia collectivi~ation had been carried 
through. Rate of Growth of agriculture in all these countries except 
Romania has not been ggod. While Poland and Yugoslavia achieved an 
annual growth rate of 5.5. and 4.2 respectively, evidence is not 
sufficient to show that collectivization will increase the rate of 
growth in this sphere. In India large farming (with or without' 
collectivization) and increased mechanisation without a1te.rnative 
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rural or urh~n employmen~ will aggravate the unemployment problem. 

This will further lower rurai wages and ~~ai i'ncome. Government 

action in this sphere instead of collectivization, can be geared 

to abol i sh absentee 1 and 1 ordi sm and. 

to ensure ownership for the tiller. If this is done the results 

would be far rore effective than collectivization. 

With regard to prices we saw how in the socialist countries 
administratively determined prices have created many problems. Recent 
reforms have allowed flexible prices for many commodities. With the 
introduction of profitability criteria, flexible prices reflecting 
demand and supply is considered to be a prerequisite. These socialist 
countries will no doubt if not irrrnediately will eventually switch 
over to flexible prices. In India in general for almost all commodities 
flexible prices are allowed. We have shown how price control in a 
few conrnodities have promoted only. inefficiency. Price control 
need not be resorted to controllthe assortment of goods to be produced. 
With effective licensing policy and effective control over utilization 
of existing capacity the government will be able to control directions 
of production and encourage commodities of essential ~onsumption 
and direct resources fr~m luxury to essential goods. 
One mqy legitimately question what good is planning without 
reduction in inequalities of income and wealth. Western countries 
di d not emphas i ze thi s aspect 5i nce 1abour scare; ty and hi gh wages 
without governmental intervention did result in fairly good amount 
of distribution of wealth and income comparatively. This is not 
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likely to happen in India without positive intervention on the 
part of the government. A radical redistribution of wealth is not 
likely to solve the problem considering the magnitude of Indian 
popul ati on and present weal th into consi derati on. Moreover!j: 
with inequalities in skills; educational opportunities and so on 
it is not possible to maintain equality even if such distribution 
is achieved. From the practical point of view gradual transformation 
seems to be more workable. This is to be attempted by developing 
vocational training for the rural and urban people and other welfare 
measures increasing investment on human capital to assure equal 
opportunities especially to economically weaker section. Effective 
fiscal policy will help to reduce disparities of income and wealth. 
These however do not aim anything more than the 'Fabiani solution. 
But will gradual socialism help? Following Pigou we may say 
I gradualness I is not a polite na,ne for standing still. Nevertheless, 
as mentioned earlier,sincere implementation of land reforms aiming 
at abolition of absentee land lordism and transfer of land to the 
tiller will pave the path towards reducing disparities and providing 
the necessary incentives for increased production and investment 
in agriculture. With reference to' the industries, a policy of 
progressive worker's participation in management and ownership 
may be encouraged by the government acti on. Already compulsory 
Bonus s.dierre is in vogue and this can be modified to transfer <J11l1ership 
progressively. A s,uitable policy may be evolved regarding percentage 
of labour ownership, phase of such ownership etc., consulting manage­
ment, labour representatives etc. A suitable tax policy may be 
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evolved discouraging unearned income (including income through 
shares) and encouraging worke-rs to transfer part of thei r extra 
income to purchase of shares of the companies in which they are 
working. T~is will enable the government to promote and enjoy gains 
of socialism while avioding the pitfalls of extensive nationalization 
such as huge investment, ;neffi ciency, waste and so on. as revealed 
in the experiences of the countries of our study. 
As mentioned earlier, socialist experiences show that it 
is possible to have a society in which the means of production 
are owned by the state and there is no incone from,.- :private .property. It 
has also shown that it is not a sufficient condition .. ~either for 
eg1 atari an di stri buti on of income or to . ensure unhi ndered 
economic development. They have also shown how plan and market 
can and should be judi ciously combined for sati sfying the present 
and future, individual and social needs of the country. IThe market 
system has many virtues which are insufficiently recognized in 
developing countries. Where ever possible, planning should work in 
cl.o!e co-operati on with the market forces rather than against them. 
The great advantage of the market system; s that its effi ciency 
requfres no great discipline or sacrifice or honesty from individuals. 
Individuals acting in harmony with their self interest keep the 
wheels ·of the market economy in motion. Aplanned society, on the 
other hand requires a large cadre of disciplined, honest. selfless, 
dedicated government officials, and businessmen who will subordinate 
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their selfish interests to the larger interests of societies. When 
this is in short supply - and it is in most developing soci es­
pl arming often brings resul ts that are inferior to what waul d have 
resulted from the operati on of a free market. . •.. The economi c 
organization of the developing countries of today involves a marriage 
between the systems of private enterprise and planning. The progeny 
resulting from such a marriage may inherit the virtues of both its 
parents or their vices. I 1 Fortunately in India n(1N the political 
discipline seems to be improving. Will they exercise it imaginatively 
and wisely to determine the 'mix' in such a way to bring about virtues 
and aviod vices of such a union? Time alone can provide the answer .. 
1. Charles I) K. J., 'The Future of Capitalism!, SOUTHERN ECONOMIST I) 
January 1, 1969, p. 31. 
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